When message tailoring backfires: The role of initial attitudes in affect–cognition matching

This research explores when and how tailoring messages to attitudinal bases backfires. Study 1 demonstrated that for attitudes (toward education subsidies) that were based more on beliefs than emotions, recipients whose initial attitudes were incongruent with the message position (i.e., message opponents) showed mismatching effects, such that the affective message was more persuasive than the cognitive message. Study 2 replicated these mismatching effects among message opponents for attitudes (toward a rival university) that were primarily affective. Study 3 controlled for effects of initial attitude certainty and replicated the mismatching effects of Study 2 for affective attitudes toward an increase in tuition. Finally, Study 4 suggested a potential mechanism for mismatching effects, revealing that for attitudes (toward an online course management system) that were based more on beliefs than emotions, message opponents counter‐argued with the cognitive appeal more intensely than the affective appeal. Contrary to the notion in the extant literature that mismatching effects are relatively rare compared with matching effects, the current research suggests that mismatching effects occur for both primarily affective and cognitive attitudes when the recipient is highly opposed to the message position. The present findings also demonstrate the utility of examining attitudinal bases at the object level in the context of message tailoring. Implications for message tailoring and for affective versus cognitive attitudes are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning time-varying categories

Many kinds of objects and events in our world have a strongly time-dependent quality. However, most theories about concepts and categories either are insensitive to variation over time or treat it as a nuisance factor that produces irrational order effects during learning. In this article, we present two category learning experiments in which we explored peoples’ ability to learn categories whose structure is strongly time-dependent. We suggest that order effects in categorization may in part reflect a sensitivity to changing environments, and that understanding dynamically changing concepts is an important part of developing a full account of human categorization.     

Altered working memory capacity for social threat words in high versus low social anxiety

ABSTRACT

Background and objectives: Differences in working memory capacity (WMC) have been suggested in individuals with high levels of social anxiety (SA). Specifically, these individuals may preferentially maintain socially threatening material in working memory.

Design and methods: We adapted the digit span task to a series of word span tasks. We assessed WMC for lists of words that varied in terms of their threat-relatedness, in individuals either high or low in SA.

Results: Experiment 1 revealed reduced WMC for socially threatening words in those with high compared to low SA. Importantly, this relative reduction in WMC was driven by the low SA group showing expanded capacity for socially threatening words relative to neutral or generally threatening words. Furthermore, reductions in WMC for social threat were uniquely predicted by SA, and not by other theoretically related constructs such as state general anxiety, trait general anxiety, or depression. Experiment 2 showed that the semantic similarity of the words within each list was not responsible for the differences in WMC between list type or SA group.

Conclusions: Our findings suggest that individuals high in SA may fail to upregulate WMC for social information due to the activation of, or rumination upon, socially threatening concepts.     

Children’s understanding of the mind’s involvement in pretense: do words bend the truth?

Many have thought that children have an early appreciation of the role of the mind in pretense, fitting with the notion that pretend play is, in general, a ‘zone of proximal development’ ( Vygotsky, 1978 ). Although results from several experiments are against this hypothesis, the evidence from that line of research has been questioned because the experiments thus far have always used the word ‘pretend’. Young children might have a perfectly clear understanding that pretense involves the mind, but have mismapped the word ‘pretend’ onto non‐mental correlates of pretending, like action and costume. Two experiments tested this possibility. Four‐year‐olds were shown videos of people engaging in real and pretend activities and asked questions regarding the role of mind; for half the children the word ‘pretend’ was used to describe the activity, and for half it was not. Contrary to the hypothesis, even when the word ‘pretend’ was not used, roughly half of the 4‐year‐olds failed to designate pretense as involving mental activity. Consistent with prior work, more children of this age were cognizant of the mind’s involvement in pretense than were cognizant of the mind’s involvement in physical actions.     

Evolutionary Development: Sustainability … and Beyond!

The act of observation can appear to affect the results of certain scientific experiments. Research has shown that the mind is much more than the brain. The perception of an observer may be significantly affected by the local and non-local environment, and is dependant on the time of the day, month, or year on which those measurements are made. This research has led toward a greater understanding of the structure of the universe, including its connection to consciousness and information. For example, it is demonstrated that the mind's ability to communicate information from across the solar system is much faster than the speed of light.