Ambiguity attitudes in qualitative contexts: The role of prior beliefs

Most studies of ambiguity aversion rely on experimental paradigms involving monetary bets. Thus, the extent to which ambiguity aversion occurs outside of such contexts is much less understood, particularly when the situation cannot easily be reduced to numerical terms. The present work seeks to understand whether people prefer to avoid ambiguous decisions in a variety of different qualitative domains (e.g., work, family, love, friendship, exercise, study, and health), and, if so, to determine the role played by prior beliefs in those domains. Across three studies, we presented participants with 24 vignettes and measured the degree to which they preferred risk to ambiguity in each. We also asked them for their prior probability estimates about the likely outcomes in the ambiguous events. Ambiguity aversion was observed in the vast majority of vignettes, but at different magnitudes. It was predicted by whether the vignette involved gain or loss as well as by people's prior beliefs; however, the heterogeneity between people meant that the role of prior beliefs was only evident in an individual-level analysis (i.e., not at the group level). Our results suggest that the desire to avoid ambiguity occurs in a wide variety of qualitative contexts but to different degrees for different people and may be partially driven by unfavorable prior estimates of the likely outcomes of the ambiguous events.     

The Fallacy Fallacy: From the Owl of Minerva to the Lark of Arete

The fallacy fallacy is either the misdiagnosis of fallacy or the supposition that the conclusion of a fallacy must be a falsehood. This paper explores the relevance of these and related errors of reasoning for the appraisal of arguments, especially within virtue theories of argumentation. In particular, the fallacy fallacy exemplifies the Owl of Minerva problem, whereby tools devised to understand a norm make possible new ways of violating the norm. Fallacies are such tools and so are vices. Hence a similar problem arises with argumentative vices. Fortunately, both instances of the problem have a common remedy.

     

The effect of abnormal displacement of the retinal image during eye movements

The displacement of the images on the retina that results from a turning of the eye does not lead to an apparent motion of what is seen, It has been generally assumed that this is due to a compensating process which takes eye movement into account and serves to discount those image displacements that result from eye movements, It follows from this view that an abnormal image displacement, that is, an image displacement that is larger or smaller than the causing eye movement would warrant, should lead to an experienced displacement of the target. Abnormal image displacement was produced by placing the eye in the converging or diverging bundle of rays from a point source that form behind a strong positive lens; this arrangement yielded a disc-shaped image, the projection of the pupil onto the retina, which displaced abnormally during eye movements. By changing the position of the eye along the axis of the lens in relation to the crossing point of the bundle, the degree to which the displacement was abnormal could be varied, For various displacement rates ranging from 25% to 120 and 400% of normal, abnormal displacements produced by incidental eye movements remained unnoticed, Only where eye movements were intentional did some of our Ss report shifts of the perceived image. It is suggested that the organism copes with the image displacement resulting from the ever-present incidental eye movements not by compensation but by ignoring them.