Active biological mechanisms: transforming energy into motion in molecular motors

Synthese - Unless one embraces activities as foundational, understanding activities in mechanisms requires an account of the means by which entities in biological mechanisms engage in their...     

Nonsuicidal Self-injury,Suicide Planning,and Suicide Attempts Among High-risk Adolescents Prior to Psychiatric Hospitalization

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - The purpose of this study was to understand the trajectories of nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) and suicide plans (SP) in the 90 days...     

Socially Situated Transmission: The Bias to Transmit Negative Information is Moderated by the Social Context

Cultural evolutionary theory has identified a range of cognitive biases that guide human social learning. Naturalistic and experimental studies indicate transmission biases favoring negative and positive information. To address these conflicting findings, the present study takes a socially situated view of information transmission, which predicts that bias expression will depend on the social context. We report a large-scale experiment (N = 425) that manipulated the social context and examined its effect on the transmission of the positive and negative information contained in a narrative text. In each social context, information was progressively lost as it was transmitted from person to person, but negative information survived better than positive information, supporting a negative transmission bias. Importantly, the negative transmission bias was moderated by the social context: Higher social connectivity weakened the bias to transmit negative information, supporting a socially situated account of information transmission. Our findings indicate that our evolved cognitive preferences can be moderated by our social goals.     

Affect and emotions in placebo and nocebo effects: What do we know so far?

Once considered nuisance variance in clinical trials, placebo effects and nocebo effects are now widely recognized as important and mutable psychobiological contributors to mental and physical health. Psychological theory explaining these effects emphasizes associative learning and conscious expectations. It has long been suggested, however, that affective states such as moods, emotions, and distress could play a significant role. In this paper, we draw together and review the empirical data linking affective states to placebo and nocebo effects. To organize this disparate literature, three questions are addressed: (1) Does pre‐existing state and trait affect modulate placebo and nocebo effects? (2) Does administering placebo and nocebo treatments change affective states, and if so, does the resulting affect causally influence placebo and nocebo effects? Finally, (3) Can placebo treatments be successfully employed as a regulation strategy to modulate different affective states? In reviewing the evidence in relation to these three questions, it is clear that affect does play a key role in placebo and nocebo effects in many circumstances, and further, there may be a reciprocal dynamic at play between a treatment event, affect, and placebo/nocebo effects. The paper concludes by discussing implications for theory and intervention and recommends future research priorities.     

Re-exposure to reinforcement in Context A during treatment in Context B reduces ABC renewal

Previous work from our laboratory showed that intermittently re-exposing rats to reinforcement for lever pressing in a training (A) context, while eliminating lever pressing in a second (B) context, increased ABA renewal of lever pressing relative to rats that experienced only Context B during response elimination. In the current study, we replicated these procedures while assessing renewal in the presence of a novel context (i.e., ABC renewal). Unlike the findings described above, renewal was reduced in the group that experienced re-exposure to Context A during lever-press elimination relative to rats that experienced only Context B. These findings suggest that alternating between contexts associated with reinforcement and extinction during treatment reduces the probability that organisms will respond in novel contexts. These outcomes may be the result of discrimination and/or generalization processes. Moreover, this training procedure may offer a potential mitigation strategy for ABC renewal.     

Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties

G.E.M. Anscombe argued that we should dispense with deontic concepts when doing ethics, if it is psychologically possible to do so. In response, I contend that deontic concepts are constitutive of the common moral experience of guilt. This has two consequences for Anscombe's position. First, seeing that guilt is a deontic emotion, we should recognize that Anscombe's qualification on her thesis applies: psychologically, we need deontology to understand our obligations and hence whether our guilt is warranted. Second, the fact that guilt is a deontic moral emotion debunks Anscombe's claim that deontic concepts are a relic of the Western, religious past: guilt feelings–hence the idea of moral duty as well–can be found in cultures without an ethics of divine command. Modern moral philosophers' interest in oughts and obligations is not an academic hobbyhorse, but a vital concern arising out of a primeval human emotion.     

Wittgenstein and Redundant Truth

Philosophia - In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is sometimes claimed to hold a redundancy (or deflationary) theory of truth. The main evidence to support this view, however, comes...