Psychological type and attitude toward Christianity: a replication

A sample of 149 university students completed the Francis Psychological Type Scales together with the Francis Scale of Attitude Toward Christianity. The data indicated that university students classified as Feeling Types hold a more positive attitude toward Christianity than those classified as Thinking Types. These findings replicate the 1999 report of Jones and Francis.     

On-line story representation in boys with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder

Children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) face an increased risk of poor achievement in school. Thus, knowledge of the cognitive processing abilities of children with ADHD is critical to understanding and improving their academic performance. Although many studies have focused on the specific nature of the attention deficit experienced by children with ADHD, few have examined higher order cognitive processing such as comprehension of stories. The present study examined the processes of encoding story information, building a story representation, and modifying a story representation in boys with ADHD and nonreferred boys. Boys were asked to narrate a story from a picture book twice. Boys with ADHD showed deficits in representing goals and goal plans in their narrations, as compared to nonreferred boys. Boys with ADHD also committed more errors than nonreferred boys, but did correct certain types of errors on their second telling. Implications are discussed in terms of future research needed to identify the cognitive deficits that account for these narrative deficits.     

Playing with Dreams: The Introduction of a Third Party into the Transference Dynamic of the Couple

Dreams in couple therapy are expressions of the multiple discontinuous selves of partners and of interpersonal defenses. Two dreams offered during analytic couple therapy illustrate the use of transference and countertransference to observe disturbances in self-cohesion, communication of self-states, and attempts to affectively influence the partner. Dreams transferentially communicate the state of the realtionship, activate a third formation expressing shared pathology, and facilitate the growth of new aspects of the self seeking a more loving bond.     

Age stereotypes in younger and older women: analyses of accommodative shifts with a sentence-priming task

A sentence-priming technique was used to examine whether older women (N = 39) share a more positive view of aging than younger women (N = 35). Situationally specified statements about older and younger persons were presented, followed either by a semantically related word, an unrelated word of the same valence, or a nonword. The accessibility of target words was measured by reaction times in a lexical decision task. Whereas a semantic priming effect for negatively connoted materials emerged for both groups, a priming effect for positively connoted materials was found for older women only. Furthermore, an affective priming effect was found for the older group, i.e., older women tended to respond relatively faster (slower) to semantically unrelated positive (negative) words following a sentence about an older person. The results are discussed within a coping-theoretical framework.     

Three Assistants on Boltzmann

The three demi-articles presented here would give a brief biographical account of Ludwig Boltzmann’s life plus some details about his Vienna laboratories first in the 1860’s in the Erdberg and second in Türkenstrasse from 1894. Josef Nabl’s account discusses J. J. Thomson’s Laboratory in Cambridge, which allows a provisional comparison between two different largely contemporary institutes. Nabl’s second letter also mentions Lord Kelvin’s late rejection of the kinetic gas theory of Maxwell and Boltzmann, rejection which on top of the negative attitude of Mach, Zermelo, and Poincaré probably did not benefit Boltzmann’s state of mind and may have contributed to the extreme character of Boltzmann’s anti-philosophical counterattack starting in 1903. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Merleau-Ponty's Modification of Phenomenology: Cognition,Passion and Philosophy

This paper problematizes the analogy that Hubert Dreyfus has presented between phenomenology and cognitive science. It argues that Dreyfus presents Merleau-Ponty's modification of Husserl's phenomenology in a misleading way. He ignores the idea of philosophy as a radical interrogation and self-responsibility that stems from Husserl's work and recurs in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. The paper focuses on Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the phenomenological reduction. It shows that his critical idea was not to restrict the scope of Husserl's reductions but to study the conditions of possibility for the thetic acts. Merleau-Ponty argued, following Husserl's texts, that the thetic acts rest on the basis of primordial pre-thetic experience. This layer of experience cannot, by its nature, be explicated or clarified, but it can be questioned and unveiled. This is the recurrent task of phenomenological philosophy, as Merleau-Ponty understands it.     

Quantifiers and Congruence Closure

We prove some results about the limitations of the expressive power of quantifiers on finite structures. We define the concept of a bounded quantifier and prove that every relativizing quantifier which is bounded is already first-order definable (Theorem 3.8). We weaken the concept of congruence closed (see [6]) to weakly congruence closed by restricting to congruence relations where all classes have the same size. Adapting the concept of a thin quantifier (Caicedo [1]) to the framework of finite structures, we define the concept of a meager quantifier. We show that no proper extension of first-order logic by means of meager quantifiers is weakly congruence closed (Theorem 4.9). We prove the failure of the full congruence closure property for logics which extend first-order logic by means of meager quantifiers, arbitrary monadic quantifiers, and the Härtig quantifier (Theorem 6.1).     

The concept of auditory stimulus representation in cognitive neuroscience

The sequence of neurophysiological processes elicited in the auditory system by a sound is analyzed in search of the stage at which the processes carrying sensory information cross the borderline beyond which they directly underlie sound perception. Neurophysiological data suggest that this transition occurs when the sensory input is mapped onto the physiological basis of sensory memory in the auditory cortex. At this point, the sensory information carried by the stimulus-elicited process corresponds, for the first time, to that contained by the actual sound percept. Before this stage, the sensory stimulus code is fragmentary, lacks the time dimension, cannot enter conscious perception, and is not accessible to top-down processes (voluntary mental operations). On these grounds, 2 distinct stages of auditory sensory processing, prerepresentational and representational, can be distinguished.     

Repeated Interrogations –Stretching the Deception Detection Paradigm

In real life, suspects are often subjected to repeatedinterrogations. Psycho-legal research on deception has neglectedthis fact. To remedy this mismatch a series of studies wasconducted mapping how repeated interrogations affectlie-catchers' judgemental processes, deception detectionperformance, and meta-assessments. In two experiments we foundthat lie-catchers given access to consecutive statements from onesuspect did not perform better than lie-catchers given access toone statement only. In addition, access to repeatedinterrogations inflated the lie-catchers' confidence in thecorrectness of their veracity judgement, which had a detrimentaleffect on the accuracy-confidence relation. As the basis forassessing veracity was changed from one to several statements thelie-catchers, to a large extent, seemed to trust the `consistencyheuristic'. The assumption underlying this heuristic is thatinconsistency implies deception and consistency implies truth.The data show that (a) people tend to disagree as to whether aparticular set of consecutive statements is consistent or not,and (b) deceptive statements are at least equally consistent astruthful statements. In order to explain the latter finding a`repeat vs. reconstruct' hypothesis was suggested, assuming thatliars try to repeat their initial statement, whereastruth-tellers try to reconstruct a previously experienced event.The low predictive accuracy found for the `consistency heuristic'strongly questions beliefs held by professional lie-catchers,opinions expressed in the psycho-legal literature andrecommendations found in applied interrogation manuals.