Divided attention between simultaneous auditory and visual signals

Past studies of simultaneous attention to pairs of visual stimuli have used the “dual-task” paradigm to show that identification of the direction of a change in luminance, whether incremental or decremental, is “capacity-limited,” while simple detection of these changes is governed by “capacity-free” processes. On the basis of that finding, it has been suggested that the contrast between identification and detection reflects different processes in the sensory periphery, namely the responses of magno- and parvocellular receptors. The present study questions that assertion and investigates the contribution of central processing in resource limitation by applying the dual task to a situation in which one stimulus is auditory and one is visual. The results are much the same as before, with identification demonstrating the tradeoff in performance generally attributed to a limited capacity but detection showing no loss compared with single-task controls. This implies that limitations on resources operate at a central level of processing rather than in the auditory and visual peripheries.     

One night of sleep deprivation affects reaction time, but not interference or facilitation in a Stroop task

The Stroop color-naming task is one of the most widely studied tasks involving the inhibition of a prepotent response, regarded as an executive function. Several studies have examined performance on versions of the Stroop task under conditions of acute sleep deprivation. Though these studies revealed effects on Stroop performance, the results often do not differentiate between general effects of sleep deprivation on performance and effects specifically on interference in the Stroop task. To examine the effect of prolonged wakefulness on performance on the Stroop task, we studied participants in a 40-h "constant routine" protocol during which they remained awake in constant conditions and performed a Stroop color-naming task every two hours. We found that reaction time was slowest when the color and word did not match (incongruent), fastest when the color and word did match (congruent), and intermediate when participants named the color of the non-word stimulus (neutral). Performance on all three trial types degraded significantly as a function of time awake. Extended wakefulness did not significantly change the additional time needed to respond when the color and word did not match (Stroop interference), nor did it change the amount of facilitation when color and word matched. These results indicate that one night of sleep deprivation influences performance on the Stroop task by an overall increase in response time, but does not appear to impact the underlying processes of interference or facilitation. The results suggest that the degree to which an "executive function" is affected by sleep deprivation may depend on the particular executive function studied and the degree to which it is subserved by the prefrontal cortex.     

Reactive and proactive control in incarcerated and community adolescents and young adults

This study compared the cognitive control skills of male incarcerated adolescents (n = 44), male control adolescents (n = 33), male incarcerated young adults (n = 41), and male control young adults (n = 35) using the AX-continuous performance test (AX-CPT). This test measures proactive control (the ability to maintain a mental representation of goal-related information in preparation for a behavioral response) and reactive control (the ability to activate goal-related information in response to an external trigger). Incarcerated individuals had more difficulty implementing proactive control, whereas control individuals had more difficulty implementing reactive control. Adolescents had more difficulty with both reactive and proactive control compared with young adults, suggesting that both skills improve with age. Additional analyses indicated that the effect of age on proactive control was due to the presence of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, whereas the effect of age on reactive control appeared to be a natural developmental trend that could not be explained by other variables. These findings are considered in relation to the dual mechanisms of control theory [Braver, T. S., Gray, J. R., & Burgess, G. C. (2007). Explaining the many varieties of working memory variation: Dual mechanisms of cognitive control. In A. R. A. Conway, C. Jarrold, M. J. Kane, A. Miyake, & J. N. Towse (Eds.), Variation in Working Memory. New York: Oxford University Press.].     

Contextual influences on interpersonal complementarity

The influence of context on interpersonal complementarity was examined using an event-contingent recording procedure. Setting and role status moderated the relation between how a person behaved and how the other person behaved. Individuals were more likely to respond with agreeable behavior to agreeableness in others when not at work than when at work and when in a high status work role relative to a low status work role. Reciprocity between dominance and submissiveness was found in work settings but not in nonwork settings. Individuals were more likely to reciprocate more submissive behavior by the other person with more dominant behavior and more likely to reciprocate more dominant behavior by the other person with relatively more submissive behavior when in a higher status work role relative to lower status work roles. Results were interpreted in terms of the influence of decreased structure and shared goals on increasing interpersonal complementarity.     

Time of day and the representation of text

This article reports an experiment to investigate the idea that time-of-day differences in memory for text are related to type of text processing that is carried out at different times of day. In particular, it was hypothesized that subjects tested in the morning tend to retain more of the exact wording of the text, whereas those tested in the afternoon are more likely to produce a meaning-based representation. The results of a recognition test showed that, in agreement with other studies, immediate text memory is better in the morning than in the afternoon. As predicted, the subjects tested in the morning better remembered the exact wording of the original passages. However, the idea that memory for meaning is better in the afternoon than the morning was not supported by the data. The results suggest that subjects at both times of day produce a meaning-based representation of the text but, in the morning, this representation is supported by good verbatim memory, enabling accurate recall of the text at that time.     

Pigeons flexibly time or count on cue

In Experiment 1, pigeons were presented with a sequence of light flashes and cued to peck a key for reward either after a fixed time or after a fixed number of flashes. Curves that showed the rate of key pecking over time within trials indicated that peak rates of response were reached near the fixed time on timing-cued trials and near the fixed number of flashes on counting-cued trials. In Experiment 2, the key cue was shifted from timing to counting or from counting to timing midway through a trial. The peak times reached after the cue change indicated that pigeons kept track of time while cued to count but did not count while cued to time. These findings suggest a basic asymmetry in the dual-mode model of timing and counting.     

Syllogistic reasoning and belief-bias inhibition in school children: evidence from a negative priming paradigm

Research on deductive reasoning in adolescents and adults has shown that errors in deductive logic are not necessarily due to a lack of logical ability but can stem from an executive failure to inhibit biases. Few studies have examined this dissociation in children. Here, we used a negative priming paradigm with 64 children (8-10 years old) to test the role of cognitive inhibition in syllogisms with belief-bias effects. On trials where negative priming was predicted, results were as follows: For the first syllogism (A), the strategy 'unbelievable-equals-invalid' had to be inhibited. The logic of the syllogism led to affirming a conclusion inconsistent with one's knowledge of the world, such as 'All elephants are light.' For the second syllogism (B), one's real-world knowledge and the syllogism's logic were congruent but the latter required affirming exactly what had been inhibited for A (i.e. that elephants are heavy). A negative priming effect on the A-B sequence was reflected in a significant drop in reasoning performance on B. This supports the idea that during cognitive development, inhibitory control is required for success on syllogisms where beliefs and logic interfere.