JobShift: A Book Review

Book reviewed in this article: JobShtft: How to Prosper in a Workplace Without Jobs by William Bridges     

‘I feel better when…’: An analysis of the memory-experience gap for peoples’ estimates of the relationship between health behaviours and experiences

Objective: People often overestimate how strongly behaviours and experiences are related. This memory-experience gap might have important implications for health care settings, which often require people to estimate associations, such as “my mood is better when I exercise”. This study examines how subjective correlation estimates between health behaviours and experiences relate to calculated correlations from online reports and whether subjective estimates are associated with engagement in actual health behaviour.

Design: Seven-month online study on physical activity, sleep, affect and stress, with 61 online assessments.

Main Outcome Measures: University students (N = 168) retrospectively estimated correlations between physical activity, sleep, positive affect and stress over the seven-month study period.

Results: Correlations between experiences and behaviours (online data) were small (r = ?.12–.14), estimated correlations moderate (r = ?.35–.24). Correspondence between calculated and estimated correlations was low. Importantly, estimated correlations of physical activity with stress, positive affect and sleep were associated with actual engagement in physical activity.

Conclusion: Estimation accuracy of relations between health behaviours and experiences is low. However, association estimates could be an important predictor of actual health behaviours. This study identifies and quantifies estimation inaccuracies in health behaviours and points towards potential systematic biases in health settings, which might seriously impair intervention efficacy.     

Sleep and theology: ‘An half adieu to the world’

The study of sleep has become a field of widespread interest. It engages many disciplines from neuroscience to sociology, philosophy to evolutionary biology. It features in the lifestyle sections of newspapers and websites often because of its connections with mental and physical wellbeing. Yet theology has, in the most part, remained silent on the subject, despite many Biblical references to sleep in both the Old and New Testaments. There is a theological story to be told about sleep ? as a gift, and not an affliction ? despite the unfortunate occasional conflation of sleep with sloth. It is a state of grace and not of sin. It refreshes and renews yet can never be earned; all we can do is to be in a posture of receptivity so that it falls upon us. Sleep is profoundly precarious and sometimes frustratingly elusive and is suggestive of the fragility and vulnerability of human existence. When it comes to us, sleep transforms our experience of waking life. The eschatological character of sleep points us to reflect on mortality and resurrection. This article argues that it is possible to speak of a ‘theology of sleep’, but that it is not to be found in a coherent body of teaching or theological exploration. Rather, a theology of sleep is found articulated in Christian practices such as the Office of Compline, the keeping of vigils and the Examen of Consciousness, and in evening hymnody and prayers before bed. The author will suggest that the word theosomnia encapsulates this understanding of sleep.     

The Effect of Expected Value on Attraction Effect Preference Reversals

The attraction effect shows that adding a third alternative to a choice set can alter preference between the original two options. For over 30 years, this simple demonstration of context dependence has been taken as strong evidence against a class of parsimonious value‐maximising models that evaluate alternatives independently from one another. Significantly, however, in previous demonstrations of the attraction effect alternatives are approximately equally valuable, so there was little consequence to the decision maker irrespective of which alternative was selected. Here we vary the difference in expected value between alternatives and provide the first demonstration that, although extinguished with large differences, this theoretically important effect persists when choice between alternatives has a consequence. We use this result to clarify the implications of the attraction effect, arguing that although it robustly violates the assumptions of value‐maximising models, it does not eliminate the possibility that human decision making is optimal. © 2016 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism

Several philosophers have recently argued that disagreement with others undermines or precludes epistemic justification for our opinions about controversial issues (e.g. political, religious, and philosophical issues). This amounts to a fascinating and disturbing kind of intellectual scepticism. A crucial piece of the sceptical argument, however, is that our opponents on such topics are epistemic peers. In this paper, I examine the reasons for why we might think that our opponents really are such peers, and I argue that those reasons are either (a) too weak or (b) too strong, implying absurd conclusions. Thus, there is not a compelling case for disagreement-based intellectual scepticism.     

Failures of cognitive control or attention? The case of stop-signal deficits in schizophrenia

We used Bayesian cognitive modelling to identify the underlying causes of apparent inhibitory deficits in the stop-signal paradigm. The analysis was applied to stop-signal data reported by Badcock et al. (Psychological Medicine 32: 87-297, 2002) and Hughes et al. (Biological Psychology 89: 220-231, 2012), where schizophrenia patients and control participants made rapid choice responses, but on some trials were signalled to stop their ongoing response. Previous research has assumed an inhibitory deficit in schizophrenia, because estimates of the mean time taken to react to the stop signal are longer in patients than controls. We showed that these longer estimates are partly due to failing to react to the stop signal (“trigger failures”) and partly due to a slower initiation of inhibition, implicating a failure of attention rather than a deficit in the inhibitory process itself. Correlations between the probability of trigger failures and event-related potentials reported by Hughes et al. are interpreted as supporting the attentional account of inhibitory deficits. Our results, and those of Matzke et al. (2016), who report that controls also display a substantial although lower trigger-failure rate, indicate that attentional factors need to be taken into account when interpreting results from the stop-signal paradigm.     

Collective rationality in interactive decisions: evidence for team reasoning

Decision theory and game theory rest on a fundamental assumption that players seek to maximize their individual utilities, but in some interactive decisions it seems intuitively reasonable to aim to maximize the utility of the group of players as a whole. Such team reasoning requires collective preferences and a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. Findings from two experiments provide evidence for collective preferences and team reasoning. In lifelike vignettes (Experiment 1) and abstract games (Experiment 2) with certain structural properties, most players preferred team-reasoning strategies to strategies supporting unique Nash equilibria, although individually rational players should choose equilibrium strategies. These findings suggest that team reasoning predicts strategy choices more powerfully than orthodox game theory in some games.     

Borderline personality as a self-other representational disturbance

A great deal has been written about the nature of borderline personality. We maintain that borderline psychopathology emanates from particular disturbances in mental representations-impairment in the ability to maintain and use benign and integrated internal images of self and others-and that these troubled ways of thinking drive the troubled interpersonal relations, affective instability, and impulsivity associated with borderline. Aspects of borderline self-other representational disturbances are present across a wide theoretical spectrum, and a number of research methodologies already exist to assess the phenomena. We conclude that borderline attributes exist on continua, and summarize important features as: (1) unstable mental images of self and others, often marked by self-loathing and attributions of malevolence to others; (2) interactions with others organized around a fundamental need for care that is felt to be necessary for basic functioning; (3) fear of others based on expectations of being mistreated and disappointed and/or terror of having one's identity subsumed by another person; (4) difficulty considering multiple and/or conflicting perspectives, with a tendency toward concrete, all-or-none, or black-and-white, thinking and distortion of reality; and (5) sadomasochistic interpersonal interactions in which a person alternatively inflicts suffering on others and suffers at the hands of others.