On field's argument for substantivalism

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space‐time to be à substance since it ascribes field properties to space‐time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space‐time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space‐time to be a substance.     

An erotetic approach to explanation by specification

In earlier publications of the first author it was shown that intentional explanation of actions, functional explanation of biological traits and causal explanation of abnormal events share a common structure. They are called explanation by specification (of a goal, a biological function, an abnormal causal factor, respectively) as opposed to explanation by subsumption under a law. Explanation by specification is guided by a schematic train of thought, of which the argumentative steps not concerning questions were already shown to be logically valid (elementary) arguments.Independently, the second author developed a new, inferential approach to erotetic logic, the logic of questions. In this approach arguments resulting in questions, with declarative sentences and/or other questions as premises, are analyzed, and validity of such arguments is defined.In the present paper it is shown that all four kinds of erotetic argumentative steps occurring in the train of thought of explanation by specification are valid arguments in the sense of inferential erotetic logic. Hence, in view of the fact that the other argumentative steps were already shown to be valid, it may be concluded that the logical structure of explanation by specification can be as well-established as that of explanation by nomological subsumption. Moreover, explanation by specification provides some illustrations of the applicability of erotetic logic in everyday life and some empirical sciences.     

On the reducibility of questions

The concepta question is reducible to a non-empty set of questions is defined and examined. The basic results are: (1) each question which is sound relative to some of its presuppositions is reducible to some set of binary (i.e. having exactly two direct answers) questions; (b) each question which has a finite number of direct answers is reducible to some finite set of binary questions; (c) if entailment is compact, then each normal question (i.e. sound relative to its presuppositions) is reducible to some finite set of binary questions.     

Approximative truth of fact-statements,laws, and theories

Summary The paper is a sketch of a conception of approximative truth (or verisimilitude). The concepts of relative error, and degree of inadequacy are introduced. By means of them the concept of truth-content of quantitative facts-statements, laws and theories is defined. Laws and theories accepted in science have a high truth-content, i.e. they are approximately true.     

The lattice of strengthenings of a strongly finite consequence operation

First, we prove that the lattice of all structural strengthenings of a given strongly finite consequence operation is both atomic and coatomic, it has finitely many atoms and coatoms, each coatom is strongly finite but atoms are not of this kind — we settle this by constructing a suitable counterexample. Second, we deal with the notions of hereditary: algebraicness, strong finitisticity and finite approximability of a strongly finite consequence operation. Third, we formulate some conditions which tell us when the lattice of all structural strengthenings of a given strongly finite consequence operation is finite, and subsequently we give some applications of them.This paper was read at the Third Autumn School on Strongly Finite Sentential Calculi organized by the Section of Logic, Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, in Ustronie (Poland), November 1979.     

Towards a topological philosophy

This article examines the use of mathematical concepts in philosophy, focusing on topology, which may be viewed as a modern supplement to geometry. We show that Plato and Parmenides were already employing geometric ideas in their research, and discuss three examples of the application of topology to philosophical problems: the first concerns the analysis of the Cartesian distinction between res extensa and res cogitans, the second the ontology of possible worlds of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, and the third Leibniz's monadology. We also consider the role of topology in mathematical explanations of the sort found in science, arguing that it can perform a role in philosophy that is of comparable importance.     

On the Relation Between Religiosity and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories: The Role of Political Orientation

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory-driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta-analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian-dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need-related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.