Rules versus cognitive structure as bases for children's performances on probability problems

The present study compared two hypotheses about children's solutions to Piaget and Inhelder's (1975) two-set alternative choice probability problems. The first was that children follow rules that specify a temporally ordered sequence of tests and decisions (Siegler, 1981). One prediction of rules is that children who know strategies that combine variables within sets (e.g., ratio or subtraction strategies) will only use them on problems that require such strategies (conflict problems), whereas lower level (nonconflict) problems will be solved by directly comparing the values of variables between sets. The second hypothesis was that once children develop knowledge of within-set solutions to probability problems, they apply them to both conflict and nonconflict problems. The results supported the latter hypothesis. The majority of children who solved conflict problems using within-set strategies explained at least one nonconflict problem by referring to within-set combinations. Results were discussed in terms of their implications for cognitive development and for instruction.     

Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

Zur Analyse des Bumerang-Effektes

Zusammenfassung In zwei Experimenten wurde mit Hilfe unterschiedlicher sozialer Attitüden und Werthaltungen jeweils die Hypothese geprüft, daß sich Einstellungen nach einstellungskonträrer Agitation in Richtung dieser Agitation oder aber nicht und in Gegenrichtung zur Agitation ändern, je nachdem ob sie weniger oder mehr in allgemeineren Werthaltungen verankert sind. Im Rahmen einer um die Konzeption der Verankerung erweiterten Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz können damit besser als bisher sogenannte Bumerang-Effekte bei Änderungen von Attitüden erklärt werden.

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Summary In two experiments we tested the following hypothesis concerning social attitudes and value orientations: Attitudes will be changed after counter-attitudinal agitation in the direction of this agitation or in opposite direction depending on their degree of being anchored in general value orientations. With the theory of cognitive dissonance, supplemented by the conception of anchoring, we are now able to explain better than before the so-called boomerang-effects which appear with attitude changes.