Intending or Pretending? Automatic Evaluations of Goal Cues Discriminate True and False Intentions

This research presents a novel approach to discriminating between true and deceptive statements about intended future behavior. Arguing that true intentions are goal‐directed, we predict that people who genuinely intend to pursue a reported goal will implicitly evaluate goal‐relevant cues positively, whereas people who do not intend to pursue the goal will not. Participants in an experiment were instructed to tell the truth about a planned future behavior (true intention) or to falsely report that same behavior to mask their actual mock‐criminal intention (false intention). As predicted, an evaluative priming task showed that participants with true intention exhibited implicit positive evaluations of cues relevant to the reported goal, whereas participants with false intention did not. Subsequent analyses showed that implicit positivity significantly discriminated between true and false intentions. The findings are discussed in terms of theoretical contributions and implications for the development of future detection tools. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can > Will: Predictions of What Can Happen are Extreme,but Believed to be Probable

Predictions of uncertain events are often described in terms of what can or what will happen. How are such statements used by speakers, and what are they perceived to mean? Participants in four experiments were presented with distributions of variable product characteristics and were asked to generate natural, meaningful sentences containing either will or can. Will was typically associated with either low or intermediate numeric values, whereas can consistently suggested high (maximum) values. For instance, laptop batteries lasting from 1.5 to 3.5 hours will last for 1.5 hours or for 2.5 hours, but they can last for 3.5 hours. The same response patterns were found for positive and negative events. In will‐statements, the most frequent scalar modifiers were at least and about, whereas in can‐statements, the most frequent modifier included up to. A fifth experiment showed that will indicates an outcome that may be certain but more often simply probable. Can means possible, but even can‐statements are perceived to imply probable outcomes. This could create a communication paradox because most speakers use can to describe outcomes that because of their extremity are at the same time quite unlikely. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An account of the relationship between fluid intelligence and complex learning in considering storage capacity and executive attention

Although fluid intelligence and complex learning are conceptualized differently and assessed by apparently different measures, both theoretical accounts and empirical evidence suggest a relationship between the two constructs. In this study, major working memory aspects including the storage capacity and executive attention were proposed to account for the relationship between fluid intelligence and complex learning. A sample of 184 participants completed fluid intelligence and complex learning scales, as well as working memory measures that each included two or three treatment levels differing in the demands on capacity or executive control. The differences among the treatment levels provided a favorable precondition for employing fixed-links models to separate the core processes of storage capacity or executive attention from the auxiliary processes. Results indicated that both storage capacity and executive attention contributed significantly to fluid intelligence and complex learning. A further analysis showed that the two working memory aspects, particularly the storage capacity, accounted for most of the shared variance between fluid intelligence and complex learning.     

A CHRISTIAN NATURALISM: DEVELOPING THE THINKING OF GORDON KAUFMAN

This essay develops a theological naturalism using Gordon Kaufman's nonpersonal idea of God as serendipitous creativity in contrast to the personal metaphorical theology of Sallie McFague. It then develops a Christian theological naturalism by using Kaufman's idea of historical trajectories, specifically Jesus trajectory₁ and Jesus trajectory₂. The first is the trajectory in the early Christian church assuming a personal God in the framework of Greek philosophy that results in the Trinity. The second is the naturalistic‐humanistic trajectory of creativity (God) that evolves from nonpersonal interactions in the universe and life to creativity in persons and is manifested in Jesus as love. This is elaborated further with Dean Keith Simonton's Darwinian understanding of genius and Marcus Borg's analysis of Jesus as Jewish mystic, teacher of alternative wisdom, and nonviolent resister to the domination system of the Roman Empire. What makes Jesus a religious genius is his exemplifying unconditional, universal love—a new mode of creativity (God) that has evolved from nonhuman to a human form.     

Perceptions of alcohol risk among people on antiretroviral treatment in South Africa: a qualitative study

This study explored perceptions of alcohol abuse risk among people on antiretroviral treatment (ART) who self-identified as alcohol users. Twenty six people receiving ART from an out-patient setting were interviewed on their alcohol abuse risk perception. Data were thematically analysed. Findings suggest participants developed routines to drink alcohol around the times they took their antiretroviral medications to reduce adverse impact. They also reported alcohol abuse risk reduction strategies such as reducing alcohol use because of the event of an HIV positive diagnosis and/or getting on antiretroviral treatment, and alcohol use reduction following health education or counselling by health care staff. These findings suggest a need for alcohol interventions tailored to ART patients.     

Social learning in Cartilaginous fish (stingrays Potamotrygon falkneri)

Social learning is considered one of the hallmarks of cognition. Observers learn from demonstrators that a particular behavior pattern leads to a specific consequence or outcome, which may be either positive or negative. In the last few years, social learning has been studied in a variety of taxa including birds and bony fish. To date, there are few studies demonstrating learning processes in cartilaginous fish. Our study shows that the cartilaginous fish freshwater stingrays (Potamotrygon falkneri) are capable of social learning and isolates the processes involved. Using a task that required animals to learn to remove a food reward from a tube, we found that observers needed significantly (P < 0.01) fewer trials to learn to extract the reward than demonstrators. Furthermore, observers immediately showed a significantly (P < 0.05) higher frequency of the most efficient “suck and undulation” strategy exhibited by the experienced demonstrators, suggesting imitation. Shedding light on social learning processes in cartilaginous fish advances the systematic comparison of cognition between aquatic and terrestrial vertebrates and helps unravel the evolutionary origins of social cognition.     

SPSS and SAS programs for comparing Pearson correlations and OLS regression coefficients

Several procedures that use summary data to test hypotheses about Pearson correlations and ordinary least squares regression coefficients have been described in various books and articles. To our knowledge, however, no single resource describes all of the most common tests. Furthermore, many of these tests have not yet been implemented in popular statistical software packages such as SPSS and SAS. In this article, we describe all of the most common tests and provide SPSS and SAS programs to perform them. When they are applicable, our code also computes 100 × (1 ? α)% confidence intervals corresponding to the tests. For testing hypotheses about independent regression coefficients, we demonstrate one method that uses summary data and another that uses raw data (i.e., Potthoff analysis). When the raw data are available, the latter method is preferred, because use of summary data entails some loss of precision due to rounding.     

Hemispheric lateralization in aging: Interest of the verbal-manual concurrency paradigm

ABSTRACT

Introduction: The aim of this study was to evaluate whether the classic asymmetry seen in hemispheric functioning is modified in older adults by using a verbal-manual concurrency task. Method: Thirty-five right-handed participants divided into two groups according to age (15 older participants, mean age: 68 ± 8 years, without cognitive decline and 20 younger participants, mean age: 23 ± 2 years) had to perform a 30-second uni-manual tapping task, in both a single task (tapping alone) and dual task (tapping and performing a letter fluency task together) condition. Results: In younger participants, the letter fluency task disrupted the right hand more than the left hand whereas, in older participants, the letter fluency task disrupted both hands equally. Conclusion: These results should be considered preliminary data using a behavioral dual task condition, which might be useful for studying lateralized hemispheric functioning and the processes of divided attention during aging.