Surviving resurrection

In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified.     

Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categories

Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members (e.g., facts about all or many stups) and generic facts about entire kinds (e.g., facts about zorbs as a kind). Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable (rather than idiosyncratic) properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified‐to‐generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments (N = 449) supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable‐versus‐idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds.     

Upshifted decision criteria in attentional blink and repetition blindness

A large number of “unawareness” phenomena have been explained and quantified in terms of sensitivity (d′) fluctuations, with very few attempts at addressing an alternative putative cause, i.e., fluctuations of subjects’ response criteria (c). Response criteria fluctuations are particularly likely under dual-task paradigms with unbalanced sensitivities (Gorea & Sagi, 2000) such as those used in evidencing attentional blink (AB) and repetition blindness (RB) phenomena. The present study inquires into whether AB and RB are indeed prone to a deviant decisional behaviour. AB and RB were studied with a yes/no task allowing the assessment of d′ and c for the detection (presence/absence) of a target letter T2 as a function of its temporal lag relative to the presentation of another (AB) or of the same (RB) letter, T1 (Experiment 1). A significant criterion increase was observed in both cases. Additional experiments demonstrate that this criterion effect is typical of these dual-task AB and RB paradigms as it is not observed in a standard contrast detection task with mixed contrasts (Experiment 2), in a “control” AB design stripped off its first task T1 (Experiment 3), or in a metacontrast experiment (Experiment 4). We propose that the observed criterion shifts are the consequence of the inherent dual-task AB and RB designs (where observers have to judge two events of unequal saliencies) and that they entail an enhancement of the AB and RB effects as long as these effects are assessed via subjective (yes/no or matching) procedures.     

Permanence, Something, Being: The Cosmogonic Argument of the Heng Xian

The Heng Xian is one of the recently discovered paleographic materials that disclose a heretofore unknown richness of the cosmogonic thought of early China and contribute to our understanding of the elaboration of a uniform cosmogonic discourse during the late Warring States period. Focusing on the structure and vocabulary of the Heng Xian account, the present paper attempts to explore the conceptual core of its cosmogonic vision. Based on the idea of the spontaneous self-generation of the world out of some primary state of simplicity, or nothingness, the cosmogony of the Heng Xian is quite close to the approach of the Laozi and other related texts. Nevertheless, many of its conceptual terminological features disclose an original understanding of the world genesis.     

What Do North American Babies Hear? A large‐scale cross‐corpus analysis

A range of demographic variables influences how much speech young children hear. However, because studies have used vastly different sampling methods, quantitative comparison of interlocking demographic effects has been nearly impossible, across or within studies. We harnessed a unique collection of existing naturalistic, day‐long recordings from 61 homes across four North American cities to examine language input as a function of age, gender, and maternal education. We analyzed adult speech heard by 3‐ to 20‐month‐olds who wore audio recorders for an entire day. We annotated speaker gender and speech register (child‐directed or adult‐directed) for 10,861 utterances from female and male adults in these recordings. Examining age, gender, and maternal education collectively in this ecologically valid dataset, we find several key results. First, the speaker gender imbalance in the input is striking: children heard 2–3× more speech from females than males. Second, children in higher‐maternal education homes heard more child‐directed speech than those in lower‐maternal education homes. Finally, our analyses revealed a previously unreported effect: the proportion of child‐directed speech in the input increases with age, due to a decrease in adult‐directed speech with age. This large‐scale analysis is an important step forward in collectively examining demographic variables that influence early development, made possible by pooled, comparable, day‐long recordings of children's language environments. The audio recordings, annotations, and annotation software are readily available for reuse and reanalysis by other researchers.     

Should Abraham Get a Religious Exemption?

Res Publica - The standard liberal egalitarian approach to religious exemptions from generally applicable laws implies that such exemptions may be necessary in the name of equal respect for each...     

Memory accessibility shapes explanation: Testing key claims of the inherence heuristic account

People understand the world by constructing explanations for what they observe. It is thus important to identify the cognitive processes underlying these judgments. According to a recent proposal, everyday explanations are often constructed heuristically: Because people need to generate explanations on a moment-by-moment basis, they cannot perform an exhaustive search through the space of possible reasons, but may instead use the information that is most easily accessible in memory (Cimpian & Salomon 2014a, b). In the present research, we tested two key claims of this proposal that have so far not been investigated. First, we tested whether—as previously hypothesized—the information about an entity that is most accessible in memory tends to consist of inherent or intrinsic facts about that entity, rather than extrinsic (contextual, historical, etc.) facts about it (Studies 1 and 2). Second, we tested the implications of this difference in the memory accessibility of inherent versus extrinsic facts for the process of generating explanations: Does the fact that inherent facts are more accessible than relevant extrinsic facts give rise to an inherence bias in the content of the explanations generated (Studies 3 and 4)? The findings supported the proposal that everyday explanations are generated in part via a heuristic process that relies on easily accessible—and often inherent—information from memory.     

Why Believe Infinite Sets Exist?

The axiom of infinity states that infinite sets exist. I will argue that this axiom lacks justification. I start by showing that the axiom is not self-evident, so it needs separate justification. Following Maddy’s (J Symb Log 53(2):481–511, 1988) distinction, I argue that the axiom of infinity lacks both intrinsic and extrinsic justification. Crucial to my project is Skolem’s (in: van Heijnoort (ed) From Frege to Gödel: a source book in mathematical logic, 1879–1931, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 290–301, 1922) distinction between a theory of real sets, and a theory of objects that theory calls “sets”. While Dedekind’s (in: Essays on the theory of numbers, pp. 14–58, 1888. http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/21016) argument fails, his approach was correct: the axiom of infinity needs a justification it currently lacks. This epistemic situation is at variance with everyday mathematical practice. A dilemma ensues: should we relax epistemic standards or insist, in a skeptical vein, that a foundational problem has been ignored?