Can Nanotechnology Be Just? On Nanotechnology and the Emerging Movement for Global Justice

Because of the overly market-oriented way in which technological development is carried out, there is a great amount of hubris in regard to how scientific and technological achievements are used in society. There is a tendency to exaggerate the potential commercial benefits and willfully neglect the social, cultural, and environmental consequences of most, if not all innovations, especially in new fields such as nanotechnology. At the same time, there are very few opportunities, or sites, for ensuring that nanotechnology is used justly and fairly, or for that matter, contribute to alleviating any of the wide variety of injustices that exist in the world. Most of the public authorities responsible for the development and application of science and technology are uninterested and unwilling to “assess” the implications of nanotechnology, and there are few, if any spaces in the broader culture for assessment to take place. Within the various “social movements” that are, in one way or another, concerned with issues of global justice, there is as yet little interest in nanotechnology. By examining the relations between nanotechnology and the emerging movement for global justice this article attempts to understand the enormous gap between the potential for science and technology to do good and the actual ways in science and technology get developed, and what, if anything, might be done to help close the gap in relation to nanotechnology, so that it might better be able to contribute to global justice.     

Anxiety-related bias in the classification of emotionally ambiguous facial expressions

High- and low-trait socially anxious individuals classified the emotional expressions of photographic quality continua of interpolated ("morphed") facial images that were derived from combining 6 basic prototype emotional expressions to various degrees, with the 2 adjacent emotions arranged in an emotion hexagon. When fear was 1 of the 2 component emotions, the high-trait group displayed enhanced sensitivity for fear. In a 2nd experiment where a mood manipulation was incorporated, again, the high-trait group exhibited enhanced sensitivity for fear. The low-trait group was sensitive for happiness in the control condition. The mood-manipulated group had increased sensitivity for anger expressions, and trait anxiety did not moderate these effects. Interpretations of the results related to the classification of fearful expressions are discussed.     

Statistical Bias and Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories

Previous research proposes that endorsement of anomalous beliefs is associated with proneness to conjunction error. This supposition ignores important differences between belief types. Correspondingly, the present study examined the degree to which components of statistical bias predicted conspiratorial ideation and belief in the paranormal. Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modelling revealed that conjunction error was associated with conspiratorial ideation, whilst perception of randomness most strongly predicted belief in the paranormal. These findings opposed the notion that anomalous beliefs, by virtue of possession of common characteristics, relate similarly to conjunction error. With regard to conspiracy, conjunction‐framing manipulations produced only minor variations in relationship strength. This supported the notion that conspiratorial ideation was associated with a domain‐general susceptibility to conjunction error. Framing, however, did influence the relationship between belief in the paranormal and conjunction; whilst paranormal conjunctions were generally easier to solve, performance declined as level of paranormal belief increased.Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the doing-allowing distinction and the problem of evil: a reply to Daniel Lim

In his article ‘Doing, allowing, and the problem of evil’ recently published in this journal, Daniel Lim attempts to undermine the following claims with respect to God: (1) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (2) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. I argue that Lim’s attempt is unsuccessful, and that his understanding of divine providence has the unacceptable consequence of implying that God is the originator of evil.     

Couple‐based Intervention for Depression: An Effectiveness Study in the National Health Service in England

This study represents an effectiveness study and service evaluation of a cognitive behavioral, couple‐based treatment for depression (BCT‐D) provided in London services that are part of the “Improving Access to Psychological Therapies” (IAPT) program in England. Twenty‐three therapists in community clinics were trained in BCT‐D during a 5‐day workshop, followed by monthly group supervision for 1 year. The BCT‐D treatment outcome findings are based on 63 couples in which at least one partner was depressed and elected to receive BCT‐D. Eighty‐five percent of couples also demonstrated relationship distress, and 49% of the nonclient partners also met caseness for depression or anxiety. Findings demonstrated a recovery rate of 57% with BCT‐D, compared to 41% for all IAPT treatments for depression in London. Nonclient partners who met caseness demonstrated a 48% recovery rate with BCT‐D, although they were not the focus of treatment. BCT‐D was equally effective for clients regardless of the clinical status of the nonclient partner, suggesting its effectiveness in assisting both members of the couple simultaneously. Likewise, treatment was equally effective whether or not both partners reported relationship distress. The findings are promising regarding the successful application of BCT‐D in routine clinical settings.     

Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said

This article discusses the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the content of assertions in order to gain testimonial knowledge? There is a brief discussion of why this issue is of importance, followed by two counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that in order for an audience to gain testimonial knowledge that p they must know that the speaker has asserted p . It is then suggested that the argument generalises and can be made to work on different sets of assumptions about the conditions for knowledge, and the conditions under which a proposition is asserted.     

Are Callous Unemotional (CU) Traits Enough?

A guiding question for this special section, sparked by the increasing number of studies on callous –unemotional traits (CU traits) and the DSM-5 Limited Prosocial Emotion (LPE) specifier, is whether CU traits are enough to identify a clinically meaningful subgroup of youth with conduct problems or whether other psychopathic traits contribute. Seven empirical papers and two commentary papers address this question to varying degrees and in different ways with some papers “competing” various models against one another along with other papers investigating distinct correlates of the psychopathy factors. Findings across the papers suggest that there could be benefits to examining the broader construct of psychopathy in addition to examining its underpinning dimensions rather than CU traits alone. Two commentary papers also shed light on the importance of psychopathic traits in children with Conduct Disorder (CD) and provide insights for future work on this topic. It is hoped that the articles and commentary will generate new ideas for research and practice that could have implications for the treatment of those individuals with CD and psychopathic traits.     

Distress tolerance but not impulsivity predicts outcome in concurrent treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder and substance use disorder

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and substance use disorder (SUD) commonly co-occur. Emerging research suggests that both distress tolerance and impulsivity may underlie this comorbidity. However, to our knowledge no studies have examined whether these 2 constructs predict outcome in PTSD-SUD treatment. The current study investigated whether pretreatment distress tolerance and impulsivity predicted posttreatment PTSD and cravings severity in a sample of 70 Veterans receiving concurrent treatment for PTSD and SUD in a residential day treatment program. Veterans completed measures of symptom severity before and after treatment. Results demonstrated that pretreatment distress tolerance predicted posttreatment PTSD severity while controlling for pretreatment PTSD. By contrast, pretreatment impulsivity was not predictive of posttreatment PTSD while controlling for pretreatment values. Neither distress tolerance nor impulsivity predicted posttreatment cravings severity. The findings support the notion that distress tolerance may help to explain the co-occurrence of PTSD and SUD and suggest that targeting this construct in PTSD-SUD treatment may be important for successful outcomes.     

Live Showups and Their Influence on a Subsequent Video Line‐up

A live showup (known as a street identification in the UK) allows the perpetrator to be identified shortly after a street crime. If the suspect disputes the identification, a video line‐up often ensues. Four experiments examined the reliability of live showups and their influence on a subsequent video line‐up using realistic procedures and conditions. Similar proportions of culprits and innocent suspects were identified from live showups and video line‐ups. Both culprits and innocent suspects previously identified were likely to be identified again in a subsequent line‐up, with delays from a few minutes to a month. Only a weak effect of clothing bias was observed. There was strong evidence of commitment to a previous identification but no reliable evidence of source monitoring errors. The results suggest that a live showup is not less fair than a line‐up, but the use of repeated identification procedures introduces an unfair bias against innocent suspects. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.