Quantifying temporal ventriloquism in audiovisual synchrony perception

The integration of visual and auditory inputs in the human brain works properly only if the components are perceived in close temporal proximity. In the present study, we quantified cross-modal interactions in the human brain for audiovisual stimuli with temporal asynchronies, using a paradigm from rhythm perception. In this method, participants had to align the temporal position of a target in a rhythmic sequence of four markers. In the first experiment, target and markers consisted of a visual flash or an auditory noise burst, and all four combinations of target and marker modalities were tested. In the same-modality conditions, no temporal biases and a high precision of the adjusted temporal position of the target were observed. In the different-modality conditions, we found a systematic temporal bias of 25–30 ms. In the second part of the first and in a second experiment, we tested conditions in which audiovisual markers with different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) between the two components and a visual target were used to quantify temporal ventriloquism. The adjusted target positions varied by up to about 50 ms and depended in a systematic way on the SOA and its proximity to the point of subjective synchrony. These data allowed testing different quantitative models. The most satisfying model, based on work by Maij, Brenner, and Smeets (Journal of Neurophysiology 102, 490–495, 2009), linked temporal ventriloquism and the percept of synchrony and was capable of adequately describing the results from the present study, as well as those of some earlier experiments.     

Internalization of the therapeutic process: differences between borderline and neurotic patients

Intersession process in psychotherapy refers to the thoughts, memories, and feelings about each other and about their therapy sessions that participants experience during the intervals between sessions. This study compared the intersession process experienced by patients who had been diagnosed with severe borderline personality disorders (BPD) with others who had not. A total of 76 patients with neurotic disturbances and 20 patients with BPD were treated in a therapeutic day clinic and completed the Intersession Experience Questionnaire (IEQ) before sessions of individual psychotherapy and the Session Questionnaire (Stundenbogen) after those sessions. Comparison of the two groups on these measures of intersession process and postsession outcome showed markedly different patterns in patients' evaluations and internalizations of in-session therapeutic experiences: most prominently, that BPD patients internalize therapy sessions with much more negative and contradictory emotions.     

Kapital und Soziale Organisation

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Against over-estimating the role of ethics in technology development

The role of ethics in technology development has been often questioned, especially in the early days of societal reflection of technology. However, the situation has changed dramatically. Ethical consideration now is generally declared to be indispensable in shaping technology in a socially acceptable and sustainable way. The expectations of ethics are large; often even a kind of “New Ethics” is postulated. In the present paper an over-estimation of the role of ethics for technology development is rejected. It is argued that ethical reflection is, indeed, indispensable in certain problem areas and situation types; but there is, on the other hand, space for technology development free from the requirement for ethical reflection. The absence of a requirement for ethical reflection, however, always has to be considered relative to some “morale provisoire” (provisional morality) as an accepted normative framework within which technology development may occur without explicit ethical reflection. If this framework, however, is doubted or is shown to be insufficient the situation changes completely. Ethical reflection in this case becomes necessary, to consider this normative framework in order to offer modifications or supplements.     

Die konstitutive Rolle von Technik in Der Konstruktivistischen Wissenschaftstheorie. Konsequenzen für die Technikphilosophie

Suumary   The constitutive role of technology in the constructive theory of science. Consequences for the philosophy of technology. Technology plays an important role in the constructivistic reconstructions of the natural sciences. However, there is no in-depth view or thorough explication of the term “technology” and its connotations and relations in those exercises. Technology, there, is seen as a more or less evident part of the lifeworld’s A priori of the natural sciences. This paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of the function of technology in the argumentations chains and proto-theories which shall, in the constructivistic (methodical) theory of sciences, provide the methodical fundament of the sciences. In a second step, the aspects of technology are identified which are indispensable to fulfil the functions of technology in the argumentation chains mentioned above. Finally, these aspects are related to current debates in the philosophy of technology.     

Das prädiskursive Einverständnis. Wissenschaftlicher Wahrheitsbegriff und prozedurale Rechtfertigung

The pre-discoursive agreement. Theory of scientific truth and procedural justification. — On basis of the constructive philosophy of science, the attention is focussed to the pre-discoursive elements of discoursive theories of truth. By using a pragmatic approach it is shown that foundation of those pre-discoursive elements, like discourse rules or the basic terminology, is possible though the discourse rules are not available at this level. Propositions which can be shown in the presented theory to be true, always describe a know-how instead of a knowledge about the world. As a result, the relevance of the presented analysis for prototheories of scientific disciplines is investigated. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

When cognitive scientists become religious, science is in trouble: On neurotheology from a philosophy of science perspective

Since the 1990s medical technology has afforded exciting possibilities for studying the brain. Together with knowledge accrued through psychology and psychiatry, it has set the stage for pioneering research and stimulated disciplines such as Social Neuroscience, the Cognitive Science of Religion, Cognitive Anthropology, and Cognitive Archaeology. Another discipline has arisen, Neurotheology, which is interested in the brain and religious experience. Early proponents such as d'Aquili and Newberg had a religious agenda in their work. Others, such as members of Transcendental Meditation, have used experimental and brain studies to legitimate religious agendas. Experiential shamanists have embarked on a similar legitimation process. The differences between science and therapy and spirituality have been blurred or denied. Neurotheological attempts to discover areas of the brain responsible for religious experiences have led to untenable results. The fact that such research has passed the peer review process of leading psychological, psychiatric, and neurological journals is perhaps more indicative of the pervasiveness of religiosity throughout American society than of objective brain science. This essay argues that neurotheology is an example of the struggle between confessional and critical approaches to the study of religion. The main difference is that the battlefield of this struggle is the brain.