Choice preferences without inferences: subconscious priming of risk attitudes

We present a procedure for subconscious priming of risk attitudes. In Experiment 1, we were reliably able to induce risk‐seeking or risk‐averse preferences across a range of decision scenarios using this priming procedure. In Experiment 2, we showed that these priming effects can be reversed by drawing participants' attention to the priming event. Our results support claims that the formation of risk preferences can be based on preconscious processing, as for example postulated by the affective primacy hypothesis, rather than rely on deliberative mental operations, as posited by several current models of judgment and decision making. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rules and Self-Rules: Effects of Variation Upon Behavioral Sensitivity to Change

The Psychological Record - Four experiments compared the effects of self-rules and rules, and varied and specific schedules of reinforcement. Participants were first exposed to either several...     

Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex

Following damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, humans develop a defect in real-life decision-making, which contrasts with otherwise normal intellectual functions. Currently, there is no neuropsychological probe to detect in the laboratory, and the cognitive and neural mechanisms responsible for this defect have resisted explanation. Here, using a novel task which simulates real-life decision-making in the way it factors uncertainty of premises and outcomes, as well as reward and punishment, we find that prefrontal patients, unlike controls, are oblivious to the future consequences of their actions, and seem to be guided by immediate prospects only. This finding offers, for the first time, the possibility of detecting these patients' elusive impairment in the laboratory, measuring it, and investigating its possible causes.     

Ethos,pathos and logos in Aristotle's Rhetoric: A re-examination

In Aristotle's Rhetoric, logos must be conceived as enthymematical argumentation relative to the issue of the case. Ethos and pathos also can take the form of an enthymeme, but this argumentation doesn't relate (directly) to the issue. In this kind of enthymeme, the conclusion is relative to the ethos of the speaker or (reasons for) the pathos of the audience. In an ideal situation — with a good procedure and rational judges — logos dominates and in the real situation of Aristotle's time — with an imperfect procedure and irrational judges — ethos and pathos prevail.I should like to thank R. Berkenbosch and J. Wisse for their comments.     

Investment behavior and the negative side of emotion

Can dysfunction in neural systems subserving emotion lead, under certain circumstances, to more advantageous decisions? To answer this question, we investigated how normal participants, patients with stable focal lesions in brain regions related to emotion (target patients), and patients with stable focal lesions in brain regions unrelated to emotion (control patients) made 20 rounds of investment decisions. Target patients made more advantageous decisions and ultimately earned more money from their investments than the normal participants and control patients. When normal participants and control patients either won or lost money on an investment round, they adopted a conservative strategy and became more reluctant to invest on the subsequent round; these results suggest that they were more affected than target patients by the outcomes of decisions made in the previous rounds.     

Testing a Model of Mammography Intention1

This paper presents the results of a study testing components of the Triandis model of choice to predict intention to obtain screening mammography in the next 2 years. A questionnaire was developed to measure the theoretical components of this model. Analysis was based on 2,521 women, 50 to 65 years old, who received primary care from 1 of 28 participating primary care group practices. Based on the four theoretical components of intention described in the Triandis model-social influence, affect, consequence, and barriers-a set of structural equation models was explored. The sample was split into two equal subsamples: one sample used for model exploration and one used for model confirmation. Results showed that the original intention model was not supported. Instead, the model that best fit the data, and upheld it in the subsample used for model confirmation, was a model in which habit and intention were strongly related. The strongest predictors of habit were barriers and consequences; the strongest predictors of intention were social influences and barriers.     

LIFE RECEDES WHEN EXCHANGE FAILS: CLINICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AMONG TURKISH PATIENTS

This paper presents a multidimensional analysis of a young Turkish ill woman. The psychological interpretation is based on clinical data and on projective techniques, i.e., the Thematic Apperception Test and the Rorschach Test. The psychological interpretation is combined with a semantic interpretation of the symbolic cultural processes. This anthropological approach concentrates on the temporal and spatial aspects of the culturally established symbolic congruence between the subject's bodily acts and her socio-cultural environment (in particular the subject's family and their discourse).     

"I can tell when my blood pressure is up, can't I?"

Forty-four insurance company employees were measured on blood pressure, moods, symptoms, and predictions of their blood pressures, twice daily for 10 days. Twenty subjects had elevated blood pressure and 24 did not. The measures were correlated within-subjects to determine if blood pressure predictions were associated with moods, symptoms, or blood pressure readings, and if moods and symptoms were related to blood pressure. Predictions of pressure were expected to be correlated with symptoms and moods, but not with blood pressure. No strong relationship was expected when blood pressure was compared to symptoms or to moods. The data showed that self-predictions of blood pressure were most strongly associated with reported symptoms, next with reported moods, and least with actual blood pressure. A comparison of subjects who were accurate in predicting their blood pressure with those who were not showed no differences in blood pressure levels, systolic blood pressure variation, self-esteem, or private body-consciousness. Subjects' beliefs that they could monitor blood pressure were little influenced by contrary information. The results suggest it would be an error to encourage subjects to believe they can successfully treat blood pressure elevations by monitoring symptoms related to blood pressure change.