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111.
What is Levinas's relation to Hegel, the thinker who seems to summarize everything which Levinas's philosophy opposes, yet with whom Levinas never enters a sustained philosophical engagement? An answer can be found through an analysis of the concept of work, understood both as activity of labor and product thereof. The concept of work reveals that, despite the apparent (but superficial) sense of opposition, Levinas's philosophy works in a deliberately noncommittal, or, to use a Levinasian expression, ``dis-interested'' mode with respect to Hegel. Such mode of disinterstedness expresses an ethical gesture of joyful hospitality that neither confirms nor refutes the German philosopher but rather opens him up to an eschatological dimension.  相似文献   
112.
Moral Relativism     
Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person's moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person's moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.  相似文献   
113.
What accounts for individual differences in the sort of knowledge that people may draw on in everyday cognitive tasks, such as deciding whom to vote for in a presidential election, how to invest money in the stock market, or what team to bet on in a friendly wager? In a large sample of undergraduate students, we investigated correlates of individual differences in recently acquired knowledge of current events in domains such as politics, business, and sports. Structural equation modeling revealed two predictive pathways: one involving cognitive ability factors and the other involving two major nonability factors (personality and interests). The results of this study add to what is known about the sources of individual differences in knowledge and are interpreted in the context of theoretical conceptions of adult intelligence that emphasize the centrality and importance of knowledge (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; Cattell, 1971).  相似文献   
114.
We report the results of four experiments in which we explored the flexibility and fallibility of associative recognition memory. In each experiment, pairs were studied one or more times, and the task was to discriminate intact from rearranged pairs. The critical findings are that the pattern of false alarm rates was dependent on the nature of the recognition procedure (e.g., ratings vs. yes-no) and the situation in which the task was performed. The specific pattern of findings suggest that subjects adopt different recognition strategies in order to achieve a desired level of performance in the most efficient manner possible by varying the degree to which they base their decisions on familiarity versus recollected information. Implications for theories of recognition memory are discussed.  相似文献   
115.
Anna Case-Winters 《Zygon》2000,35(1):69-81
This article offers a brief overview of the argument for God's existence grounded in the evidence of design. It gives particular attention to the way the argument has evolved over time and in relation to changing scientific perspectives. The argument from de-sign has in fact been formulated and reformulated in response to the discoveries and challenges it has encountered from the field of science. The conclusion of the article explores the theological importance of this argument—its extent and its limits.  相似文献   
116.
In this rejoinder to Tidwell and Corona Garrett (1994), the authors discuss three important aspects of the term at risk that help to clarify its meaning.  相似文献   
117.
118.
Grant Havers 《Sophia》2015,54(4):525-543
The political philosopher Leo Strauss is famous for contending that any synthesis of reason and revelation is impossible, since they are irreconcilable antagonists. Yet he is also famous for praising the secular regime of liberal democracy as the best regime for all human beings, even though he is well aware that modern philosophers such as Spinoza thought this regime must make use of biblical morality to promote good citizenship. Is democracy, then, both religious and secular? Strauss thought that Spinoza was contradictory in teaching that reason and revelation should be separated from each other while also insisting that a secular democratic politics still requires the biblical morality of charity (love thy neighbor as thyself). The paradox that liberal democracy is both religious and secular, which is central to Spinoza, was dismissed by Strauss as a Machiavellian subterfuge or the cynical attempt to use religion for political purposes. In order to adhere to his dualistic separation of reason and revelation, Strauss turned to ancient Greek political philosophy, particularly the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, as the true ground of liberal democracy since this classical tradition was never exposed to biblical revelation. Yet, the illiberal and hierarchical implications of Greek political thought, which clash with Strauss’s modern views on human individuality and dignity, ultimately take him back to the biblically based philosophies of Spinoza and Kierkegaard, who teach the paradox that the Bible is the true foundation of human freedom.  相似文献   
119.
We investigated the psychological adaptation of Ingrian–Finnish migrants from Russia to Finland between 2008 and 2013. Pre‐migration data (N = 225) were collected at the Finnish language courses that were part of the immigration training program. The three post‐migration follow‐ups were conducted half a year (N = 155), and 2 (N = 133) and 3 years (N = 85) after migration. Well‐being was assessed with measures of Life Satisfaction and Self‐Esteem. Life Satisfaction increased from pre‐migration to the first post‐migration measurement point, after which it stabilized. Self‐Esteem decreased throughout the study. Variables reflecting adjustment to the event of migration (e.g., acculturation stress, socio‐cultural adaptation) were primarily associated with well‐being at the first post‐migration measurement point. More general determinants of well‐being (e.g., social support and subjective economic situation) were more consistently associated with well‐being throughout the study. The results suggest that migration can be beneficial to some but detrimental to other types of well‐being.  相似文献   
120.
In this cross‐sectional study, we examined the relationship between national identification of majority Finns (nation‐wide probability sample, N = 335) and their attitudes towards Russian immigrants living in Finland. As previous research indicates both possibilities, we tested whether this relationship was moderated or mediated by threats and gains perceived to result from immigration. The results supported the mediation hypothesis; those individuals who identified stronger with their national ingroup perceived more threats than gains related to increased immigration and these perceptions, in turn, were associated with more negative attitudes towards immigrants. The role of realistic as opposed to symbolic threats and gains was particularly pronounced. The implications of the results are discussed in terms of their theoretical relevance and practical means to improve intergroup relations, with a particular focus on the relations between Finns and Russian immigrants in Finland.  相似文献   
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