Examiner error in curriculum-based measurement of oral reading

Although curriculum based measures of oral reading (CBM-R) have strong technical adequacy, there is still a reason to believe that student performance may be influenced by factors of the testing situation, such as errors examiners make in administering and scoring the test. This study examined the construct-irrelevant variance introduced by examiners using a cross-classified multilevel model. We sought to determine the extent of variance in student CBM-R scores attributable to examiners and, if present, the extent to which it was moderated by students' grade level and English learner (EL) status. Fit indices indicated that a cross-classified random effects model (CCREM) best fits the data with measures nested within students, students nested within schools, and examiners crossing schools. Intraclass correlations of the CCREM revealed that roughly 16% of the variance in student CBM-R scores was associated between examiners. The remaining variance was associated with the measurement level, 3.59%; between students, 75.23%; and between schools, 5.21%. Results were moderated by grade level but not by EL status. The discussion addresses the implications of this error for low-stakes and high-stakes decisions about students, teacher evaluation systems, and hypothesis testing in reading intervention research.     

Two Key Differences between Science and Philosophy

C. S. Peirce made the following claim: If science reveals truth, then consensus among scientists can be expected in the limit. This article does not dispute this claim; it simply assumes it. On the basis of this assumption, the following question is asked: Is it possible to extend Peirce's claim to philosophy in a natural way? It is argued that two important differences between science and philosophy strongly militate against such an extension. Does this mean that there is no truth to be found in philosophy? Are there, perhaps, different kinds of truth (scientific, philosophical, religious, and so on)? But such questions, though related to the present investigation, are nevertheless well beyond the scope of this article.     

Metacognitive monitoring during criterion learning: When and why are judgments accurate?

Research on metacognitive judgment accuracy during retrieval practice has increased in recent years. However, prior work had not systematically evaluated item-level judgment accuracy and the underlying bases of judgment accuracy in a criterion-learning paradigm (in which items are practiced until correctly recalled during encoding). Understanding these relationships during criterion learning has important theoretical implications for self-regulated learning frameworks, and also has applied implications for student learning: If the factors that influence metacognitive judgments are not predictive of subsequent test performance, students may make poor decisions during self-regulated learning. In the present experiments, participants engaged in test–restudy practice until items were recalled correctly. Once a given item reached criterion, participants made an immediate or delayed judgment of learning (JOL) for the item. A final cued-recall test occurred 30 min later. We examined judgment accuracy (the relationship between JOLs and test performance) and the underlying bases of judgment accuracy by evaluating cue utilization (the relationship between cues and JOLs) and cue diagnosticity (the relationship between cues and test performance). Immediate JOLs were only modestly related to subsequent test performance, and further analyses revealed that the cues related to JOLs were only weakly predictive of test accuracy. However, delaying JOLs improved both the accuracy of the JOLs and the diagnosticity of the cues that influenced judgments.     

Wittgenstein on Showing What Cannot Be Said

The distinction between saying and showing in Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus is not self‐refuting, unbelievable or nonsensical. It makes good sense given Wittgenstein's equation of saying with communicable information and showing with necessarily true thought. The key to understanding his thinking is his claim in the Preface that unassailable and definitive truths are expressed in the book, and the subsidiary assumption that asserting empty truths is nonsensical. His conception of pictures, propositions, logic, mathematics, mathematical physics, mysticism, the inexpressible and solipsism as showing is of a piece with his conception of necessary/a priori truths as tautologies broadly understood.     

Hope as a Moderator of the Associations Between Common Risk Factors and Frequency of Substance Use Among Latino Adolescents

Ample research suggests that delinquency, depressive symptoms, and peer substance use are common risk factors associated with adolescent substance use. However, the factors that may help to buffer the deleterious effects of these risk factors on adolescent substance use, such as hope, have yet to be examined. The current study evaluated hope as a moderator of the associations between these common risk factors and frequency of substance use (alcohol, tobacco, and marijuana) in a sample of Latino high school students (M _age ?=?16.14 years, SD?=?1.30; 55 % female). Findings indicated that the influence of delinquency on frequency of tobacco and marijuana use depended on levels of hope, with delinquency only positively associated with frequency of use when levels of hope were low. Additionally, hope moderated the association between depressive symptoms and alcohol use, such that depressive symptoms were only positively associated with frequency of alcohol use when levels of hope were low. Results and their implications for intervention are reviewed.     

DEFINING “RELIGION” AS NATURAL: A CRITICAL INVITATION TO ROBERT McCAULEY

Previous critics have argued that Robert McCauley defines religion and science selectively and arbitrarily, cutting them to fit his model in Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. McCauley has responded that final definitions are “overrated” and that artificial distinctions can serve an important role in naturalistic investigation. I agree with this position but argue that a genealogy of the category of religion is crucial to the methodology that McCauley describes. Since the inherent ambiguity of religion will undermine any essential claims about its cognitive naturalness, I invite McCauley to consider how his research might investigate scientific and religious cognition in new terms.     

Choice‐making,Expectations, and Treatment Positivity: How and When Choosing Shapes Aversive Experiences

Every day we use products and treatments with unknown but expected effects, such as using medication to manage pain. In many cases, we have a choice over which products or treatments to use; however, in other cases, people choose for us or choices are unavailable. Does choosing (versus not choosing) have implications for how a product or treatment is experienced? The current experiments examined the role of choice‐making in facilitating so‐called expectation assimilation effects—or situations in which a person's experiences (e.g., discomfort and pain) are evaluated in a manner consistent with their expectations. In Experiment 1, participants were initially exposed to a baseline set of aversive stimuli (i.e., sounds). Next, some participants were given expectations for two “treatments” (i.e., changes in screen display) that could ostensibly reduce discomfort. Critically, participants were either given a choice or not about which of the two treatments they preferred. Participants in a control condition were not provided with treatment expectations. Results revealed that discomfort experiences assimilated to expectations only when participants were provided with choice. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and provided evidence against the idea that demand characteristics and choice‐making unrelated to the core task (i.e., choices without associated expectations) could account for the results. Further, Experiment 2 showed that choosing reduced discomfort because of increased positivity about the treatment. Results are discussed in the context of extant research on choice‐making and expectation effects. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Constraints on the Acquisition of Social Category Concepts

Determining which dimensions of social classification are culturally significant is a developmental challenge. Some suggest this is accomplished by differentially privileging intrinsic visual cues over nonintrinsic cues (Atran, 1990 Atran , S. (1990). Cognitive foundations of natural history: Towards an anthropology of science . New York , NY : Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]; Gil-White, 2001 Gil-White , F. J. ( 2001 ). Are ethnic groups biological ‘species’ to the human brain? Essentialism in our cognition of some social categories . Current Anthropology , 42 , 515 – 554 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), whereas others point to the role of noun labels as more general promoters of kind-based reasoning (Bigler &; Liben, 2007 Bigler , R. S. , &; Liben , L. S. ( 2007 ). Developmental intergroup theory: Explaining and reducing children's social stereotyping and prejudice . Current Directions in Psychological Science , 16 , 162 – 166 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Gelman, 2003 Gelman , S. A. ( 2003 ). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought . New York , NY : Oxford University Press .[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). A novel groups procedure was employed to examine the independent effects of noun labels and visual cues on social categorization. Experiment 1 demonstrated that in the absence of a visual cue, a noun label supported social categorization among 4-year-olds and 7-year-olds. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that children and adults fail to differentiate between intrinsic and nonintrinsic visual cues to category membership, suggesting that this distinction is not central to the acquisition of social category concepts. Experiments 2 and 3 also showed that in the absence of a shared noun label, visual cues were not sufficient for younger children to form social categories. Experiment 4 ruled out a potential demand characteristic in the previous experiments. Together, these results reveal the primacy of verbal labels over visual cues for social categorization in young children and suggest a developmental change between ages 4 and 7 in the ability to construct new representations of social category concepts.