PALEY'S iPOD: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF THE DESIGN ARGUMENT WITHIN NATURAL THEOLOGY

The argument from design stands as one of the most intuitively compelling arguments for the existence of a divine Creator. Yet, for many scientists and philosophers, Hume's critique and Darwin's theory of natural selection have definitely undermined the idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts to design in nature. Here, we examine empirical studies from developmental and experimental psychology to investigate the cognitive basis of the design argument. From this it becomes clear that humans spontaneously discern purpose in nature. When constructed theologically and philosophically correctly, the design argument is not presented as conclusive evidence for God's existence but rather as an abductive, probabilistic argument. We examine the cognitive basis of probabilistic judgments in relationship to natural theology. Placing emphasis on how people assess improbable events, we clarify the intuitive appeal of Paley's watch analogy. We conclude that the reason why some scientists find the design argument compelling and others do not lies not in any intrinsic differences in assessing design in nature but rather in the prior probability they place on complexity being produced by chance events or by a Creator. This difference provides atheists and theists with a rational basis for disagreement.     

The Moderating Influence of Disorder on Coached Overreporting Using the MMPI-2-RF

Overreporting has always been a concern within psychological evaluations. The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2-Restructured Form (Ben-Porath &; Tellegen, 2008/2011 Ben-Porath, Y. S., &; Tellegen, A. (2008/2011). MMPI-2-RF (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory—2 Restructured Form): Manual for administration, scoring, and interpretation. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. [Google Scholar]) contains validity scales designed for detecting noncredible responses. In this study, 270 undergraduates were instructed to feign either schizophrenia, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or generalized anxiety disorder (GAD); some participants were coached on symptoms and validity scales. Results at both the individual protocol and mean validity scale score levels suggest that each feigned disorder moderates the effectiveness of coaching on validity scale detection. One finding of this study suggests that schizophrenia is generally more difficult to successfully feign than PTSD or GAD. Another finding suggests that the majority of individuals able to avoid detection as symptom overreporters are able to successfully endorse at least some disorder-relevant symptoms. We suggest that future research focus on the systematic exploration of other factors influencing the effectiveness of validity scales as well as the development of validity scales designed to detect the overreporting of internalizing forms of psychopathology.