The relation between teachers' math talk and the acquisition of number sense within kindergarten classrooms

The aim of the present study was to investigate the relation between teachers' math talk and the acquisition of number sense within kindergarten classrooms. The mathematical language input provided by 35 kindergarten teachers was examined with 9 different input categories. The results of this study indicate that the role of each of these math talk categories is not as straightforward as was hypothesized. Although significant positive relations were found for math talk categories such as cardinality and conventional nominatives, the relations between the categories' calculation and number symbols and children's score on specific number sense tasks were negative. Moreover, a large diversity in math talk was negatively related to kindergartners' number sense acquisition. These results suggest that teachers should be careful and selective with the amount of math talk that they offer to young children.     

Cortical correlates of impaired self-regulation in personality disordered patients with traits of psychopathy

Psychopathic personality disordered patients would, by virtue of a failure to self-regulate, be expected to show diminished amplitudes of feedback-related brain potentials. Among a sample of personality disordered patients detained at different levels of security, those who met a Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) criterion of 25 or above were identified (N = 27). Their event-related brain potentials (ERPs), together with those of their nonpsychopathic counterparts (N = 22) and healthy male controls (N = 20), were measured while they performed a visual Go/No Go task, with feedback given for correct and incorrect performance. Psychopathic patients showed a significantly reduced amplitude of an early frontal negative ERP component maximally evoked by negative feedback, and a high rate of errors of commission. Findings are consistent with the idea that psychopathic patients' unsuccessful attempts to self-regulate reflect a cognitive deficit characterised by a failure to attend and respond to a mismatch between expected and obtained outcomes.     

Framing decisions: Hypothetical and real

This paper addresses the general issue of whether the practice of investigating human decision making in hypothetical choice situations is at all warranted, or under what conditions. A particularly relevant factor that affects the match between real decisions and hypothetical decisions is the importance of a decision’s consequences. In the literature experimental gambles tend to confound the reality of the decision situation with the size of the payoffs: hypothetical decisions tend to offer large payoffs, and real decisions tend to offer only small payoffs. Using the well-known framing effect (a tendency of risk-aversion for gains and of risk-seeking for losses) we find that the framing effect depends on payoff size but hypothetical choices match real choices for small as well as large payoffs. These results appear paradoxical unless size of incentive is clearly distinguished from the reality status of decision (real versus hypothetical). Since the field lacks a general theory of when hypothetical decisions match real decisions, the discussion presents an outline for developing such a theory.     

Connecting Dempster–Shafer Belief Functions with Likelihood-based Inference

The Dempster–Shafer approach to expressing beliefabout a parameter in a statistical model is notconsistent with the likelihood principle. Thisinconsistency has been recognized for some time, andmanifests itself as a non-commutativity, in which theorder of operations (combining belief, combininglikelihood) makes a difference. It is proposed herethat requiring the expression of belief to be committed to the model (and to certain of itssubmodels) makes likelihood inference very nearly aspecial case of the Dempster–Shafer theory.     

‘Aloneness’ and the problem of realism in classical Sākhya and yoga

The concept of kaivalya (literally, ‘aloneness’) is of crucial importance to the systems of classical Indian philosophy known as Sākhya and Yoga. Indeed, kaivalya is the supreme soteriological goal to which these systems are directed. Various statements concerning this final goal appear in the classical texts—namely, the Sākhyakārikā and Yogasūtra—and yet there is no consensus within modern scholarship about how the concept is to be interpreted. More specifically, there appears to be a great deal of confusion over the implications of kaivalya for the existence of the empirical world. In this article I discuss the principal difficulties encountered by existing interpretations of kaivalya, and propose that these difficulties result from an unwarranted assumption that Sākhya and Yoga take a realist view with regard to the empirical world. I further propose that these difficulties can, in large part, be overcome when the assumption of realism is set aside.