Affection and attention: On the phenomenology of becoming aware

Addressing the matter of attention from a phenomenological perspective as it bears on the problem of becoming aware, I draw on Edmund Husserl's analyses and distinctions that mark his “genetic” phenomenology. I describe several experiential levels of affective force and modes of attentiveness, ranging from what I call dispositional orientation and passive discernment to so-called higher levels of attentiveness in cognitive interest, judicative objectivation, and conceptualization. These modes of attentiveness can be understood as motivating a still more active mode of reflective attention, i.e., philosophical attentiveness, and to this extent, even it would be subject to varying influences of affection. What role, if any, does affection play in a peculiar kind of reflective attention that is phenomenological? I conclude by briefly considering phenomenological reflective attentiveness and its relation to affection.     

Play fighting and real fighting: Using video playback methodology with young children

This study develops a video playback methodology: children aged five to eight years viewed taped play fighting and real fighting bouts in which they were both participants and nonparticipants. Views of participants were also compared for immediate and delayed viewing. The methodology examines the criteria used to distinguish play fighting and real fighting; views concerning the characteristics of such episodes; and the motivations involved. The methodology was found to be feasible at this age; and useful in terms of differing views of participants and nonparticipants. There was evidence for increased insight from participants, who used more criteria to make their judgments, and more informative criteria such as knowledge of the rules of a game being played. Participant knowledge was most evident at the immediate viewings, but was partially retained one week later. Participants (more than nonparticipants) mostly described play fighting as friendly, and not involving hurt or showing off. The methodology could usefully be applied to examine further developmental changes in older children. Aggr. Behav. 30:164–173, 2004. © 2004 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

A Deterrence Theory of Punishment

I start from the presupposition that the use of force against another is justified only in self-defence or in defence of others against aggression. If so, the main work of justifying punishment must rely on its deterrent effect, since most punishments have no other significant self-defensive effect. It has often been objected to the deterrent justification of punishment that it commits us to using offenders unacceptably, and that it is unable to deliver acceptable limits on punishment. I describe a sort of deterrent theory which can avoid both of these objections.     

A Cognitive Behavioral Adherence Intervention for Adolescents with Type 1 Diabetes

This study examined the impact of a cognitive behavioral intervention for nonadherent adolescents with type 1 diabetes. Six youths having problems following the diabetes regimen received training in cognitive restructuring and problem solving during individual sessions. A multiple baseline design across participants was used. Treatment effectiveness was assessed through 24-hr recall adherence interviews with adolescents and frequency of testing data was downloaded from glucose meters. Data was also collected for diabetes-specific stress. Five youths displayed improvement on at least one self-care behavior. Furthermore, the results suggest that the cognitive behavioral intervention was effective in diminishing diabetes-related stress in two participants. Cognitive behavioral interventions show promise for increasing self-care behaviors among nonadherent youths with type 1 diabetes. However, individual youths varied in their response to treatment. Further research is needed in developing procedures to better meet the needs of youths, improve youth participation, and enhance treatment effectiveness.     

Reviving and Refining Psychodynamic Interpretation of the Wechsler Intelligence Tests: The Verbal Comprehension Subtests

The Wechsler intelligence tests (currently Wechsler, 2008 Wechsler, D. (2008). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Fourth Edition (WAIS–IV). San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. [Google Scholar], 2014) have traditionally been part of the multimethod test battery favored by psychodynamically oriented assessors. In this tradition, assessors have used Wechsler data to make inferences about personality that transcend cognition. Recent trends in clinical psychology, however, have deemphasized this psychodynamic way of working. In this article, I make a conceptual and clinical case for reviving and refining a psychodynamic approach to inference making about personality using the Wechsler Verbal Comprehension subtests. Specifically, I (a) describe the psychological and environmental conditions sampled by the Wechsler tests, (b) discuss the Wechsler tests conceptually in terms of assessing vulnerability to breakdowns in adaptive defensive functioning, (c) review a general framework for inference making, and (d) offer considerations for and illustrate pragmatic application of the Verbal Comprehension subtests data to make inferences that help answer referral questions and have important treatment implications.     

Belief is Contingently Involuntary

The debate between “Normativists” and “Teleologists” about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot (non‐contingently) believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief is, that suspended judgment is not a belief (or set of beliefs), and that the aim or norm of suspended judgement cannot be constitutive if suspended judgement is not a belief (or set of beliefs).     

Effects of emotional prosody on novel word learning in relation to autism-like traits

Emotional information can influence various cognitive processes, such as attention, motivation, and memory. Differences in the processing of emotion have been observed in individuals with high levels of autism-like traits. The current study aimed to determine the influence of emotional prosody on word learning ability in neurotypical adults who varied in their levels of autism-like traits. Thirty-eight participants learned 30 nonsense words as names for 30 “alien” characters. Alien names were verbally presented with happy, fearful, or neutral prosody. For all participants, recall performance was significantly worse for words spoken with fearful prosody compared to neutral. Recall performance was also worse for words spoken with happy prosody compared to neutral, but only for those with lower levels of autism-like traits. The findings suggest that emotional prosody can interfere with word learning, and that people with fewer autism-like traits may be more susceptible to such interference due to a higher attention bias toward emotion.