Propositional Plausible Logic: Introduction and Implementation

Plausible Logic allows defeasible deduction with arbitrary propositions, and yet when sufficiently simplified it is very similar to the Defeasible Logics of Billington and Nute. This paper presents Plausible Logic, explains some of the ideas behind the definitions, applies Plausible Logic to an example, and proves a coherence result which indicates that Plausible Logic is well behaved. We also report the first complete implementation of propositional Plausible Logic. The implementation has a web interface which makes it available to researchers and students everywhere. The implementation is evaluated experimentally, and is shown to be capable of handling tens of thousands of rules and sufficiently many disjunctions for realistic problems.     

Warrant <Emphasis Type=Italic>does</Emphasis> entail truth

Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows. Suppose fallibilism is true. An implication of fallibilism is that the property that makes the difference between knowledge and mere belief (which I dub ‘warrant*’) is the conjunctive property being warranted and true. I show that this implication of fallibilism conflicts with an uncontroversial thesis we have learned from reflection on Gettier cases: that nonaccidental truth is a constituent of warrant*. It follows that infallibilism is true. In the second part of the paper, I present and criticize a new argument against infallibilism. The argument states that there are plausible cases where, intuitively, the only thing that is keeping a belief from counting as knowledge is the falsity of that belief. Furthermore, it is plausible that such a belief is warranted and false. So, the argument goes, infallibilism is false. I show that this argument fails.     

Biblical Literalism: A Test of the Compensatory Schema Hypothesis Among Anglicans in England

The compensatory schema hypothesis (Hoffmann and Bartkowski, Soc Forces 86:1245–1272, 2008) has been used to explain why women seem to have higher levels of biblical literalism than men in some Christian denominations. Based on social structuration and gender theories, it proposes that biblical literalism is a key social schema in some denominations that deny women access to institutional power. Women compensate for the lack of access to institutional social resources (leadership) by stressing the accepted schema (literalism) more strongly than men. The theory was tested using two samples from the Church of England, one lay (N = 394) and one ordained (N = 1,052). Laywomen were more literal than laymen among evangelicals and Anglo-catholics, where opposition to women’s ordination is highest, but in both cases the difference was largely explained by differences in education levels between the sexes. Clergywomen, with access to leadership resources, were less literal than clergymen in both Anglo-catholic and evangelical traditions. The results offer rather weak support for the compensatory schema hypothesis, and alternative explanations of the findings are discussed.     

Integrating the study of conformity and culture in humans and nonhuman animals

Conformity--defined here by the fact that an individual displays a particular behavior because it is the most frequent the individual witnessed in others--has long been recognized by social psychologists as one of the main categories of social influence. Surprisingly, it is only recently that conformity has become an active topic in animal and comparative biology. As in any new and rapidly growing field, however, definitions, hypotheses, and protocols are diverse, not easy to organize in a coherent way, and sometimes seriously in conflict with one another. Here we pursue greater coherence by reviewing the newer literature on conformity in behavioral ecology and evolutionary biology in light of the foundational work in social psychology. We suggest that the knowledge accumulated in social psychology can be exploited by behavioral ecologists and evolutionary biologists to bring conceptual clarity to the field, avoid some experimental pitfalls, and help design new and challenging experiments. In particular, we propose that the notions of informational and normative conformity that, until now, have been little recognized in recent literature can resolve some important controversies. In turn, research on animal culture should be of great interest to social scientists, because understanding human culture and human uniqueness requires an evolutionary analysis of our cognitive capacities and their evolutionary origins. Our review suggests excellent opportunities for social and natural scientists to join forces in building an interdisciplinary and integrative approach to the pervasive phenomenon of conformity.     

Automated assembly of optimally spaced and balanced paired comparisons: Controlling order effects

To control order effects in questionnaires containing paired comparisons, Ross (1934) described an optimal ordering of the pairings. The pairs can also be balanced so that every stimulus appears equal numbers of times as the first and the second member of a pair. First, we describe and illustrate the optimally spaced, balanced ordering of pairings. Then we show how the optimally spaced, balanced order can be used to implement a matrix-sampling design or a fully incomplete design when the number of stimuli n is so large that respondents cannot reasonably be expected to judge all n(n - 1)/2 pairs. The algorithm for balancing and optimally spacing the list of pairs is described.     

‘In the Beginning is Relation’: Martin Buber’s Alternative to Binary Oppositions

In this article we develop a relational understanding of sociality, that is, an account of social life that takes relation as primary. This stands in contrast to the common assumption that relations arise when subjects interact, an account that gives logical priority to separation. We will develop this relational understanding through a reading of the work of Martin Buber, a social philosopher primarily interested in dialogue, meeting, relationship, and the irreducibility and incomparability of reality. In particular, the article contrasts Buber??s work with that of poststructuralist theorists who take as their starting point the deconstruction of the Hegelian logic of binary oppositions. Deconstruction understands difference as the excess that undoes the binary, but Buber, we argue, shows how difference derives from the primacy and ontological undefinability of relation. Relational logic does not exclude the logic of separations and oppositions: relation is the primal ground that makes separations possible.     

Ethical? Toward whom?

Comments on the original article, "Nonrational processes in ethical decision making" by M. D. Rogerson et al (see record 2011-19198-001). Among the many insightful points made by Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, and Younggren (October 2011) regarding nonrational processes in ethical decision making, one deserves further explication: Many of psychologists' ethical decisions lead to actions done to someone. Unfortunately, frameworks and models of ethical decision making frequently neglect this fact by implying that the decisions happen in the abstract, but in truth, these decisions often affect a specific recipient. Importantly, the characteristics of that specific recipient, especially as perceived by the psychologist, can have a powerful impact on the process of ethical decision making (Caughron et al., 2011). It would be wise to add such a hypothetical to the list of specific questions that Rogerson et al recommended psychologists ask themselves: Would I make the same ethical decision if the person(s) toward whom the decision is directed had different characteristics?     

Inferring facts from fiction: reading correct and incorrect information affects memory for related information

People can acquire both true and false knowledge about the world from fictional stories. The present study explored whether the benefits and costs of learning about the world from fictional stories extend beyond memory for directly stated pieces of information. Of interest was whether readers would use correct and incorrect story references to make deductive inferences about related information in the story, and then integrate those inferences into their knowledge bases. Participants read stories containing correct, neutral, and misleading references to facts about the world; each reference could be combined with another reference that occurred in a later sentence to make a deductive inference. Later they answered general knowledge questions that tested for these deductive inferences. The results showed that participants generated and retained the deductive inferences regardless of whether the inferences were consistent or inconsistent with world knowledge, and irrespective of whether the references were placed consecutively in the text or separated by many sentences. Readers learn more than what is directly stated in stories; they use references to the real world to make both correct and incorrect inferences that are integrated into their knowledge bases.     

Visual attention to emotion in depression: facilitation and withdrawal processes

Attentional biases for sadness are integral to cognitive theories of depression, but do not emerge under all conditions. Some researchers have argued that depression is associated with delayed withdrawal from, but not facilitated initial allocation of attention toward, sadness. We compared two types of withdrawal processes in clinically depressed and non-depressed individuals: (1) withdrawal requiring overt eye movements during visual search; and (2) covert disengagement of attention in a modified cueing paradigm. We also examined initial allocation of attention towards emotion on the visual search task, allowing comparison of withdrawal and facilitation processes. As predicted, we found no evidence of facilitated attention towards sadness in depressed individuals. However, we also found no evidence of depression-linked differences in withdrawal of attention from sadness on either task, offering no support for the theory that depression is associated with withdrawal rather than initial facilitation of attention.     

Cost–benefit and distributional analyses of accessory stimuli

Accessory stimuli (AS) are task-irrelevant events (typically an auditory tone) that speed reaction time (RT). With two conditions (AS-present, AS-absent) it is unclear whether AS-presence causes benefits or AS-absence causes costs, possibly due to the expectancy violations. The current study added a third condition where AS were absent in blocks and not expected (pure blocks); in other blocks, AS occurred with a probability of 0.5 (mixed blocks), allowing cost-benefit analysis comparing AS-absent RTs in pure and mixed blocks. Results demonstrated RTs were slower when AS were absent, regardless of whether the absence occurred in a mixed block or a pure block, suggesting AS do provide a benefit to RT. Additionally, AS-facilitation across the RT distribution was analysed using cumulative distribution frequencies and ex-Gaussian parameter estimation. Both provided converging evidence that AS-facilitation increases towards the slower end of the RT distribution. The implications for the utility of AS paradigms are discussed.