Concerning the resilience of Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument

Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agent’s chance for being responsible for that action.     

Artificial neural networks for analyzing inter-limb coordination: the golf chip shot

Motor control research relies on theories, such as coordination dynamics, adapted from physical sciences to explain the emergence of coordinated movement in biological systems. Historically, many studies of coordination have involved inter-limb coordination of relatively few degrees of freedom. This study looked at the high-dimensional inter-limb coordination used to perform the golf chip shot toward six different target distances. This study also introduces a visualization of high-dimensional coordination relevant within the coordination dynamics theoretical framework. A specific type of Artificial Neural Network (ANN), the Self-Organizing Map (SOM), was used for the analysis. In this study, the trajectory of consecutive best-matching nodes on the output map was used as a collective variable and subsequently fed into a second SOM which was used to create visualization of coordination stability. The SOM trajectories showed changes in coordination between movement patterns used for short chip shots and movement patterns used for long chip shots. The attractor diagrams showed non-linear phase transitions for three out of four players. The methods used in this study may offer a solution for researchers from a coordination dynamics perspective who intend to use data obtained from discrete high-dimensional movements.     

Extending Parent–Child Interaction Therapy for Early Childhood Internalizing Problems: New Advances for an Overlooked Population

Although efficacious psychological treatments for internalizing disorders are now well established for school-aged children, until recently there have regrettably been limited empirical efforts to clarify indicated psychological intervention methods for the treatment of mood and anxiety disorders presenting in early childhood. Young children lack many of the developmental capacities required to effectively participate in established treatments for mood and anxiety problems presenting in older children, making simple downward extensions of these treatments for the management of preschool internalizing problems misguided. In recent years, a number of research groups have successfully adapted and modified parent–child interaction therapy (PCIT), originally developed to treat externalizing problems in young children, to treat various early internalizing problems with a set of neighboring protocols. As in traditional PCIT, these extensions target child symptoms by directly reshaping parent–child interaction patterns associated with the maintenance of symptoms. The present review outlines this emerging set of novel PCIT adaptations and modifications for mood and anxiety problems in young children and reviews preliminary evidence supporting their use. Specifically, we cover (a) PCIT for early separation anxiety disorder; (b) the PCIT-CALM (Coaching Approach behavior and Leading by Modeling) Program for the full range of early anxiety disorders; (c) the group Turtle Program for behavioral inhibition; and (d) the PCIT-ED (Emotional Development) Program for preschool depression. In addition, emerging PCIT-related protocols in need of empirical attention—such as the PCIT-SM (selective mutism) Program for young children with SM—are also considered. Implications of these protocols are discussed with regard to their unique potential to address the clinical needs of young children with internalizing problems. Obstacles to broad dissemination are addressed, and we consider potential solutions, including modular treatment formats and innovative applications of technology.     

Prenatal and Posthumous Non-Existence: A Reply to Johansson

We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general (and arguably rational) asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves a crucial and illicit switch in temporal perspectives in the process of considering modal claims (sending us to other possible worlds).     

Lamentations 5:21 within the Development of Thomas Aquinas' Theology of the Grace of Conversion

As a case study in Thomas Aquinas' use of Scripture, this article examines his appeals to Lamentations 5:21 over the course of his career, highlighting the ways in which it informs the development of his mature theology of the grace of conversion. These considerations show how key Scripture verses not only inspire the material content of Thomas' theology, but also serve as indispensible formal components for its expression.     

On some recent moves in defence of doxastic compatibilism

According to the doxastic compatibilist, compatibilist criteria with respect to the freedom of action rule-in our having free beliefs. In Booth (Philosophical Papers 38:1–12, 2009), I challenged the doxastic compatibilist to either come up with an account of how doxastic attitudes can be intentional in the face of it very much seeming to many of us that they cannot. Or else, in rejecting that doxastic attitudes need to be voluntary in order to be free, to come up with a principled account of how her criteria of doxastic freedom are criteria of freedom. In two recent papers, Steup (Synthese 188:145–163, 2012; Dialectica 65(4):559–576, 2011) takes up the first disjunct of the challenge by proposing that even though beliefs cannot be practically intentional, they can be epistemically intentional. McHugh (McHugh forthcoming) instead takes up the second disjunct by proposing that the freedom of belief be modelled not on the freedom of action but on the freedom of intention. I argue that both Steup’s and McHugh’s strategies are problematic.     

Mechanisms of motivation–cognition interaction: challenges and opportunities

Recent years have seen a rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation–cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The present issue of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation–cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas, in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming toward a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed toward them.     

Neuropsychological function and memory suppression in conversion disorder

Conversion disorder (CD) is a condition where neurological symptoms, such as weakness or sensory disturbance, are unexplained by neurological disease and are presumed to be of psychological origin. Contemporary theories of the disorder generally propose dysfunctional frontal control of the motor or sensory systems. Classical (Freudian) psychodynamic theory holds that the memory of stressful life events is repressed. Little is known about the frontal (executive) function of these patients, or indeed their general neuropsychological profile, and psychodynamic theories have been largely untested. This study aimed to investigate neuropsychological functioning in patients with CD, focusing on executive and memory function. A directed forgetting task (DFT) using words with variable emotional valence was also used to investigate memory suppression. 21 patients and 36 healthy controls completed a battery of neuropsychological tests and patients had deficits in executive function and auditory‐verbal (but not autobiographical) memory. The executive deficits were largely driven by differences in IQ, anxiety and mood between the groups. A subgroup of 11 patients and 28 controls completed the DFT and whilst patients recalled fewer words overall than controls, there were no significant effects of directed forgetting or valence. This study provides some limited support for deficits in executive, and to a lesser degree, memory function in patients with CD, but did not find evidence of altered memory suppression to support the psychodynamic theory of repression.