Differences in the Evaluation of Generic Statements About Human and Non‐Human Categories

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. Current theories suggest that people should be especially inclined to accept generics that involve threatening information. However, previous tests of this claim have focused on generics about non‐human categories, which raises the question of whether this effect applies as readily to human categories. In Experiment 1, adults were more likely to accept generics involving a threatening (vs. a non‐threatening) property for artifacts, but this negativity bias did not also apply to human categories. Experiment 2 examined an alternative hypothesis for this result, and Experiments 3 and 4 served as conceptual replications of the first experiment. Experiment 5 found that even preschoolers apply generics differently for humans and artifacts. Finally, Experiment 6 showed that these effects reflect differences between human and non‐human categories more generally, as adults showed a negativity bias for categories of non‐human animals, but not for categories of humans. These findings suggest the presence of important, early‐emerging domain differences in people's judgments about generics.     

Intralevel mental causation

This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser, and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem.     

Increasing Psychological Capital: A Pre-Registered Meta-Analysis of Controlled Interventions

The aim of this meta-analysis was to evaluate the overall effectiveness of interventions designed to enhance psychological capital (PsyCap), well-being, and performance. We used inclusion criteria such as: to have an experimental design, the sample to be formed by employees or students, to contain a measure of PsyCap, and a control group. Forty-one trials (N_total = 3,911) met these criteria. The overall effect of the interventions on all PsyCap variables was significant but small (d = 0.34, k = 41, Z = 6.74, p < .001). Separate analyses on each of the PsyCap variables also revealed significant effects: small effects on developing PsyCap (d = 0.26, k = 9, Z = 4.37, p < .001), hope (d = 0.22, k = 5, Z = 2.26, p < .05), self-efficacy (d = 0.37, k = 18, Z = 4.11, p < .001), and optimism (d = 0.36, k = 12, Z = 2.52, p < .05), and a small to medium effect for resilience (d = 0.49, k = 12, Z = 3.61, p < .001). The effectiveness of the PsyCap interventions on well-being and performance is also significant.     

A new look at the relationship between perceptual and motor responses

A visual stimulus may affect a motor response although its visibility is prevented by a mask. This implies that the sensorimotor system is more susceptible to stimulation than the perceptual system. We report data that are contrary to this intuition. Experiments where both the observer's perceptual state related to the presence/absence of a masked stimulus and the motor behaviour elicited by the same stimulus were jointly assessed on a trial-by-trial basis show that masked visual stimulation at constant visibility (d′) has two types of effect on the motor system. When the physical energy of the masked stimulus is weak, it affects the motor response only if it exceeds the observer's perceptual response criterion. It is only when the physical energy of the masked stimulus is relatively strong that its impact on the motor response is independent of the state of the perceptual system. This indicates that reflex, “nonconscious” behaviour has a high energy threshold.     

How (not) to think about mental action

I examine Galen Strawson's recent work on mental action in his paper, ‘Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity’. I argue that his account of mental action is too restrictive. I offer a means of testing tokens of mental activity types to determine if they are actional. The upshot is that a good deal more mental activity than Strawson admits is actional.     

Behavioral ecology meets motor behavior: choosing between walking and reaching paths

Behavioral ecology is a field in which scientists try to predict behavioral choices, typically by estimating costs of behavioral alternatives even though those costs may involve different currencies. Researchers interested in motor behavior often have similar concerns, though the connections between these two fields have been largely unnoticed. The authors pursued a study of motor behaviors involving different currencies: walking over different distances and reaching over different distances. They found that the cost of reaching was much greater than the cost of walking. They also found that walking paths took into account hand preferences. The present study extends previous research on the neglected topic of the coordination of reaching and walking and provides a simple method that can be applied in other contexts.     

Emotional Intelligence in Personnel Selection: Applicant reactions,criterion, and incremental validity

In two studies, based on four samples and more than 600 participants, the authors examined applicant reactions, criterion and incremental validity, and differential prediction of emotional intelligence (EI) in personnel selection using the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test. The first study examined applicant reactions in terms of face validity and fairness evaluation of the EI test. The second study examined across three samples (salespeople, front‐desk public employees, and hospital chief executive officers) the criterion validity, incremental validity, and differential prediction of EI. Results suggest that the EI test is perceived as a fair selection tool, and is predictive of performance. The EI test has incremental validity over cognitive abilities and personality (big five) when predicting subjective and objective performance criteria. Based on these results, the authors encourage further research on the use of EI in selection settings.