Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.

Propagation of innovations in networked groups

A novel paradigm was developed to study the behavior of groups of networked people searching a problem space. The authors examined how different network structures affect the propagation of information in laboratory-created groups. Participants made numerical guesses and received scores that were also made available to their neighbors in the network. The networks were compared on speed of discovery and convergence on the optimal solution. One experiment showed that individuals within a group tend to converge on similar solutions even when there is an equally valid alternative solution. Two additional studies demonstrated that the optimal network structure depends on the problem space being explored, with networks that incorporate spatially based cliques having an advantage for problems that benefit from broad exploration, and networks with greater long-range connectivity having an advantage for problems requiring less exploration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).     

Memory for individuals: hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus) require contact to develop multicomponent representations (concepts) of others

In humans, individuals recognize other individuals by numerous types of independent information, such as the quality of the voice, appearance of the face, smell, gait, and posture. Humans also have integrated memories of others--that is, in response to a face or a voice the individual is recognized by name and other information about that individual is remembered. In many nonhuman species, individual recognition also occurs. Although observational studies suggest that individuals of some nonhuman species may be able to use several different cues for individual recognition, little experimental proof for this is available. Golden hamsters have at least 5 individually distinctive odors and they develop integrated, multi-odor memories (concepts) of familiar individuals, as shown by across-odor habituation experiments. Little is known, however, about the conditions that are necessary to develop such integrated memories. In these experiments we investigated what kinds of experiences were necessary for male hamsters to develop multiodor memories of females. The results show that exposure to all of the odors of another individual was not sufficient to develop such multiodor memories but that physical contact between the subjects and stimulus animals was necessary. Multiodor representations were developed after interactions with anesthetized individuals, confirming the finding that physical contact was important but also showing that interaction with an awake, behaving individual was not necessary to form multiodor representations of other individuals. We are not aware of experimental proof for integrated, multicomponant memories in any other nonhuman species.