The verbal threat information pathway to fear in children: the longitudinal effects on fear cognitions and the immediate effects on avoidance behavior

Verbal information has long been assumed to be an indirect pathway to fear. Children (aged 6-8 or 12-13 years) were exposed to threat, positive, or no information about 3 novel animals to see the long-term impact on their fear cognitions and the immediate impact on avoidance behavior. Their directly (self-report) and indirectly (implicit association task) measured attitudes toward the animals changed congruent with the information provided, and the changes persisted up to 6 months later. Verbal threat information also induced behavioral avoidance of the animal. Younger children formed stronger animal- threat and animal-safe associations because of threat and positive verbal information than older children, but there were negligible age effects on self-reported fear beliefs and avoidance behaviors. These results support theories of fear acquisition that suppose that verbal information affects components of the fear emotion.     

Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.

Decreasing Child Distress During Needle Sticks and Maintaining Treatment Gains Over Time

This study examined the effectiveness of an intervention for reducing behavioral distress in children during needle sticks. Participants were eight children and their parents. The children received injections or venipunctures for hematological or oncological disease. The distress management intervention included instruction for children to engage in a distraction activity during needle sticks and parent training in coaching their children. The intervention was adapted to clinic and home treatment settings. Results indicated that five children exhibited significantly less distress after treatment when compared with baseline sessions, that treatment gains were maintained at follow-up for three of them, and that child distress was significantly and negatively related to use of the experimental distractor. Implications for clinical practice are discussed.     

Long-term persistence of sort strategy in free classification

Two free classification experiments that investigate the persistence of sort strategy are reported. Participants tend to persist with their initial categorization type (family resemblance or unidimensional) for the remaining sorts, overriding the effects of otherwise influential stimulus properties. Sort type was found to persist even after a one-week delay. Stimulus-driven models of free classification (e.g., the SUSTAIN model, [Love, B. C., Medin, D. L., & Gureckis, T. M. (2004). SUSTAIN: A network model of category learning. Psychological Review, 111, 309-332]) cannot predict the sort type persistence effects we observe, but they are naturally accounted for by theories that posit strategic selection of a problem-solving strategy (e.g., Hypothesis theory, [Levine, M. (1971). Hypothesis theory and nonlearning despite ideal S-R-reinforcement contingencies. Psychological Review, 78, 130-140]).     

Temperament moderates the effect of the verbal threat information pathway on children's heart rate responses to novel animals

Temperamental variables such as trait anxiety are risk factors in children for the development of anxiety disorders. This experiment aimed to test whether temperament moderates the effect of verbal threat information on the physiological component of the fear emotion. An experiment is reported in which 6-10 year old children's (N = 54) fear beliefs about novel animals were measured. They were then given threat, positive or no verbal information about these animals following which their heart rate was recorded while they placed their hands in boxes that they believed these animals inhabited. Children also completed a questionnaire measure of trait anxiety. Child-reported temperament moderated the effect that threat information has on the physiological component of the fear emotion. Fear information is, therefore, a possible mechanism through which temperament leads children to acquire animal fears.     

Is Socrates free? The Theaetetus as case study

Most scholars agree that Plato’s concept of freedom, to the extent he has one, is ‘intellectualist’: true freedom is submission to the rule of reason through philosophical knowledge of rational order. Surprisingly, though, there are few explicit linkages of philosophy and freedom in Plato. Socrates is called many things in the dialogues, but not ‘free’. I aim to understand why by studying the Theaetetus, heretofore ignored in discussions of Platonic freedom. By examining the Digression (172c-177c) and Socrates’ ‘dream’ about wholes and parts (201c-206c), I show that describing freedom as ‘rule of reason’ simplifies what, for Plato, is a more tangled skein. In the Digression, philosophers are free in occupying a comprehensive standpoint transcending all limited and partial perspectives. Socrates’ dream, however, shows that logos cannot completely account for the knowledge of complex wholes or for itself as such a whole. Philosophical freedom cannot mean comprehensive discursive knowledge, then, since reason lacks a comprehensive grasp of itself. Socrates dreams of the rational whole, but is aware of why it remains only a dream, rather than wakeful knowledge. This awareness constitutes a freedom attained, not in total liberation from the confines of the partial human perspective, but within those confines.     

Vicarious learning and the development of fears in childhood

Vicarious learning has long been assumed to be an indirect pathway to fear; however, there is only retrospective evidence that children acquire fears in this way. In two experiments, children (aged 7-9 years) were exposed to pictures of novel animals paired with pictures of either scared, happy or no facial expressions to see the impact on their fear cognitions and avoidance behavior about the animals. In Experiment 1, directly (self-report) and indirectly measured (affective priming) fear attitudes towards the animals changed congruent with the facial expressions with which these were paired. The indirectly measured fear beliefs persisted up to 3 months. Experiment 2 showed that children took significantly longer to approach a box they believed to contain an animal they had previously seen paired with scared faces. These results support theories of fear acquisition that suppose that vicarious learning affects cognitive and behavioral fear emotion, and suggest possibilities for interventions to weaken fear acquired in this way.     

Memory for emotionally neutral information in posttraumatic stress disorder: A meta-analytic investigation

Studies have come to conflicting conclusions about whether posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is associated with poorer memory for emotionally neutral information. The authors report a meta-analysis of 27 studies that investigated verbal and/or visual memory in samples with PTSD and healthy controls. The results indicated that the association between PTSD and memory impairment appears to be robust, small to moderate in size, and stronger for verbal than for visual memory. Effect sizes did not vary according to whether recall was immediate or delayed. The association is found in both civilian and military samples and cannot be readily explained as being due to the use of nontraumatized healthy control groups or concurrent head injury. The findings are placed in the context of recent neurobiological and experimental cognitive research.