Moderating effects of attributions on the relationship between emotional dissonance and surface acting: a transactional approach to health care professionals' emotion work

Based on a transactional model of stress, this study aims to understand the role played by attributions in selecting surface acting as emotion regulation strategy when coping with emotion‐rule dissonance. A sample of primary health care professionals (n = 87) based in Madrid filled in a questionnaire. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to test hypotheses on the moderating effects of attributions on the relationship between emotion‐rule dissonance and surface acting. Results showed that high levels of attribution to patients of responsibility for negative events, low levels of professionals' self‐accountability, and low attribution of being able to promote a positive change strengthen the positive association between emotion‐rule dissonance and surface acting. This could explain why professionals use a potentially damaging emotion regulation strategy.     

Attachment security and intergroup contact

The contact hypothesis suggests that the interaction between members of different groups decreases prejudice. Moderators and mediators shaping this link have been investigated. However, research about the factors that facilitate contact is not frequent. This article examines secure attachment as an antecedent of contact. Three studies provide information about various aspects of the relationship between secure attachment and contact: security is positively associated with (a) intergroup contact, which in turn is related to reduced prejudice (Study 1); (b) implicit approach tendencies toward the outgroup (Study 2); and, once again, (c) with contact through the indirect effect of openness to exploration (Study 3). In the discussion, we recommend priming both secure and insecure schemas to investigate their unique effects on intergroup contact.     

Beyond Theory: Martin Buber’s I and Thou and the Role of Contemplation in Integrated Relational Counseling

The current paradigm in mental health practice does not completely protect practitioners from theory-induced blindness. Many clinicians continue to rely on stable theoretical frameworks, which, although helpful, can become a hindrance to integrated relational practice. Overreliance on a particular theory or set of techniques can prevent clinicians from adopting a genuinely relational orientation. This article describes the nature of the contemplative-relational orientation using concepts from Martin Buber’s I and Thou and proposes that clinicians wishing to build competency in integrated relational counseling may benefit from contemplative prayer, meditation, and other mindfulness practices. A clinical vignette is provided and illustrates general features of an integrated relational approach, and empirical evidence is advanced to support the benefits of contemplative practice for mental health practitioners.     

Individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities: Do educators assign them a fully human status?

The present research investigates the humanity attributions to individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD). In three studies, professional educators, who worked in day‐care or community centers, were examined. Humanity attributions were assessed using emotion‐based and trait‐based measures. As expected, individuals with IDD were denied a fully human status: they were perceived as having more non‐uniquely than uniquely human attributes. Furthermore, a lower human status was assigned to individuals with IDD in relation to educators. We also discovered that humanity attributions, but not attitudes, were related to approach/avoidance responses. Altogether, findings show the importance of considering humanity perceptions in the study of social relationships of individuals with IDD. Dehumanizing perceptions can explain the differential treatment these individuals face in various social settings.     

Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I am dreaming” are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition “There are physical objects” or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects.