Attitudes,Tracing, and Control

There is an apparent tension in our everyday moral responsibility practices. On the one hand, it is commonly assumed that moral responsibility requires voluntary control: an agent can be morally responsible only for those things that fall within the scope of her voluntary control. On the other hand, we regularly praise and blame individuals for mental states and conditions that appear to fall outside the scope of their voluntary control, such as desires, emotions, beliefs, and other attitudes. In order to resolve this apparent tension, many philosophers appeal to a tracing principle to argue that agents are morally responsible (only) for those attitudes whose existence can be traced back, causally, to a voluntary action or omission in the past. My aim in this article is to critically evaluate this tracing strategy and to argue that it gives us a misguided picture of when and why we are morally responsible for our attitudes. I argue that we should accept a ‘judgment sensitivity’ condition of moral responsibility rather than a ‘voluntary control’ condition, and defend this account against various objections.     

Counting On Blood Donors: Increasing the Impact of Reminder Calls

Two experiments were conducted to see if blood drive attendance could be increased by altering the content of reminder calls. In Experiment 1 college students received either a standard reminder (the place, time, and necessity of eating beforehand) or a commitment-enhancing reminder in which they agreed to be "counted on". Those in the latter condition were significantly more likely (p <.007) to attend a blood drive. Experiment 2 demonstrated that an alternate wording for the commitment-enhancing message was possible; that a verbal response was necessary to ensure the commitment; and that a message enhancing altruism was not as effective. The studies suggest that asking for an additional commitment during a reminder call can appreciably increase blood drive participation rates.