The effect of generic statements on children's causal attributions: questions of mechanism

Generic statements, or generics, express generalizations about entire kinds (e.g., "Girls are good at a game called 'tooki'"). In contrast, nongeneric statements express facts about specific (sets of) individuals (e.g., "Jane is good at tooki"). Aside from simply conveying information, generics and nongenerics also instill different causal perspectives on the facts expressed, implying that these facts stem from deep, inherent causes (e.g., talent) or from external, mechanistic causes (e.g., instruction), respectively. In the present research (with samples of 4- to 7-year-olds and undergraduates, N = 220), we proposed that children's causal attributions for the facts learned through these statements are determined not by the generic/nongeneric format of the statements themselves but rather by the generic/nongeneric format of the beliefs relevant to these statements. This proposal led to two specific predictions. First, the influence of the generic belief induced by a novel generic statement should be detected in any subsequent context that falls under its scope--even in circumstances that involve particular individuals. Confirming this prediction, participants often attributed a fact conveyed in a nongeneric statement (e.g., a particular girl's tooki ability) to deep, inherent causes if they had previously formed a relevant generic belief (e.g., by hearing that girls are good at tooki). Second, we predicted that nongeneric statements such as "Most girls are good at tooki" should also promote attributions to deep causes because they often ultimately give rise to generic beliefs, as suggested by recent evidence. This prediction was confirmed as well. These results clarify and expand our knowledge of the influence of language on children's understanding of the world.     

Intentions are mental states

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the ‘mental state’ theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.     

Reciprocal trust mediates deep transfer of learning between games of strategic interaction

We studied transfer of learning across two games of strategic interaction. We found that the interpersonal relation between two players during and across two games influence development of reciprocal trust and transfer of learning from one game to another. We show that two types of similarities between the games affect transfer: (1) deep similarities facilitate transfer of an optimal solution across games; (2) surface similarities can either facilitate or hinder transfer depending on whether they lead players toward an optimal or sub-optimal solution in the target game. Learning an optimal solution in a context of interdependence between players is associated with development of reciprocal trust, which in turn mediates transfer of learning across games. The results can be used to inform the design of training exercises to develop strategic interaction skills.     

Surviving resurrection

In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified.     

The effect of practice on n–2 repetition costs in set switching

Inhibition in set switching is inferred from so-called n–2 repetition costs: slower response times to ABA sequences compared to CBA sequences (where A, B, and C are arbitrary labels for different tasks). These costs are thought to reflect the persisting inhibition of task A when it was disengaged recently (as is the case in an ABA sequence). In this study we were interested in whether more inhibition may be required when the tasks are relatively novel. To this end, we examined the effect of practice on the n–2 repetition cost in nine participants across five experimental sessions, with 1222 trials performed in each session. The results show a clear reduction in the n–2 repetition cost, being altogether absent from the final sessions. Such a reduction is predicted by both: (a) a recent computational model of the n–2 repetition cost (Grange, Juvina, & Houghton, 2013) due to the gradual strengthening of task-related memory elements with practice to the point where inhibition has less impact; and (b) prior work showing smaller n–2 repetition costs with greater cue–target association strength (Houghton, Pritchard, & Grange, 2009). In this paper, we integrate these two theoretical derivations by extending our computational model, which fit the current data—at the mean level, block level, and individual-subject (i.e., individual differences) level—well.     

The dark side of cognitive illusions: When an illusory belief interferes with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge

Cognitive illusions are often associated with mental health and well‐being. However, they are not without risk. This research shows they can interfere with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge. During the first phase of the experiment, one group of participants was induced to develop a strong illusion that a placebo medicine was effective to treat a fictitious disease, whereas another group was induced to develop a weak illusion. Then, in Phase 2, both groups observed fictitious patients who always took the bogus treatment simultaneously with a second treatment which was effective. Our results showed that the group who developed the strong illusion about the effectiveness of the bogus treatment during Phase 1 had more difficulties in learning during Phase 2 that the added treatment was effective.     

Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categories

Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members (e.g., facts about all or many stups) and generic facts about entire kinds (e.g., facts about zorbs as a kind). Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable (rather than idiosyncratic) properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified‐to‐generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments (N = 449) supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable‐versus‐idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds.