Believing in the purpose of events—why does it occur,and is it supernatural?

What is the cognitive basis for the common belief that random events have a purpose, and are these beliefs a form of supernatural thinking, as Bering has suggested? Two questionnaire studies with Finnish volunteer participants (N = 2650, 1830 females, mean age 26) used structural equation modelling (SEM) to test the hypotheses that beliefs in the purpose of events are part of the same phenomenon as paranormal beliefs and that confusions of core knowledge of the psychological, biological and physical domains predict both sets of beliefs. In Study 1, participants were not given a definition of purpose, and in Study 2, purpose was explicitly defined as entailing planning by a supernatural agent. The results from both studies supported the predictions. The results indicate that construing events in terms of purpose is not a universal tendency but an individual cognitive bias that can be accounted for by false analogies from intuitive psychology, biology and physics. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Focused group therapy: An integrative approach

Focused Group Therapy (FGT) was developed within a research project on treatment for burned out patients on long-term sick leave. The core of FGT is to find and formulate an individual focus expressed in behavioural terms. This focus is then worked with in the here-and-now of the group therapy. It is argued that the use of common factors in group therapy, rather than a special technique, improves the clinical work. Thesupport factor in group therapy is understood in terms of cohesion, therapeutic alliance and goal-corrected empathic attunement. Thelearning factors that are stressed are the experience of being a part of a developing group, building on similarities instead of differences, affective communication and the implicit knowledge developed in new ways of dealing with interpersonal relations. Theaction factor is considered to consist of challenging interpersonal situations corresponding to the individual focus, which are mastered in the here-and-now of the group.     

Capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) respond to video images of themselves

Many studies have used mirror-image stimulation in attempts to find self-recognition in monkeys. However, very few studies have presented monkeys with video images of themselves; the present study is the first to do so with capuchin monkeys. Six tufted capuchin monkeys were individually exposed to live face-on and side-on video images of themselves (experimental Phase 1). Both video screens initially elicited considerable interest. Two adult males looked preferentially at their face-on image, whereas two adult females looked preferentially at their side-on image; the latter elicited lateral movements and head-cocking. Only males showed communicative facial expressions, which were directed towards the face-on screen. In Phase 2 monkeys discriminated between real-time, face-on images and identical images delayed by 1 s, with the adult females especially preferring real-time images. In this phase both screens elicited facial expressions, shown by all monkeys. In Phase 3 there was no evidence of discrimination between previously recorded video images of self and similar images of a familiar conspecific. Although they showed no signs of explicit self-recognition, the monkeys’ behaviour strongly suggests recognition of the correspondence between kinaesthetic information and external visual effects. In species such as humans and great apes, this type of self-awareness feeds into a system that gives rise to explicit self-recognition.     

Relations between episodic memory, suggestibility, theory of mind, and cognitive inhibition in the preschool child

The development of episodic memory, its relation to theory of mind (ToM), executive functions (e.g., cognitive inhibition), and to suggestibility was studied. Children (n= 115) between 3 and 6 years of age saw two versions of a video film and were tested for their memory of critical elements of the videos. Results indicated similar developmental trends for all memory measures, ToM, and inhibition, but ToM and inhibition were not associated with any memory measures. Correlations involving source memory was found in relation to specific questions, whereas inhibition and ToM were significantly correlated to resistance to suggestions. A regression analysis showed that age was the main contributor to resistance to suggestions, to correct source monitoring, and to correct responses to specific questions. Inhibition was also a significant main predictor of resistance to suggestive questions, whereas the relative contribution of ToM was wiped out when an extended model was tested.     

Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory?

Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor’s genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones’ own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors’ own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory.     

Maltreated Children's Memory of Stressful Removals from Their Biological Parents

The effects of stress on memory were examined through a study of 33 3 to 12‐year‐old maltreated children removed from their biological parents by the Child Protective Services because of an emergency (acute) or normal (planned) care order. Children's stress levels were rated by a researcher present during the removal and children's memory of the removal investigated at a later time. The type of removal significantly predicted children's level of stress. ‘Acute removal’ children remembered more from high‐stress phases of the removal than the ‘planned removal’ children. All children had more accurate memories of the low‐stress phases. Details remembered were rated as central or peripheral; more central information was recalled than peripheral information. The ‘acute removal’ children recalled more peripheral information from the high‐stress phases of the removal than the low‐stress phases, a difference, which was not present for the ‘planned removal’ children. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Defining reward value by cross-modal scaling

Researchers in comparative psychology often use different food rewards in their studies, with food values defined by a pre-experimental preference test. While this technique rank orders food values, it provides limited information about value differences because preferences may reflect not only value differences, but also the degree to which one good may “substitute” for another (e.g., one food may substitute well for another food, but neither substitutes well for water). We propose scaling the value of food pairs by a third food that is less substitutable for either food offered in preference tests (cross-modal scaling). Here, Cebus monkeys chose between four pairwise alternatives: fruits A versus B; cereal amount X versus fruit A and cereal amount Y versus fruit B where X and Y were adjusted to produce indifference between each cereal amount and each fruit; and cereal amounts X versus Y. When choice was between perfect substitutes (different cereal amounts), preferences were nearly absolute; so too when choice was between close substitutes (fruits); however, when choice was between fruits and cereal amounts, preferences were more modest and less likely due to substitutability. These results suggest that scaling between-good value differences in terms of a third, less-substitutable good may be better than simple preference tests in defining between-good value differences.