A promising novel judgement bias test to evaluate affective states in dogs (Canis familiaris)

Animal Cognition - The judgement bias test represents one of the most applied tools to evaluate animals’ optimistic/pessimistic attitude and to infer their emotional and welfare state...     

Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission: what else?!)

In the contemporary expanding literature on transmission failure and its connections with issues such as the Closure principle, the nature of perceptual warrant, Moore??s proof of an external world and the effectiveness of Humean scepticism, it has often been assumed that there is just one kind of it: the one made familiar by the writings of Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. Although it might be thought that one kind of failure is more than enough, Davies has recently challenged this view: apparently, there are more ways in heaven and earth that warrant can fail to transmit across valid inference from one (set of) belief(s) to another, than have been dreamt of in philosophy so far. More specifically, Davies thinks that a second kind of transmission failure has to be countenanced. He connects each kind of failure of transmission of warrant with two different kinds of epistemic project, respectively, and with the exploration of whether the current dispute between conservatives such as Wright, and liberals such as Jim Pryor, on the nature of perceptual warrant, would have a bearing on them. I point out why Davies??s second kind of transmission failure is indeed no such thing. I then move on to canvass another kind of transmission failure, different from the one studied by both Wright and Davies, and dependent on an alternative conception of the structure of empirical warrants, which I dub ??moderatism??. I then consider how this alternative notion of transmission failure fares with respect to Moore??s proof, its relationship with Wright??s kind of transmission failure and with the Closure principle. In closing, I defend it from criticisms that can be elicited from Pryor??s recent work.     

Kids observing other kids' hands: visuomotor priming in children

We investigated motor resonance in children using a priming paradigm. Participants were asked to judge the weight of an object shortly primed by a hand in an action-related posture (grasp) or a non action-related one (fist). The hand prime could belong to a child or to an adult. We found faster response times when the object was preceded by a grasp hand posture (motor resonance effect). More crucially, participants were faster when the prime was a child's hand, suggesting that it could belong to their body schema, particularly when the child's hand was followed by a light object (motor simulation effect). A control experiment helped us to clarify the role of the hand prime. To our knowledge this is the first behavioral evidence of motor simulation and motor resonance in children. Implications of the results for the development of the sense of body ownership and for conceptual development are discussed.     

Conceptual information about size of objects in nouns

Two experiments provide evidence that information about the real-life size of objects is elicited by nouns. A priming paradigm was used with a category membership verification task. The results showed that targets were responded to faster when preceded by a same-size prime, and that large entities were processed faster than small ones. Overall, our results significantly extend previous work on perceptual information elicited by concepts (e.g., Zwaan & Yaxley, 2004) and, in particular, on size information (e.g., Rubinstein & Henik, 2002) by means of a size-unrelated paradigm.     

When meaning is useless

The aim of this study is to disentangle the relative contribution of semantic and phonological representation in immediate serial recall. Indeed, short-term memory (STM) performance could be enhanced by familiarity with the phonological form of the word only or together with semantic information. Participants learned two sets of words in an unknown language: for one set they acquired both phonology and semantics, while for the other only phonology. After that, they performed two immediate serial recall tasks involving either “phonology and semantics” or “only phonology” words and one with untrained words. The analyses showed that the trained lists did not differ from each other, while they did from the untrained one. These data confirm that familiarity with the phonological form is sufficient for immediate serial recall. Therefore, we argue that semantics is not required for verbal STM, but knowledge of the phonological form is what matters.     

The role of affordances in inhibition of return

Inhibition of return (IOR) is a response delay that occurs when the target is preceded by an irrelevant stimulus (cue) at the same location. IOR can be object based, as well as location based. The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of the pragmatic features of a visually presented object in causing IOR. Two experiments were carried out using different objects as stimuli, for which the graspable part (affordance) was clearly defined. The presentation of a whole object, with the part commonly used to grasp it located below, served as a cue. The presentation of either the graspable or the ungraspable part of the cued or uncued object served as the target Results showed that responses were slower when the graspable part was shown in the cued location than when the ungraspable part was shown in the same location. The effect was apparently linked to the kind of action necessary to grasp an object.     

Of the Same in the Different. What is Wrong with Kuhn's Use of ``Seeing' and ``Seeing as'

Kuhn uses the distinction between `(simple) seeing', and `seeing as' in order to claim that among competing paradigms there cannot be found any middle (experiential) ground; nothing `same' can be located behind such radically different paradigm-worlds. He claims that scientists do not see a common something as this thing at one time and as that thing at another. Each time scientists simply see what they see. To claim the contrary is to claim that scientists arrive at their paradigmatic experiences of the world due to an interpretation of something `same' beyond the paradigms,and Kuhn rejects this. The question of whether a common ground can be found behind two or more different paradigmatic world-views relates to many issues in philosophy of science and in general epistemology (e.g., realism-idealism, relativism-objectivism, etc.). As a first approach to these, in this paper I examine the presuppositions of Kuhn's claim, its consistency in the exposition, and its overall viability. I conclude that the actual way in which Kuhn refers to the historical examples he examines undermines his explicit thesis. But also the paradox he himself recognizes in his thought that `though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientists afterward works in a different world' can be solved only if we start to think seriously about the necessity and nature of a `same in the different' behind the competing paradigmatic world-experiences. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

When motivation is not enough: Effects of prosociality and organizational socialization in volunteers’ intention to continue volunteering

Retention of volunteers is a main issue for no‐profit organizations. In the present study, using a cross‐sectional design, determinants of volunteers’ intentions to continue their service were investigated in a sample of 116 volunteers at different Italian organizations (M_age = 42.32, SD_age = 15.91). Guided by the conceptual model of the volunteer process, we hypothesized that organizational socialization should mediate the link between prosocial personality and intention to continue volunteering. Results confirmed our prediction. Findings provide suggestions for organizations concerned about volunteers’ dropout that focus on ameliorating the socialization process of less prosocial volunteers in order to support their intention to remain in the organization.