Reducing drug and alcohol use and improving well-being for Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians using the Community Reinforcement Approach: A feasibility and acceptability study

There is a lack of evidence of effective and appropriate drug and alcohol treatment for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. This paper contributes to addressing the evidence gap by examining the feasibility and acceptability and conducting a pre/post-evaluation of the Aboriginal-adapted Community Reinforcement Approach (CRA) delivered in New South Wales, Australia. Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal clients (n = 55) received tailored CRA delivery between March and November 2013. Compared to the original US version, tailored CRA had reduced technical language, reduced number of treatment sessions, and the addition of group delivery option. An Australian training manual with local case studies was developed. Alcohol, Smoking and Substance Involvement Test (ASSIST), Kessler-5 (K-5) and the Growth Empowerment Measure were used. 58% of participants were followed-up at 3 months. Tailored CRA was feasible to deliver in a rural, community-based health setting, and rated by clients as highly effective and acceptable. CRA was associated with statistically significant reductions in the use of alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, amphetamine and over the counter medication, and levels of psychological distress, and an increase in levels of empowerment for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal clients. This study provides evidence for the feasibility and acceptability of an Aboriginal-adapted psychological intervention addressing drug, alcohol and mental health outcomes.     

Stigma towards psychosis: Cross‐cultural differences in prejudice,stereotypes, and discrimination in White British and South Asians

Public stigma towards people with mental health problems has been demonstrated in Western societies. Little is known about non‐Western cultures and whether cultures differ in their perceptions of people with mental health problems. Aim of this study was to examine cultural differences in prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination towards people with psychosis. Participants were from White British and South Asian backgrounds (N = 128, aged 16–20 years) recruited from two schools and colleges in the United Kingdom. They completed a cross‐sectional survey on affective, cognitive, and behavioural dimensions of stigma. Results revealed significant cultural differences on all three stigma dimensions. South Asians attributed higher anger (prejudice) and dangerousness (stereotypes) to people with psychosis than White British. They also reported lower willingness to help, greater avoidance, and higher endorsement of segregation (discrimination). The effects of ethnic group on helping intentions, avoidance, and segregation endorsement were mediated by anger and by dangerousness. Understanding cultural differences in stigma towards psychosis will be important for designing stigma interventions as well as treatments for people with different cultural backgrounds.     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

How Wittgenstein Defeated Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment

In 1913 Wittgenstein raised an objection to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment that eventually led Russell to abandon his theory. As he put it in the Tractatus, the objection was that “the correct explanation of the form of the proposition, ‘A makes the judgement p’, must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement,” (5.5422). This objection has been widely interpreted to concern type restrictions on the constituents of judgment. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that Wittgenstein’s objection is in fact a form of the problem of the unity of the proposition.     

THE USE OF REBT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

Training, coaching, and consulting with people in leadership roles can be a primary consulting function for clinicians. In this paper, the authors describe their model of leadership, and what they believe to be the central personality or character components of leadership necessary for producing extraordinary results. Throughout they will show where and how REBT skills can make a significant contribution.     

Explication Defended

How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is concluded that explication is an appropriate methodology for formal philosophy.     

Cracking the mirror: on Kierkegaard’s concerns about friendship

In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However, the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like.