Wittgenstein on Showing What Cannot Be Said

The distinction between saying and showing in Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus is not self‐refuting, unbelievable or nonsensical. It makes good sense given Wittgenstein's equation of saying with communicable information and showing with necessarily true thought. The key to understanding his thinking is his claim in the Preface that unassailable and definitive truths are expressed in the book, and the subsidiary assumption that asserting empty truths is nonsensical. His conception of pictures, propositions, logic, mathematics, mathematical physics, mysticism, the inexpressible and solipsism as showing is of a piece with his conception of necessary/a priori truths as tautologies broadly understood.     

Hope as a Moderator of the Associations Between Common Risk Factors and Frequency of Substance Use Among Latino Adolescents

Ample research suggests that delinquency, depressive symptoms, and peer substance use are common risk factors associated with adolescent substance use. However, the factors that may help to buffer the deleterious effects of these risk factors on adolescent substance use, such as hope, have yet to be examined. The current study evaluated hope as a moderator of the associations between these common risk factors and frequency of substance use (alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana) in a sample of Latino high school students (M _age ?=?16.14 years, SD?=?1.30; 55 % female). Findings indicated that the influence of delinquency on frequency of tobacco and marijuana use depended on levels of hope, with delinquency only positively associated with frequency of use when levels of hope were low. Additionally, hope moderated the association between depressive symptoms and alcohol use, such that depressive symptoms were only positively associated with frequency of alcohol use when levels of hope were low. Results and their implications for intervention are reviewed.     

DEFINING “RELIGION” AS NATURAL: A CRITICAL INVITATION TO ROBERT McCAULEY

Previous critics have argued that Robert McCauley defines religion and science selectively and arbitrarily, cutting them to fit his model in Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. McCauley has responded that final definitions are “overrated” and that artificial distinctions can serve an important role in naturalistic investigation. I agree with this position but argue that a genealogy of the category of religion is crucial to the methodology that McCauley describes. Since the inherent ambiguity of religion will undermine any essential claims about its cognitive naturalness, I invite McCauley to consider how his research might investigate scientific and religious cognition in new terms.     

Choice‐making,Expectations, and Treatment Positivity: How and When Choosing Shapes Aversive Experiences

Every day we use products and treatments with unknown but expected effects, such as using medication to manage pain. In many cases, we have a choice over which products or treatments to use; however, in other cases, people choose for us or choices are unavailable. Does choosing (versus not choosing) have implications for how a product or treatment is experienced? The current experiments examined the role of choice‐making in facilitating so‐called expectation assimilation effects—or situations in which a person's experiences (e.g., discomfort and pain) are evaluated in a manner consistent with their expectations. In Experiment 1, participants were initially exposed to a baseline set of aversive stimuli (i.e., sounds). Next, some participants were given expectations for two “treatments” (i.e., changes in screen display) that could ostensibly reduce discomfort. Critically, participants were either given a choice or not about which of the two treatments they preferred. Participants in a control condition were not provided with treatment expectations. Results revealed that discomfort experiences assimilated to expectations only when participants were provided with choice. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and provided evidence against the idea that demand characteristics and choice‐making unrelated to the core task (i.e., choices without associated expectations) could account for the results. Further, Experiment 2 showed that choosing reduced discomfort because of increased positivity about the treatment. Results are discussed in the context of extant research on choice‐making and expectation effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Constraints on the Acquisition of Social Category Concepts

Determining which dimensions of social classification are culturally significant is a developmental challenge. Some suggest this is accomplished by differentially privileging intrinsic visual cues over nonintrinsic cues (Atran, 1990 Atran , S. (1990). Cognitive foundations of natural history: Towards an anthropology of science . New York , NY : Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]; Gil-White, 2001 Gil-White , F. J. ( 2001 ). Are ethnic groups biological ‘species’ to the human brain? Essentialism in our cognition of some social categories . Current Anthropology , 42 , 515 – 554 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), whereas others point to the role of noun labels as more general promoters of kind-based reasoning (Bigler &; Liben, 2007 Bigler , R. S. , &; Liben , L. S. ( 2007 ). Developmental intergroup theory: Explaining and reducing children's social stereotyping and prejudice . Current Directions in Psychological Science , 16 , 162 – 166 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Gelman, 2003 Gelman , S. A. ( 2003 ). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought . New York , NY : Oxford University Press .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). A novel groups procedure was employed to examine the independent effects of noun labels and visual cues on social categorization. Experiment 1 demonstrated that in the absence of a visual cue, a noun label supported social categorization among 4-year-olds and 7-year-olds. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that children and adults fail to differentiate between intrinsic and nonintrinsic visual cues to category membership, suggesting that this distinction is not central to the acquisition of social category concepts. Experiments 2 and 3 also showed that in the absence of a shared noun label, visual cues were not sufficient for younger children to form social categories. Experiment 4 ruled out a potential demand characteristic in the previous experiments. Together, these results reveal the primacy of verbal labels over visual cues for social categorization in young children and suggest a developmental change between ages 4 and 7 in the ability to construct new representations of social category concepts.     

Persistent and stable biases in spatial learning mechanisms predict navigational style

A wealth of evidence in rodents and humans supports the central roles of two learning systems—hippocampal place learning and striatal response learning—in the formation of spatial representations to support navigation. Individual differences in the ways that these mechanisms are engaged during initial encoding and subsequent navigation may provide a powerful framework for explaining the wide range of variability found in the strategies and solutions that make up human navigational styles. Previous work has revealed that activation in the hippocampal and striatal networks during learning could predict navigational style. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the relative activations in these systems during both initial encoding and the act of dynamic navigation in a learned environment. Participants learned a virtual environment and were tested on subsequent navigation to targets within the environment. We observed that a given individual had a consistent balance of memory system engagement across both initial encoding and subsequent navigation, a balance that successfully predicted the participants’ tendencies to use novel shortcuts versus familiar paths during dynamic navigation. This was further supported by the observation that the activation during subsequent retrieval was not dependent on the type of solution used on a given trial. Taken together, our results suggest a model in which the place- and response-learning systems are present in parallel to support a variety of navigational behaviors, but stable biases in the engagement of these systems influence what solutions might be available for any given individual.     

Mechanisms of motivation–cognition interaction: challenges and opportunities

Recent years have seen a rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation–cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The present issue of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation–cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas, in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming toward a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed toward them.