Do Historical Changes in Parent–Child Relationships Explain Increases in Youth Conduct Problems?

The coincidence of historical trends in youth antisocial behavior and change in family demographics has led to speculation of a causal link, possibly mediated by declining quality of parenting and parent–child relationships. No study to date has directly assessed whether and how parenting and parent–child relationships have changed. Two national samples of English adolescents aged 16–17 years in 1986 (N = 4,524 adolescents, 7,120 parents) and 2006 (N = 716 adolescents, 734 parents) were compared using identical questionnaire assessments. Youth-reported parental monitoring, expectations, and parent–child quality time increased between 1986 and 2006. Ratings of parental interest did not change. Parenting differences between affluent and disadvantaged families narrowed over time. There was thus little evidence of a decline in quality of parenting for the population as a whole or for disadvantaged subgroups. Parent-reported youth conduct problems showed a modest increase between 1986 and 2006. Findings suggested that the increase in youth conduct problems was largely unrelated to observed change in parent–child relationships.     

Further routes to psychological constructionism

In this commentary, we do two things. First, we sketch two further routes to psychological constructionism. They are complementary to Lindquist et al.'s meta-analyses and have potential to add new evidence. Second, we look at a challenging kind of case for constructionism, namely, emotional anomalies where there are correlated, and probably relevant, brain anomalies. Psychopaths are our example.     

Visual attention to emotion in depression: facilitation and withdrawal processes

Attentional biases for sadness are integral to cognitive theories of depression, but do not emerge under all conditions. Some researchers have argued that depression is associated with delayed withdrawal from, but not facilitated initial allocation of attention toward, sadness. We compared two types of withdrawal processes in clinically depressed and non-depressed individuals: (1) withdrawal requiring overt eye movements during visual search; and (2) covert disengagement of attention in a modified cueing paradigm. We also examined initial allocation of attention towards emotion on the visual search task, allowing comparison of withdrawal and facilitation processes. As predicted, we found no evidence of facilitated attention towards sadness in depressed individuals. However, we also found no evidence of depression-linked differences in withdrawal of attention from sadness on either task, offering no support for the theory that depression is associated with withdrawal rather than initial facilitation of attention.     

Toward making progress feedback an effective common factor in couple therapy

Systematic monitoring of individual therapy progress, coupled with feedback to the therapist, reliably enhances therapy outcome by alerting therapists to individual clients who are off track to benefit by the end of therapy. The current paper reviews the possibility of using similar systematic monitoring and feedback of therapy progress as a means to enhance couple therapy outcome, including what measures of therapy progress are most likely to be useful, how to structure feedback to be most useful to therapists, and the likely mediators of the effects of therapy progress feedback. One implicit assumption of therapy progress feedback is that clients unlikely to benefit from therapy can be detected early enough in the course of therapy for corrective action to be taken. As a test of this assumption, midtherapy progress was examined as a predictor of final couple therapy outcome in a sample of 134 distressed couples. Either a brief 7- or 32-item assessment of couple therapy progress at midtherapy detected a substantial proportion (46%) of couples who failed to benefit by the end of therapy. Given that failure to benefit from couple therapy is somewhat predictable across the course of therapy, future research should test whether systematic monitoring and feedback of progress could enhance therapy outcome.     

Ethical? Toward whom?

Comments on the original article, "Nonrational processes in ethical decision making" by M. D. Rogerson et al (see record 2011-19198-001). Among the many insightful points made by Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, and Younggren (October 2011) regarding nonrational processes in ethical decision making, one deserves further explication: Many of psychologists' ethical decisions lead to actions done to someone. Unfortunately, frameworks and models of ethical decision making frequently neglect this fact by implying that the decisions happen in the abstract, but in truth, these decisions often affect a specific recipient. Importantly, the characteristics of that specific recipient, especially as perceived by the psychologist, can have a powerful impact on the process of ethical decision making (Caughron et al., 2011). It would be wise to add such a hypothetical to the list of specific questions that Rogerson et al recommended psychologists ask themselves: Would I make the same ethical decision if the person(s) toward whom the decision is directed had different characteristics?     

Hoping for more: The influence of outcome desirability on information seeking and predictions about relative quantities

People must often engage in sequential sampling in order to make predictions about the relative quantities of two options. We investigated how directional motives influence sampling selections and resulting predictions in such cases. We used a paradigm in which participants had limited time to sample items and make predictions about which side of the screen contained more of a critical item. Sampling selections were biased by monetary desirability manipulations, and participants exhibited a desirability bias for both dichotomous and continuous predictions.     

Scientific knowledge suppresses but does not supplant earlier intuitions

When students learn scientific theories that conflict with their earlier, naïve theories, what happens to the earlier theories? Are they overwritten or merely suppressed? We investigated this question by devising and implementing a novel speeded-reasoning task. Adults with many years of science education verified two types of statements as quickly as possible: statements whose truth value was the same across both naïve and scientific theories of a particular phenomenon (e.g., “The moon revolves around the Earth”) and statements involving the same conceptual relations but whose truth value differed across those theories (e.g., “The Earth revolves around the sun”). Participants verified the latter significantly more slowly and less accurately than the former across 10 domains of knowledge (astronomy, evolution, fractions, genetics, germs, matter, mechanics, physiology, thermodynamics, and waves), suggesting that naïve theories survive the acquisition of a mutually incompatible scientific theory, coexisting with that theory for many years to follow.