Conventionalism and the world as bare sense-data

We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, merely project our conventions of individuation. Our confidence is warranted because apart from those conventions there are no phenomena of kind-sameness or of numerical sameness across time. There is just ‘stuff’ displaying properties. This paper argues that conventionalists can assign no properties to the ‘stuff’ beyond immediate phenomenal properties. Consequently they cannot explain how each of us comes to be able to wield ‘our conventions’.     

Liberalism and Eugenics

‘Liberal eugenics’ has emerged as the most popular position amongst philosophers writing in the contemporary debate about the ethics of human enhancement. This position has been most clearly articulated by Nicholas Agar, who argues that the ‘new’ liberal eugenics can avoid the repugnant consequences associated with eugenics in the past. Agar suggests that parents should be free to make only those interventions into the genetics of their children that will benefit them no matter what way of life they grow up to endorse. I argue that Agar's attempt to distinguish the new from the old eugenics fails. Once we start to consciously determine the genetics of future persons, we will not be able to avoid controversial assumptions about the relative worth of different life plans. Liberal eugenicists therefore confront the horns of a dilemma. Whichever way they try to resolve it, the consequences of widespread use of technologies of genetic selection are likely to look more like the old eugenics than defenders of the new eugenics have acknowledged.     

Can a Neural System Geared to Bring About Rapid,Predictive, and Efficient Function Explain Creativity?

Abstract

Vandervert, Schimpf, and Liu (this issue) have presented a cerebellar model of creativity in the featured article by relating their ideas to processes of working memory in relation to the cerebellum as well as by generalizing the motor control role of the cerebellum to extend to non-motor facets of cognition. In the present article, I discuss the weaknesses of their approach at different levels, ranging from the inadequate definition of the construct under study and the lack of specificity in their claims, to the counterintuitive underlying rationale of their approach, and the inadequate evidence provided to cement their ideas. I end by briefly outlining what would be necessary to propound an account of creativity that is uniquely attributable to cerebellum function.     

Initial job analysis of military embedded behavioral health services: Tasks and essential competencies

Utilization of mental health personnel assigned to operational military units is an area of growth for the US military. What activities they perform, how requirements may differ from working in clinical settings, and how to select and train for these types of positions is still poorly understood. A job analysis was conducted of Air Force mental health providers and enlisted technicians embedded in special operations, intelligence, and high-risk training units. Participants rated 27 tasks on frequency, importance, difficulty, and risks, as well as the importance of 37 knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs), with differentiation between KSAs that may be trained versus those that must be present to be assigned to the embedded position. Tasks reflected 4 areas of activity: unit embedding/engagement, behavioral health consultation and support, performance optimization activities, and operational mission tasks. Tasks varied by professional training (psychologist, social worker, enlisted technician) and unit type. The KSAs rated as most important were ethical judgment and ability to manage complex relationships and boundaries while working outside of a clinic, strong interpersonal skills with appropriate assertiveness to advocate for safe, effective courses of action, and understanding of unit missions and organizational dynamics. Results have implications for job design, selection criteria, professional disciplines with KSAs necessary to unit-specific tasks, and training of personnel for integrated operational support positions.     

Bocheński on authority

Józef Maria Bocheński introduced an important distinction between deontic and epistemic authority. A typical example of epistemic authority is the relation of a teacher to his students; a typical example of deontic authority is the relation between an employer and his employee. The difference between the two lies in domains of authority: declarative sentences make up the domain in the case of epistemic authority, orders—in the domain of deontic authority. In the article, I analyze in detail the concepts of the two kinds of authority and propose some new explications. The concept of epistemic authority is distinguished from the concept of infallibility and expertise; and the concept of deontic authority is distinguished from the concept of sovereign. I interpret various kinds of deontic authority in the light of the theory of imperative sentences. The concepts of gradation and de-gradation of authority are introduced and explicated.     

Lexicality and Stimulus Length Effects in Italian Dyslexics: Role of the Overadditivity Effect

The effect of lexicality and stimulus length was studied in 32 third- and fourth-grade Italian dyslexics and in 86 age-matched controls. A visual lexical decision task was used. As proposed by Faust et al. (1999) Faust, M. E., Balota, D. A., Spieler, D. H. and Ferraro, F. R. 1999. Individual differences in information-processing rate and amount: Implications for group differences in response latency. Psychological Bulletin, 125: 777–799. [INFOTRIEVE][CROSSREF][CSA][Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], the results were analyzed in terms of raw reaction time (RT) data and using the z-score transformation to control for the presence of overadditivity effects. In terms of RTs, dyslexics showed a larger difference between words and nonwords (lexicality effect) and between short and long stimuli (length effect) than proficient readers. When data were transformed into z scores, only the group by length interaction remained significant while that with lexicality vanished. This pattern indicates that stimulus length has a specific role in Italian dyslexics’ reading deficit; in contrast, slowness in responding to nonwords was not specific but was interpreted as one aspect of dyslexics’ general inability to deal with alphabetical material (overadditivity effect).     

Receptive vocabulary and semantic knowledge in children with SLI and children with Down syndrome

Receptive vocabulary and associated semantic knowledge were compared within and between groups of children with specific language impairment (SLI), children with Down syndrome (DS), and typically developing children. To overcome the potential confounding effects of speech or language difficulties on verbal tests of semantic knowledge, a novel task was devised based on picture-based semantic association tests used to assess adult patients with semantic dementia. Receptive vocabulary, measured by word-picture matching, of children with SLI was weak relative to chronological age and to nonverbal mental age but their semantic knowledge, probed across the same lexical items, did not differ significantly from that of vocabulary-matched typically developing children. By contrast, although receptive vocabulary of children with DS was a relative strength compared to nonverbal cognitive abilities (p < .0001), DS was associated with a significant deficit in semantic knowledge (p < .0001) indicative of dissociation between word-picture matching vocabulary and depth of semantic knowledge. Overall, these data challenge the integrity of semantic-conceptual development in DS and imply that contemporary theories of semantic cognition should also seek to incorporate evidence from atypical conceptual development.     

On the Reality and Causal Efficacy of Familiar Objects

What caused the event we report by saying “the window shattered”? Was it the baseball, which crashed into the window? Causal exclusionists say: many, many microparticles collectively caused that event—microparticles located where common sense supposes the baseball was. Unitary large objects such as baseballs cause nothing; indeed, by Alexander’s dictum, there are no such objects. This paper argues that the false claim about causal efficacy is instead the one that attributes it to the many microparticles. Causation obtains just where there is an “invariance”, a true generalization to the effect that had things been different with the putative cause, things would have been correspondingly different with the putative effect. But “correspondingly” here requires a rough metric. There must be a fact as to which alternative group events, involving many microparticles, would have departed less from the putative cause of the shattering, and which would have departed more. Surprisingly, there is no such fact.     

THE BRUNO KLOPFER,WALTER G. KLOPFER,AND MARTIN MAYMAN AWARDS

The Bene-Anthony Family Relations Test was administered to 190 eleven-year-old, sixth grade children (86 boys, 104 girls) by students under the supervision of the author. Means and standard deviations for the outgoing and incoming, positive and negative, categories were calculated for ‘Father’, ‘Mother’, ‘Nobody’, ‘Next Oldest Sibling’ and ‘Next Youngest Sibling’, boys and girls being treated separately. The ‘norms’ for boys are compared with “clinic”, “delinquent” and “non-reading” groups. Some important and statistically significant differences are noted between these groups.