Automatic Mechanisms for Social Attention Are Culturally Penetrable

Are mechanisms for social attention influenced by culture? Evidence that social attention is triggered automatically by bottom‐up gaze cues and is uninfluenced by top‐down verbal instructions may suggest it operates in the same way everywhere. Yet considerations from evolutionary and cultural psychology suggest that specific aspects of one's cultural background may have consequence for the way mechanisms for social attention develop and operate. In more interdependent cultures, the scope of social attention may be broader, focusing on more individuals and relations between those individuals. We administered a multi‐gaze cueing task requiring participants to fixate a foreground face flanked by background faces and measured shifts in attention using eye tracking. For European Americans, gaze cueing did not depend on the direction of background gaze cues, suggesting foreground gaze alone drives automatic attention shifting; for East Asians, cueing patterns differed depending on whether the foreground cue matched or mismatched background cues, suggesting foreground and background gaze information were integrated. These results demonstrate that cultural background influences the social attention system by shifting it into a narrow or broad mode of operation and, importantly, provides evidence challenging the assumption that mechanisms underlying automatic social attention are necessarily rigid and impenetrable to culture.     

The moderating role of extrinsic contingency focus on reactions to threat

Over the last decade a number of theorists have advanced a multifaceted conceptualization of self‐esteem. Central to this idea is the notion that self‐esteem is less secure and more defensive when individuals are more focused on extrinsic contingencies. To test the hypothesis that individuals with high dispositional levels of extrinsic contingency focus (ECF) are insecure and respond defensively to threat, we developed a measure of ECF and conducted two validation studies. Study 1 showed that the extrinsic contingency focus scale (ECFS) was positively correlated with measures of defensiveness and was negatively correlated with measures of security and well‐being. Study 2 showed that people with a high (vs. low) focus on extrinsic contingencies were more likely to defensively distance from a socially insensitive person following negative feedback about their own social sensitivity. Study 3 showed that when mortality (vs. dental pain) was salient, high ECF individuals responded more defensively toward a worldview violator than low ECF individuals. Discussion is focused on theoretical issues related to ECF and defensiveness. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How to do a meta‐analysis

Meta‐analysis is a statistical tool for estimating the mean and variance of underlying population effects from a collection of empirical studies addressing ostensibly the same research question. Meta‐analysis has become an increasing popular and valuable tool in psychological research, and major review articles typically employ these methods. This article describes the process of conducting meta‐analysis: selecting articles, developing inclusion criteria, calculating effect sizes, conducting the actual analysis (including information on how to do the analysis on popular computer packages such as IBM SPSS and R) and estimating the effects of publication bias. Guidance is also given on how to write up a meta‐analysis.     

The temporal stability and predictive validity of pupils' causal attributions for difficult classroom behaviour

Background. Recent studies have investigated the causal attributions for difficult pupil behaviour made by teachers, pupils, and parents but none have investigated the temporal stability or predictive validity of these attributions. Aims. This study examines the causal attributions made for difficult classroom behaviour by students on two occasions 30 months apart. The longitudinal stability of these attributions is considered as is the predictive validity of the first set of attributions in relation to teachers' later judgments about individual students' behaviour. Sample. Two hundred and seventeen secondary school age pupils (114 males, 103 females) provided data on the two occasions. Teachers also rated each student's behaviour at the two times. Method. A questionnaire listing 63 possible causes of classroom misbehaviour was delivered to pupils firstly when they were in Year 7 (aged 11–12) and then again, 30 months later. Responses were analysed through exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Additionally, teachers were asked to rate the standard of behaviour of each of the students on the two occasions. Results. EFA of the Years 7 and 10 data indicated that pupils' attributions yielded broadly similar five‐factor models with the perceived relative importance of these factors remaining the same. Analysis also revealed a predictive relationship between pupils' attributions regarding the factor named culture of misbehaviour in Year 7, and teachers' judgments of their standard of behaviour in Year 10. Conclusion. The present study suggests that young adolescents' causal attributions for difficult classroom behaviour remain stable over time and are predictive of teachers' later judgments about their behaviour.     

Secondary Qualities and Self‐Location1

There is a strong pull to the idea that there is some metaphysically interesting distinction between the fully real, objective, observer‐independent qualities of things as they are in themselves, and the less‐than‐fully‐real, subjective, observer‐dependent qualities of things as they are for us. Call this (putative) distinction the primary/secondary quality distinction. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is philosophically interesting because it is (a) often quite attractive to draw such a distinction, and (b) incredibly hard to spell it out in any kind of satisfying and sensible way. I attempt such a spelling‐out after first trying to pin down in more detail what we want from the primary/secondary quality distinction, and saying a bit about why that is such a hard thing to get.     

I know that “Kiki” is angular: The metacognition underlying sound–shape correspondences

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - We examined the ability of people to evaluate their confidence when making perceptual judgments concerning a classic crossmodal correspondence, the Bouba/Kiki...     

Prediction Errors and Attention in the Presence and Absence of Feedback

ABSTRACT— Contemporary theories of learning typically assume that learning is driven by prediction errors—in other words, that we learn more when our predictions turn out to be incorrect than we do when our predictions are correct. Results from the recording of electrical brain activity suggest one mechanism by which this might happen; we seem to direct visual attention toward the likely causes of previous prediction errors. This can happen very rapidly—within less than 200 milliseconds of the error-causing object being presented. It is tempting to infer that if learning is driven by prediction errors, then little can be learned in the absence of feedback. Such a conclusion is unwarranted. In fact, the substantial learning that is sometimes the result of simple exposure to objects can also be explained by processes of directing attention toward the likely causes of previous prediction errors.     

Do anxious parents interpretive biases towards threat extend into their child's environment?

Anxiety disorders are known to run in families [Turner, S. M., Beidel, D. C., & Costello, A. (1987). Psychopathology in the offspring of anxiety disorder patients. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55(2), 229–235] and environmental factors may largely account for the concordance between parental and child anxieties. Cognitive psychology models emphasise the importance of interpretive biases towards threat in the maintenance of anxiety and it is well established that anxious adults and children display similar interpretive biases and that these biases in anxious parents and their children are correlated. This raises the question of whether anxious cognitions/cognitive style may be transmitted from parent to child. We propose that this is more likely if anxious parents demonstrate interpretive biases not only about potential threats in their own environment but also about potential threats in their child's environment. Forty parents completed a recognition memory measure of interpretation bias adapted from Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, and Mathews (1991) [Bias in interpretation of ambiguous sentences related to threat in anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100(2), 144–150] to measure biases in response to potentially threat provoking situations involving themselves and their child. The interpretive biases demonstrated by parents were similar across situations involving themselves and their children. As expected, parental interpretive biases were further modified by anxiety with higher levels of parental anxiety associated with more negative interpretive biases about situations in their own and their child's environment, although this association was significantly stronger for potentially threat provoking situations in their own environment. These results are consistent with parent's interpretive biases extending beyond their own environment into their child's environment, although future research should continue to consider the mechanisms by which anxious parents may transmit fear cognitions to their children.     

The Dynamical Challenge

Recent studies such as Thelen and Smith (1994), Kelso, (1995), Van Gelder, (1995), Beer, (1995), and others have presented a forceful case for a dynamical systems approach to understanding cognition and adaptive behavior. These studies call into question some foundational assumptions concerning the nature of cognitive scientific explanation and (in particular) the role of notions such as internal representation and computation. These are exciting and important challenges. But they must be handled with care. It is all too easy, in this debate, to lose sight of the explanatorily important issues and to talk at cross-purposes, courtesy of the (surprisingly) various ways in which different theorists often conceive the key terms. The primary goal of the present paper is thus a modest one: to begin to clarify just what is at issue and to highlight some of the most central and pressing concerns. In so doing, we may hope to develop a constructive framework for future debate. In addition, I try to open up a space of intermediate options—ways in which dynamical and representational/computational understandings may sometimes afford complementary (rather than competing) perspectives on adaptive success.