A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism

In recent years, an impressive research program has developed around non‐analytic reductions of the normative. Nevertheless, non‐analytic naturalists face a damning dilemma: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus, reasonhood. Since, for example, a desire‐based account of epistemic reasons is implausible, the reductionist must opt for the latter. Yet, if the desire‐based account of practical reasons is merely a species of the larger genus, then, due to a violation of irreflexivity, the reduction fails.     

The importance of eyes: how infants interpret adult looking behavior

Two studies assessed the gaze following of 12-, 14-, and 18-month-old infants. The experimental manipulation was whether an adult could see the targets. In Experiment 1, the adult turned to targets with either open or closed eyes. Infants at all ages looked at the adult's target more in the open- versus closed-eyes condition. In Experiment 2, an inanimate occluder, a blindfold, was compared with a headband control. Infants 14- and 18-months-old looked more at the adult's target in the headband condition. Infants were not simply responding to adult head turning, which was controlled, but were sensitive to the status of the adult's eyes. In the 2nd year, infants interpreted adult looking as object-directed--an act connecting the gazer and the object.     

Bigger than a breadbox? Attention to distractors may not enhance negative priming

In several recent studies, P. A. MacDonald and colleagues (e.g., P. A. MacDonald & S. Joordens, 2000) reported unusually large negative priming effects and claimed that attention to distractors, counter to expectations, served to enhance the magnitude of the effect. In 3 experiments using their novel comparative judgment task, negative priming was assessed using both a control condition based on that of P. A. MacDonald, S. Joordens, and K. N. Seergobin (1999) and one in which control probe items exactly matched those on ignored repetition trials. In MacDonald et al.'s unmatched control condition, participants were faster than on ignored repetition trials, but this difference was reduced or absent when control items were matched. This result led to the conclusion that the apparently large negative priming effect reported by MacDonald and colleagues may be an artifact arising because judgments for a subset of their control trials were relatively easier than for ignored repetition trials.     

Separating sensitivity from response bias: implications of comparisons of yes-no and forced-choice tests for models and measures of recognition memory

A fundamental challenge to psychological research is the measurement of cognitive processes uncontaminated by response strategies resulting from different testing procedures. Test-free estimates of ability are vital when comparing the performance of different groups or different conditions. The current study applied several sets of measurement models to both forced-choice and yes-no recognition memory tests and concluded that the traditional signal-detection model resulted in distorted estimates of accuracy. Two-factor models were necessary to separate memory sensitivity from response bias. These models indicated that (a) memory accuracy did not differ across the tests and (b) the tests relied on the same underlying memory processes. The results illustrate the pitfalls of using a single-component model to measure accuracy in tasks that reflect 2 or more underlying processes.