Attitudes and Attraction: Optimism and Weight as Explanations for the Similarity–Dissimilarity Asymmetry

The positive link between attitude similarity and attraction is one of the fundamental outcomes in social psychology. However, attitude dissimilarity seems to be a stronger driver of this relationship than attitude similarity. The authors review the evidence on this similarity–dissimilarity asymmetry, and discuss two explanations. One is that people generally enter into interactions with optimism, and so supposedly neutral partners are often seen as mildly positive. Another is that dissimilar attitudes carry greater weight than similar attitudes in cognitive processes. Implications of these mechanisms for wider issues in person perception and attitude structure are discussed, connecting them with more recent theories of attitudinal ambivalence and evaluative space.     

Understanding cross-cultural sales manager–salesperson relationships in the Asia-Pacific Rim region: a grounded theory approach

Abstract

As more organizations implement multinational strategies, sales managers leading sales forces encounter complex cultural challenges that affect relationships, processes, and outcomes. We undertake a qualitative study with the objective of understanding the sales manager–salesperson relationship when the sales manager is leading sales representatives located in other cultures. Because of the significant size and growth of Asian countries, we focus our study on the Asia-Pacific Rim region. In-depth interviews conducted with 21 sales managers working for a large multinational technology firm in our focal region provide the data for our analysis. Using a grounded theory approach, we identify five key themes: building and sustaining cross-cultural relationships, cross-cultural communication effectiveness, acquisition and maintenance of trust across cultures, language, and decision-making. From our findings, research propositions are offered and implications for researchers and practitioners are discussed.     

Attitudes,Tracing, and Control

There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to resolve this apparent tension, many philosophers appeal to a tracing principle to argue that agents are morally responsible (only) for those attitudes whose existence can be traced back, causally, to a voluntary action or omission in the past. My aim in this article is to critically evaluate this tracing strategy and to argue that it gives us a misguided picture of when and why we are morally responsible for our attitudes. I argue that we should accept a ‘judgment sensitivity’ condition of moral responsibility rather than a ‘voluntary control’ condition, and defend this account against various objections.