A perspective on the study of social attitudes

Argues that the comparative neglect of the cognitive component and social origins of social attitudes has produced serious inadequacies in social psychology and limited its social relevance. Discusses critically the question of how far social change can be brought about by changing attitudes. The argument is exemplified with reference to the literature on authoritarianism and recent British research on racial prejudice and mass communication. Concludes that the psychology of social attitudes needs to take greater account of the way the production and communication of culture are related to social structure and change.     

Replication and extension analyzing the factor structure of Locus of Control scales for substance-abusing behaviors

Two research questions were addressed in this study. First, what are the dimensions of the concept of control orientation with respect to substance-abusing behaviors as measured by Keyson and Janda's 1972 Drinking-related Locus of Control Scale and by an adaptation of that scale developed for users of other drugs. Second, utilizing a large sample of both male and female clients who abused both alcohol and other drugs, how does that dimensional structure differ from the one presented by Donovan and O'Leary in 1978 for male alcoholics at a VA hospital. Since the present sample was a large (N = 542) representative sample of publicly subsidized clients in Missouri, it provided an opportunity to extend earlier work across type of drug abused and sex. Like Donovan and O'Leary we used a principal components analysis with a varimax rotation to examine the dimensions of the 25-item locus of control scales. Like those authors, the analysis for male alcohol users produced a three-factor solution with interpretations resembling their "intrapersonal" and "interpersonal" factors but with a more fully developed third factor interpretable as a fate or luck dimension. These dimensions were apparent for the other groups as well, although the first two factors were reversed for male users of other drugs and the analysis for female alcohol abusers showed a more consistent sociability dimension than for males. While the derived structures are therefore similar to Donovan and O'Leary's results and consistent with the theoretical uses of control orientation in discussion of alcohol and other drug abuse, they also show some differences for type of drug abused and by sex. These are necessary but not sufficient conditions for including such measures in more specific models relating clients' motivation and propensity for change to outcomes.     

Denial of visual perception.

An adult with the diagnosis of cortical blindness, complaining of a complete visual loss of 2 years in duration, was found to have a small preserved visual field and remarkably preserved visual abilities. Although denying visual perception, he correctly named objects, colors, and famous faces, recognized facial emotions, and read various types of single words with greater than 50% accuracy when presented in the upper right visual field. Upon confrontation regarding his apparent visual abilities, the patient continued to deny visual perceptual awareness, typically stating "I feel it." CT indicated bioccipital lesions sparing the left inferior occipital area but involving the left parietal lobe. The denial of visual perception evidenced by this patient may be explained by a disconnection of parietal lobe attentional systems from visual perception. The clinical presentation is described as representing "inverse Anton's syndrome."     

A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre's Theory of Emotions

This paper discusses recent interpretations of Jean‐Paul Sartre's early theory of emotions, in particular his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Despite the great interest that Sartre's approach has generated, most interpretations assume that his approach fails because it appears to be focussed on ‘malformed’, ‘irrational’ or ‘distorted’ emotions. I argue that these criticisms adopt a rationalistic or epistemically biassed perspective on emotions that is wrongly applied to Sartre's text. In my defence of Sartre I show that the directional fit of emotions is not towards an evaluatively loaded world which is independently given and, at best, represented by emotions, but towards a world shaped through the impact of emotions themselves. Sartre's idea of emotions ‘magically transforming’ reality for the subject so that the latter is better able to cope with problematic aspects of practically relevant situations encapsulates the world‐shaping capacities of emotions, which are thus not reserved for a restricted class of emotions. Recognition of the transformative powers of emotions will also direct attention away from their seemingly representative elements to their normative and practical aspects and offer a new basis for delineating the criteria for judging them. The plausibility of this position is discussed with reference to some of Sartre's examples, such as fear, sadness and horror, but also with reference to Joan Didion's account of grief in The Year of Magical Thinking.     

Hat die Seele in der Gegenwart noch einen Platz?

„Die Zeit“ zitierte 2008 einen Ausspruch des Neurowissenschaftlers Gerhard Roth: „... die meisten meiner neurowissenschaftlichen Kollegen (w?ren) schockiert, wenn ich sie fragte, ob man in der Hirnforschung noch etwas mit dem Begriff der Seele anfangen k?nne oder wo im Gehirn die Seele sitze.“ Gerhard Roth fragt dennoch in seiner Abhandlung: „Hat die Seele in der Hirnforschung noch einen Platz?“ und antwortet: „Das Seelische ist ein physikalischer Zustand eigener Art, d. h. ein Zustand, der den Naturgesetzen nicht widerspricht und aufs Engste mit bekannten physikalischen (chemischen, physiologischen) Zust?nden interagiert, ohne dass seine spezifischen Gesetze bereits hinreichend bekannt sein müssen.“ Diese Aussage ist besonders deshalb so bemerkenswert, da Gerhard Roth auch zu den Proponenten des „Manifestes der Neurowissenschaftler“ z?hlte, dessen Aussagen in einem Neurodeterminismus gipfelten. Zu diesem Thema wurde auch am 26. J?nner 2008 am Symposium „Psychiatrie und Philosophie: Homo Neurobiologicus? – Menschenbilder der modernen Psychiatrie“ in München diskutiert.     

When cognitive scientists become religious, science is in trouble: On neurotheology from a philosophy of science perspective

Since the 1990s medical technology has afforded exciting possibilities for studying the brain. Together with knowledge accrued through psychology and psychiatry, it has set the stage for pioneering research and stimulated disciplines such as Social Neuroscience, the Cognitive Science of Religion, Cognitive Anthropology, and Cognitive Archaeology. Another discipline has arisen, Neurotheology, which is interested in the brain and religious experience. Early proponents such as d'Aquili and Newberg had a religious agenda in their work. Others, such as members of Transcendental Meditation, have used experimental and brain studies to legitimate religious agendas. Experiential shamanists have embarked on a similar legitimation process. The differences between science and therapy and spirituality have been blurred or denied. Neurotheological attempts to discover areas of the brain responsible for religious experiences have led to untenable results. The fact that such research has passed the peer review process of leading psychological, psychiatric, and neurological journals is perhaps more indicative of the pervasiveness of religiosity throughout American society than of objective brain science. This essay argues that neurotheology is an example of the struggle between confessional and critical approaches to the study of religion. The main difference is that the battlefield of this struggle is the brain.     

Ambulante Psychotherapie bei Kindern und Jugendlichen

This paper presents the results of a study of the state of outpatient psychotherapy of children and juveniles in Germany after the PTG came into force. A total of 180 psychotherapists were questioned on certain issues. One result was that patients have to wait 4.5 months for psychotherapy and that every second patient asking for a diagnostic interview and possible treatment was refused.Of those who were given a diagnostic interview 43% were not taken into treatment, although disturbances were diagnosed such as addiction, bodily disabilities with psychic complications, enuresis/encopresis, anorexia nervosa, psychosomatic illnesses, developmental arrests which would normally demand psychotherapeutic treatment. Furthermore only 25% of those children and juveniles who Löcherbach et al. (2000, S.59 f.) considered needing and wanting psychotherapeutic treatment were actually in a G IV psychotherapy.Apart from this the possibility of getting psychotherapy as well as the kind of psychotherapy proved to be dependent on the kind of medical insurance. Differing payments by the insurance companies caused longer waiting times for patients and determined the choice of psychotherapy by the psychotherapists.