Cross-task individual differences in error processing: Neural,electrophysiological, and genetic components

The error-related negativity (ERN) and error positivity (Pe) are electrophysiological markers of error processing thought to originate in the medial frontal cortex. Previous studies using probabilistic reinforcement showed that individuals who learn more from negative than from positive feedback (negative learners) had larger ERNs than did positive learners. These findings support the dopamine (DA) reinforcement-learning hypothesis of the ERN and associated computational models. However, it remains unclear (1) to what extent these effects generalize to tasks outside the restricted probabilistic reinforcement-learning domain and (2) whether there is a dopaminergic source of these effects. To address these issues, we tested subjects’ reinforcement-learning biases behaviorally and recorded EEG during an unrelated recognition memory experiment. Initial recognition responses were speeded, but the subjects were subsequently allowed to self-correct their responses. We found that negative learners, as assessed via probabilistic learning, had larger ERNs in the recognition memory task, suggestive of a common underlying enhanced error-processing mechanism. Negative learners also had enhanced Pes when selfcorrecting errors than did positive learners. Moreover, the ERN and Pe components contributed independently to negative learning. We also tested for a dopaminergic genetic basis of these ERP components. We analyzed the COMT val/met polymorphism, which has been linked to frontal DA levels. The COMT genotype affected Pe (but not ERN) magnitude; met/met homozygotes showed enhanced Pes to self-corrected errors, as compared with val carriers. These results are consistent with a role for the Pe and frontal monoamines in error awareness.     

Intentional Objects

The idea of an intentional object, or an object of thought, gives rise to a dilemma for theories of intentionality. Either intentional objects are existing objects, in which case it is impossible, contrary to appearances, to think about something which does not exist. Or some intentional objects are non-existent real objects. But this requires an obscure and implausible metaphysics. I argue that the way out of this dilemma is to deny that being an intentional object is being an entity of any kind. 'Object' here does not mean thing or entity. Rather, to say that something is an intentional object is just to say that it is an object of thought (or other intentional state or act) for a subject. It is further argued that theories of intentionality should not dispense with the idea of an intentional object.     

What's Really Wrong with the Limited Quantity View?

In Part Four of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit seeks Theory X – the Utilitarian account of the morality of choices where the number of people who will ever exist depends upon our actions. Parfit argues that X has yet to be found. The two simplest versions of Theory X are Total Utilitarianism and Average Utilitarianism. Unfortunately, Parfit argues, each of these leads to unacceptable results. Parfit explores various alternatives and finds them all unsatisfactory. This paper deals with one of those alternatives: the Limited Quantity View. I argue that ParfitÕs argument against this view fails. However, I then present a new and more general objection which defeats a broad range of utilitarian views, including the Limited Quantity View.     

Exclusion Problems and the Cardinality of Logical Space

Wittgenstein’s atomist picture, as embodied in his Tractatus, is initially very appealing. However, it faces the famous colour-exclusion problem. In this paper, I shall explain when the atomist picture can be defended (in principle) in the face of that problem; and, in the light of this, why the atomist picture should be rejected. I outline the atomist picture in Section 1. In Section 2, I present a very simple necessary and sufficient condition for the tenability (in principle) of the atomist picture. The condition is: logical space is a power of two. In Sections 3 and 4, I outline the colour-exclusion problem, and then show how the cardinality-condition supplies a response to exclusion problems. In Section 5, I explain how this amounts to a distillation of a proposal due to Moss (2012), which goes back to Carruthers (1990: 144–7). And in Section 6, I show how all this vindicates Wittgenstein’s ultimate rejection of the atomist picture. The brief reason is that we have no guarantee that there are any solutions to a given exclusion problem but, if there are any, then there are far too many.     

Nostalgia in response to group‐based exclusion: The role of attachment‐related avoidance

We proposed that nostalgia, by virtue of its sociality, can be an indirect strategy to counteract relational deficiencies stemming from group‐based exclusion. We instructed Greek participants to recall an event in which they experienced exclusion on the basis of their nationality versus a control event. We anticipated that participants would react to group‐based exclusion with increased nostalgia. Specifically, because low attachment‐related avoidance facilitates proximity‐seeking in response to distress, we hypothesized that group‐based exclusion would increase nostalgia (a form of proximity‐seeking) more strongly when avoidance is low. Results supported this moderation hypothesis. In turn, increased nostalgia in response to group‐based exclusion predicted stronger ingroup identification. For low‐avoidants, then, group‐based exclusion fortified ingroup identification via increased nostalgia (moderated mediation).     

Two scenes or not two scenes: The effects of stimulus repetition and view-similarity on scene categorization from brief displays

Previous research suggests that understanding the gist of a scene relies on global structural cues that enable rapid scene categorization. This study used a repetition blindness (RB) paradigm to interrogate the nature of the scene representations used in such rapid categorization. When stimuli are repeated in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) sequence (~10 items/sec), the second occurrence of the repeated item frequently goes unnoticed, a phenomenon that is attributed to a failure to consolidate two conscious episodes (tokens) for a repeatedly activated type. We tested whether RB occurs for different exemplars of the same scene category, which share conceptual and broad structural properties, as well as for identical and mirror-reflected repetitions of the same scene, which additionally share the same local visual details. Across 2 experiments, identical and mirror-image scenes consistently produced a repetition facilitation, rather than RB. There was no convincing evidence of either RB or repetition facilitation for different members of a scene category. These findings indicate that in the first 100–150 ms of processing scenes are represented in terms of local visual features, rather than more abstract category-general features, and that, unlike other kinds of stimuli (words or objects), scenes are not susceptible to token individuation failure.     

Differences in holistic processing do not explain cultural differences in the recognition of facial expression

The aim of this study was to investigate the causes of the own-race advantage in facial expression perception. In Experiment 1, we investigated Western Caucasian and Chinese participants’ perception and categorization of facial expressions of six basic emotions that included two pairs of confusable expressions (fear and surprise; anger and disgust). People were slightly better at identifying facial expressions posed by own-race members (mainly in anger and disgust). In Experiment 2, we asked whether the own-race advantage was due to differences in the holistic processing of facial expressions. Participants viewed composite faces in which the upper part of one expression was combined with the lower part of a different expression. The upper and lower parts of the composite faces were either aligned or misaligned. Both Chinese and Caucasian participants were better at identifying the facial expressions from the misaligned images, showing interference on recognizing the parts of the expressions created by holistic perception of the aligned composite images. However, this interference from holistic processing was equivalent across expressions of own-race and other-race faces in both groups of participants. Whilst the own-race advantage in recognizing facial expressions does seem to reflect the confusability of certain emotions, it cannot be explained by differences in holistic processing.     

Children's Uncertain Responses when Testifying about Alleged Sexual Abuse in Scottish Courts

This study examined the uncertain responses of 56 alleged sexual abuse victims, aged 5–17 years, testifying in Scottish criminal court trials. Don't know/remember ground rules were explained to 38% of the children and each child reported uncertainty in response to 15% of the questions on average. Uncertain responding was associated with expressions of resistance and confusion, questioning context (proportionally more regarding substantive than non‐substantive issues), question content (least to disclosure‐focused questions), utterance type (more to directives, particularly those posed by defense lawyers; more to recall‐based than recognition prompts), and age (children in mid‐adolescence were less likely to respond uncertainly than those who were either older or younger). There were no associations between expressions of uncertainty and ground rule administration, or with whether or not the question focused on central rather than peripheral details about the alleged crimes. Findings highlight concerns surrounding preparatory procedures to help witnesses, especially adolescents, indicate uncertainty when testifying. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Early executive control and risk for overweight and obesity in elementary school

An emerging literature suggests that poor executive control (EC) may be associated with clinical weight problems, e.g., body mass index (BMI) for age percentile ≥85 in children. However, our understanding of the impact of EC on overweight and obesity in childhood is limited by the lack of longitudinal studies spanning critical developmental periods and assessing EC using comprehensive performance-based batteries. The current study addresses these limitations in a longitudinal examination of 212 children who completed an extensive laboratory-based EC task battery in preschool (age 4 years and 6 months) and were followed through elementary school (Grades 1 through 4) with objective measures of weight status. The logistic regression results indicate that poorer EC in preschool is associated with significantly greater risk for clinical weight problems (either overweight or obese status, as defined by BMI-for-age percentile ≥ 85) in elementary school, controlling for maternal education. EC in preschool was not significantly associated with risk for obese status, specifically (defined by BMI-for-age percentile ≥ 95), but the trend was in the expected direction. The results suggest that early executive abilities are relevant for children’s subsequent health status, with deficits in EC in the critical period of preschool conferring risk for later problems with weight. Based on these findings, early interventions to promote stronger EC may be a promising, yet currently overlooked, component in pediatric obesity prevention efforts.