Exploring how people respond to conflicts between self‐interest and fairness: Influence of threats to the self on affective reactions to advantageous inequity

Two studies examined how people deal with conflicts between their self‐interest concerns and their striving for fairness. Specifically, the affective reactions to outcome arrangements in which people receive better outcomes than comparable other persons, were studied. These arrangements of advantageous inequity constitute situations in which fairness and self‐interest concerns are in conflict. Building on the social psychology of the self, it was predicted, and found, in both field and lab experiments that when people experience a self‐threat, they react more positively to arrangements of advantageous inequity than when not experiencing this threat. This supports the view that people's need for positive information about their selves is an important factor in the underlying psychological processes of the way that people deal with conflicts between their fairness and self‐interest concerns.     

Recognition of psychopathology with religious content by clergy members: a case vignette study

Clergy members (CMs) frequently offer support and counselling for people with mental health problems. The current study aims to obtain insight into the ability among CMs to recognise psychopathology and need for psychiatric treatment. A random sample of CMs (N?=?143) and a control sample of mental health professionals (MHPs, N?=?73), were compared as to their evaluations of four vignettes. CMs considered the psychiatric states to be related to religious or spiritual problems to a similar degree as they did for the non-psychiatric states. Sensitivity of CMs with regard to the need of psychiatric care for the psychiatric states was modest (66%) and differed significantly from MHPs (96%). Specificity of the CMs was 89%, which was significantly lower than the MHPs (97%). The CMs did recognise psychopathology with religious content but clearly to a lower extent than MHPs. Requests by CMs for education about recognising psychopathology may be considered as justified.     

Effects of anxiety on the execution of police arrest and self-defense skills

We investigated the effects of anxiety on the execution of police officers' arrest and self-defense skills. Police officers (n=13) performed three tasks in which they kicked, blocked, or restrained an opponent who attacked them with a rubber knife (low anxiety, LA) or a shock knife (high anxiety, HA) in a within-subject design. We analyzed performance (on a 5-point Likert scale), movement times, posture, and movement velocity and acceleration. Results revealed that performance was worse in the HA compared to the LA condition. Furthermore, analysis of full-body movement showed that under increased anxiety, police officers' performance contained characteristics of avoidance behavior, such as faster reactions (to reduce the time being exposed to the threat), leaning further backward (kick), and ducking down (block). In line with recent theoretical developments, it appears that under increased anxiety, police officers were less able to inhibit stimulus-driven processing (fear of getting hit) and enforce goal-directed processing (perform the skill as well as possible) leading to avoidance behavior and a decrease in performance.     

Is human classification by experienced untrained observers a gold standard in fixation detection?

Manual classification is still a common method to evaluate event detection algorithms. The procedure is often as follows: Two or three human coders and the algorithm classify a significant quantity of data. In the gold standard approach, deviations from the human classifications are considered to be due to mistakes of the algorithm. However, little is known about human classification in eye tracking. To what extent do the classifications from a larger group of human coders agree? Twelve experienced but untrained human coders classified fixations in 6 min of adult and infant eye-tracking data. When using the sample-based Cohen’s kappa, the classifications of the humans agreed near perfectly. However, we found substantial differences between the classifications when we examined fixation duration and number of fixations. We hypothesized that the human coders applied different (implicit) thresholds and selection rules. Indeed, when spatially close fixations were merged, most of the classification differences disappeared. On the basis of the nature of these intercoder differences, we concluded that fixation classification by experienced untrained human coders is not a gold standard. To bridge the gap between agreement measures (e.g., Cohen’s kappa) and eye movement parameters (fixation duration, number of fixations), we suggest the use of the event-based F1 score and two new measures: the relative timing offset (RTO) and the relative timing deviation (RTD).     

Self‐Control as a Normative Capacity

Recently, two apparent truisms about self‐control have been questioned in both the philosophical and the psychological literature: the idea that exercising self‐control involves an agent doing something, and the idea that self‐control is a good thing. Both assumptions have come under threat because self‐control is increasingly understood as a mental mechanism, and mechanisms cannot possibly be good or active in the required sense. However, I will argue that it is not evident that self‐control should be understood as a mechanism, suggesting that we might also argue the other way around: if we have independent reason to hold onto the idea that self‐control is inherently good and active, the conclusion might be that self‐control cannot be a mechanism. I will show that Aristotle's original analysis of self‐control actually offers grounds for both assumptions: he took there to be conceptual connections between self‐control and goodness/activity. By examining these connections, I argue that an Aristotelian approach could offer promising leads for a contemporary non‐mechanistic understanding of self‐control as a normative capacity.     

The influence of spectral composition of complex tones and of musical experience on the perceptibility of virtual pitch

A matching paradigm was used to evaluate the influence of the spectral characteristics number, relative height, and density of harmonics on the perceptibility of the missing fundamental. Fifty-eight musicians and 58 nonmusicians were instructed to adjust mistuned sinusoids to the subjectively perceived fundamental pitches of corresponding overtone spectra. Analyses of variance were used to compare the average of absolute and relative deviations of the tunings from the highest common divisors of the complex tones. The results indicate that musical experience is the most influential single factor determining the assessment of fundamental pitch. Nevertheless, all spectral parameters significantly affect tuning performance. Systematic relative deviations (stretching/compression effects) were observed for all considered variables. An increase of the optimum subjective distance between an overtone spectrum and its corresponding fundamental was characteristic of musicians and unambiguous spectra, whereas the compression effect was typical of nonmusicians and complex tones containing spectral gaps.     

A reanalysis of Lord’s statistical treatment of football numbers

Stevens’ theory of admissible statistics [Stevens, S. S. (1946). On the theory of scales of measurement. Science, 103, 677680] states that measurement levels should guide the choice of statistical test, such that the truth value of statements based on a statistical analysis remains invariant under admissible transformations of the data. Lord [Lord, F. M. (1953). On the statistical treatment of football numbers. American Psychologist, 8, 750-751] challenged this theory. In a thought experiment, a parametric test is performed on football numbers (identifying players: a nominal representation) to decide whether a sample from the machine issuing these numbers should be considered non-random. This is an apparently illegal test, since its outcomes are not invariant under admissible transformations for the nominal measurement level. Nevertheless, it results in a sensible conclusion: the number-issuing machine was tampered with. In the ensuing measurement-statistics debate Lord’s contribution has been influential, but has also led to much confusion. The present aim is to show that the thought experiment contains a serious flaw. First it is shown that the implicit assumption that the numbers are nominal is false. This disqualifies Lord’s argument as a valid counterexample to Stevens’ dictum. Second, it is argued that the football numbers do not represent just the nominal property of non-identity of the players; they also represent the amount of bias in the machine. It is a question about this property-not a property that relates to the identity of the football players-that the statistical test is concerned with. Therefore, only this property is relevant to Lord’s argument. We argue that the level of bias in the machine, indicated by the population mean, conforms to a bisymmetric structure, which means that it lies on an interval scale. In this light, Lord’s thought experiment-interpreted by many as a problematic counterexample to Stevens’ theory of admissible statistics-conforms perfectly to Stevens’ dictum.     

Accidents,aberrant behaviours,and speeding of young moped riders

Moped riders, particularly youngsters, are amongst the highest risk group in traffic. We used an adapted version of the Driver Behaviour Questionnaire to examine why moped riders are often involved in traffic accidents. We conducted a questionnaire study among 146 young moped riders in the Netherlands. We found that aberrant behaviour of moped riders can indeed be classified as errors, lapses, and violations. Accidents involvement appeared not to be significantly related to errors, lapses, and violations. As hypothesised, moped riders were more likely to speed, and had a stronger intention to disobey speed limits when they have a positive attitude towards speeding, and when they think that others expect them to speed. Perceived control did not affect self-reported speeding and intention to speed. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our study.