Assessment of dysfunctional beliefs in borderline personality disorder

This study had two aims: to test the hypothesis that borderline personality disorder (BPD) patients hold numerous dysfunctional beliefs associated with a variety of Axis II disorders, and to construct a BPD belief scale which captures these beliefs. Beliefs were measured using the Personality Belief Questionnaire (PBQ) which is designed to assess beliefs associated with various personality disorders, although not specifically BPD. Eighty-four BPD patients and 204 patients with other personality disorders (OPD) were randomly split into two study samples. Fourteen PBQ items were found to discriminate BPD from OPD patients in both samples. These items came from the PBQ Dependent, Paranoid, Avoidant, and Histrionic scales and reflect themes of dependency, helplessness, distrust, fears of rejection/abandonment/losing emotional control, and extreme attention-seeking behavior. A BPD beliefs scale constructed from these items showed good internal consistency and diagnostic validity among the 288 study patients. The scale may be used to assist in diagnosis and cognitive therapy of BPD.     

The importance of eyes: how infants interpret adult looking behavior

Two studies assessed the gaze following of 12-, 14-, and 18-month-old infants. The experimental manipulation was whether an adult could see the targets. In Experiment 1, the adult turned to targets with either open or closed eyes. Infants at all ages looked at the adult's target more in the open- versus closed-eyes condition. In Experiment 2, an inanimate occluder, a blindfold, was compared with a headband control. Infants 14- and 18-months-old looked more at the adult's target in the headband condition. Infants were not simply responding to adult head turning, which was controlled, but were sensitive to the status of the adult's eyes. In the 2nd year, infants interpreted adult looking as object-directed--an act connecting the gazer and the object.     

Bigger than a breadbox? Attention to distractors may not enhance negative priming

In several recent studies, P. A. MacDonald and colleagues (e.g., P. A. MacDonald & S. Joordens, 2000) reported unusually large negative priming effects and claimed that attention to distractors, counter to expectations, served to enhance the magnitude of the effect. In 3 experiments using their novel comparative judgment task, negative priming was assessed using both a control condition based on that of P. A. MacDonald, S. Joordens, and K. N. Seergobin (1999) and one in which control probe items exactly matched those on ignored repetition trials. In MacDonald et al.'s unmatched control condition, participants were faster than on ignored repetition trials, but this difference was reduced or absent when control items were matched. This result led to the conclusion that the apparently large negative priming effect reported by MacDonald and colleagues may be an artifact arising because judgments for a subset of their control trials were relatively easier than for ignored repetition trials.     

Separating sensitivity from response bias: implications of comparisons of yes-no and forced-choice tests for models and measures of recognition memory

A fundamental challenge to psychological research is the measurement of cognitive processes uncontaminated by response strategies resulting from different testing procedures. Test-free estimates of ability are vital when comparing the performance of different groups or different conditions. The current study applied several sets of measurement models to both forced-choice and yes-no recognition memory tests and concluded that the traditional signal-detection model resulted in distorted estimates of accuracy. Two-factor models were necessary to separate memory sensitivity from response bias. These models indicated that (a) memory accuracy did not differ across the tests and (b) the tests relied on the same underlying memory processes. The results illustrate the pitfalls of using a single-component model to measure accuracy in tasks that reflect 2 or more underlying processes.     

Recognition memory for source and occurrence: The importance of recollection

Previous recognition memory studies indicate that when both recollection and familiarity are expected to contribute to recognition performance (e.g., discriminating studied items from nonstudied items) the dual-process and the unequal-variance signal detection models provide comparable accounts of performance. When familiarity is not expected to be useful (e.g., when items from two equally familiar sources are discriminated between), the dual-process model provides a significantly better account of performance. In the present study, source recognition was tested under conditions in which familiarity could have been used to perform a list-discrimination task; participants were required to discriminate between strong studied items, weak studied items, and new items. The dual-process model provided a better account of performance than did the unequal-variance model. Moreover, the results indicated that the unequal-variance assumption in a single-process signal detection model was not a valid substitution for recollection and that recollection was used to make recognition judgments even when assessments of familiarity were useful.     

Stability and skill in driving

Two experiments addressed the relation between postural stability, perceptual sensitivity, and stability of driving performance. A vehicle was fitted with differential GPS for measuring position and speed, position sensors for measuring brake and accelerator depression, force transducers for measuring door, console and footrest bracing forces, and an accelerometer for measuring the 3D accelerations of the vehicle. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether the initiation of deceleration and the control of braking might be due to sensitivity to the perceptual variable tau, which specifies time-to-contact (TTC), and in particular, whether its first derivative, tau-dot, is used to maintain a constant deceleration profile. Using both untrained experienced drivers (EDs) and trained driving instructors from the Holden Performance Driving Centre (HPDC), results confirmed that, regardless of skill level, tau-dot was maintained at a value close to 0.5 and, as predicted by Lee [Perception 5 (1976) 437], braking was initiated when TTC approximately 5 s. In Experiment 2, we wished to quantify the purported differences in driving behaviour between EDs and HPDC instructors during a variety of everyday manoeuvres. Results indicated that instructors utilised a different cornering trajectory, a different emergency braking strategy, and were able to perform a high-speed swerve and recovery task more effectively than the EDs. In general, the instructors applied greater bracing forces using the door and console compared with EDs. The instructors also applied greater footrest forces during emergency braking than did the EDs. The greater use of bracing by instructor drivers to resist g-forces represents a strategy of active stabilisation that enhances both postural stability, as well as overall stability and consistency of driving performance. Results are discussed with regard to the dynamics of perceptual-motor coordination, and how increased stability might improve sensitivity to relevant perceptual information. We conclude that driver-training programmes that focus on increasing driver stability (as a pre-requisite for increased control) show great promise as a means to improving one's attention during driving, and hence have the potential to dramatically improve road safety in general.