Die konstitutive Rolle von Technik in Der Konstruktivistischen Wissenschaftstheorie. Konsequenzen für die Technikphilosophie

Suumary   The constitutive role of technology in the constructive theory of science. Consequences for the philosophy of technology. Technology plays an important role in the constructivistic reconstructions of the natural sciences. However, there is no in-depth view or thorough explication of the term “technology” and its connotations and relations in those exercises. Technology, there, is seen as a more or less evident part of the lifeworld’s A priori of the natural sciences. This paper is dedicated to the reconstruction of the function of technology in the argumentations chains and proto-theories which shall, in the constructivistic (methodical) theory of sciences, provide the methodical fundament of the sciences. In a second step, the aspects of technology are identified which are indispensable to fulfil the functions of technology in the argumentation chains mentioned above. Finally, these aspects are related to current debates in the philosophy of technology.     

Self across time: the diachronic unity of bodily existence

The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for someone’s persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person’s entire past in his present being and potentiality.     

Schreibmotorische Effekte der Angst,dargestellt am Beispiel einer Claustrophobie

Ohne ZusammenfassungHerrn Professor Dr. Friedrich Panse zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet.     

Das prädiskursive Einverständnis. Wissenschaftlicher Wahrheitsbegriff und prozedurale Rechtfertigung

The pre-discoursive agreement. Theory of scientific truth and procedural justification. — On basis of the constructive philosophy of science, the attention is focussed to the pre-discoursive elements of discoursive theories of truth. By using a pragmatic approach it is shown that foundation of those pre-discoursive elements, like discourse rules or the basic terminology, is possible though the discourse rules are not available at this level. Propositions which can be shown in the presented theory to be true, always describe a know-how instead of a knowledge about the world. As a result, the relevance of the presented analysis for prototheories of scientific disciplines is investigated. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Causal Models of Physical Exercise Participation: Testing the Predictive Power of the Construct "Pressure to Change"

This study examines 2 different causal models to predict physical exercise motivation and behavior under a longitudinal perspective. The first model includes 5 latent variables that were hypothesized to have an impact on exercise intention and behavior: behavior-specific social support, exercise self-efficacy, perceived health benefits, perceived barriers, and subjective vulnerability to cardiovascular disease. The second model was based on all variables of the first model, but additionally included the new variable "pressure to change." Pressure to change was defined as the extent to which a person feels the necessity that specific personal life circumstances (e.g., health status, social relations) may not remain as they are and ought to be changed. It was hypothesized that the inclusion of health-related pressure to change would result in a better prediction of exercise intention. The proposed causal models were tested separately at the stages of exercise adoption and maintenance. Covariance structure analyses (LISREL) confirmed that pressure to change may be an important factor in the motivational process that leads to the adoption of regular physical exercise. Adding this latent variable to the basic model improved the amount of explained variance in exercise intention by 6%. Furthermore, the results did not support the assumption that cognitive control is critical especially during the acquisition of exercise behaviors, but may be less influential once the behavioral routines have been established. Our data rather indicate that regular physical exercise, even if performed on a regular basis for years, always remains a behavior that requires a high level of cognitive guidance.     

Correlational cuing as a function of target complexity and target-flanker similarity

It is generally assumed that the correlational cuing effect (CE) between targets and correlated flankers is due to learning association between the flankers and their correlated responses. The present study challenges this view. Experiment 1 shows that the CE for targets composed of color is eliminated as soon as the correlation is removed. Experiment 2 shows that the CE during training is not due to association of the flankers with responses. Experiment 3 shows that at least some of the CE during training with the correlation is due to repetition priming of the display. Experiment 4 replicates the results of Experiment 1 for orientation targets. In Experiments 5-7, more typical tasks with letter targets are examined, and it is demonstrated that preexperimental similarity between targets and correlated flankers is crucial. The CE for correlated but dissimilar target-flanker pairs, similar to that for color and orientation targets, is confined to on-line processes that occur during training. The CE is transferred, however, for correlated and similar target-flanker pairs. We propose that, at least for the simple stimulus to response mapping used in our study, the CE is not due to learning at all. Instead it is due to (1) on-line processes, such as repetition priming, that occur during training with the correlation and (2) a regular flanker effect (see, e.g., B. A. Eriksen & C. W. Eriksen, 1974) that occurs for similar target-flanker pairs.     

When cognitive scientists become religious, science is in trouble: On neurotheology from a philosophy of science perspective

Since the 1990s medical technology has afforded exciting possibilities for studying the brain. Together with knowledge accrued through psychology and psychiatry, it has set the stage for pioneering research and stimulated disciplines such as Social Neuroscience, the Cognitive Science of Religion, Cognitive Anthropology, and Cognitive Archaeology. Another discipline has arisen, Neurotheology, which is interested in the brain and religious experience. Early proponents such as d'Aquili and Newberg had a religious agenda in their work. Others, such as members of Transcendental Meditation, have used experimental and brain studies to legitimate religious agendas. Experiential shamanists have embarked on a similar legitimation process. The differences between science and therapy and spirituality have been blurred or denied. Neurotheological attempts to discover areas of the brain responsible for religious experiences have led to untenable results. The fact that such research has passed the peer review process of leading psychological, psychiatric, and neurological journals is perhaps more indicative of the pervasiveness of religiosity throughout American society than of objective brain science. This essay argues that neurotheology is an example of the struggle between confessional and critical approaches to the study of religion. The main difference is that the battlefield of this struggle is the brain.