What Provides Justification for Cheating—Producing or Observing Counterfactuals?

When people can profit financially by lying, they do so to the extent to which they can justify their lies. One type of justification is the observation and production of desirable counterfactual information. Here, we disentangle observing and producing of desired counterfactuals and test whether the mere observation is sufficient or whether one actually needs to produce the information in order to justify lying. By employing a modified version of the Die‐Under‐Cup task, we ask participants to privately roll a die three times and to report the outcome of the first die roll (with higher values corresponding to higher payoffs). In all three conditions, participants produce (roll the die) and observe the first die roll, which is relevant for pay. We manipulate whether participants produce and observe versus only observe the second and third die roll outcomes, which are both irrelevant for pay. Results reveal that people lie to the same extent—when producing and observing the counterfactuals, and when merely observing them. It seems that merely observing counterfactual information is sufficient to allow people to use this information to justify their lies. We further test whether creativity and moral disengagement are associated with dishonesty and replicate the finding showing that unethical behavior increases with creativity. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate

In the ethical debate on genetic modification (GM), it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: (i) It does not respect the difference between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments; (ii) it relies on the unproblematic transferability of reasons from one case to another; and (iii) it runs the risk of equivocations, especially in cases where the anti-genetic-modification argument relies on gradable features. The paper then shows how these issues play out in three specific Similarity Arguments that can be found in the literature. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from the fact that genetic modification and established technologies are similar for the ethical status of genetic modification.     

The Future Work Self and Calling: The Mediational Role of Life Meaning

Research on calling prevailingly focuses on the positive effects on well-being and career development. However, explorations of the predictors and emergence of callings are sparse. We tested a model in which clarity about the future work self promotes one’s sense of calling through increased life meaning. We sampled 473 Chinese college students with a three-wave panel design over 1 year. Using time-lagged analysis, we found that the future work self at T1 significantly predicted increased life meaning at T2, which, in turn, significantly predicted increased calling at T3. This indirect effect was significant and supported the hypothesized longitudinal mediation model. The reverse effects of one’s calling as a predictor of self-clarity about one’s future work life or life meaning were not confirmed. Our findings suggest that among Chinese college students, self-clarity about one’s future work life and understanding one’s life meaning are two important steps in the development of one’s calling.     

Planning sentences while doing other things at the same time: effects of concurrent verbal and visuospatial working memory load

This study investigated to what extent advance planning during sentence production is affected by a concurrent cognitive load. In two picture–word interference experiments in which participants produced subject–verb–object sentences while ignoring auditory distractor words, we assessed advance planning at a phonological (lexeme) and at an abstract–lexical (lemma) level under visuospatial or verbal working memory (WM) load. At the phonological level, subject and object nouns were found to be activated before speech onset with concurrent visuospatial WM load, but only subject nouns were found to be activated with concurrent verbal WM load, indicating a reduced planning scope as a function of type of WM load (Experiment 1). By contrast, at the abstract–lexical level, subject and object nouns were found to be activated regardless of type of concurrent load (Experiment 2). In both experiments, sentence planning had a more detrimental effect on concurrent verbal WM task performance than on concurrent visuospatial WM task performance. Overall, our results suggest that advance planning at the phonological level is more affected by a concurrently performed verbal WM task than advance planning at the abstract–lexical level. Also, they indicate an overlap of resources allocated to phonological planning in speech production and verbal WM.     

A test of the diffusion model explanation for the worst performance rule using preregistration and blinding

People with higher IQ scores also tend to perform better on elementary cognitive-perceptual tasks, such as deciding quickly whether an arrow points to the left or the right Jensen (2006). The worst performance rule (WPR) finesses this relation by stating that the association between IQ and elementary-task performance is most pronounced when this performance is summarized by people’s slowest responses. Previous research has shown that the WPR can be accounted for in the Ratcliff diffusion model by assuming that the same ability parameter—drift rate—mediates performance in both elementary tasks and higher-level cognitive tasks. Here we aim to test four qualitative predictions concerning the WPR and its diffusion model explanation in terms of drift rate. In the first stage, the diffusion model was fit to data from 916 participants completing a perceptual two-choice task; crucially, the fitting happened after randomly shuffling the key variable, i.e., each participant’s score on a working memory capacity test. In the second stage, after all modeling decisions were made, the key variable was unshuffled and the adequacy of the predictions was evaluated by means of confirmatory Bayesian hypothesis tests. By temporarily withholding the mapping of the key predictor, we retain flexibility for proper modeling of the data (e.g., outlier exclusion) while preventing biases from unduly influencing the results. Our results provide evidence against the WPR and suggest that it may be less robust and less ubiquitous than is commonly believed.     

Intelligence and neural efficiency: Measures of brain activation versus measures of functional connectivity in the brain

The neural efficiency hypothesis of intelligence suggests a more efficient use of the cortex (or even the brain) in brighter as compared to less intelligent individuals. This has been shown in a series of studies employing different neurophysiological measurement methods and a broad range of different cognitive task demands. However, most of the studies dealing with the brain–IQ relationship used parameters of absolute or relative brain activation such as the event-related (de-)synchronization of EEG alpha activity, allowing for interpretations in terms of more or less brain activation when individuals are confronted with cognitively demanding tasks. In order to investigate the neural efficiency hypothesis more thoroughly, we also used measures that inform us about functional connectivity between different brain areas (or functional coupling, respectively) when engaged in cognitive task performance. Analyses reveal evidence that higher intelligence is associated with a lower brain activation (or a lower ERD, respectively) and a stronger phase locking between short-distant regions of the frontal cortex.     

Say it with flowers! An fMRI study of object mediated communication

Human communicational interaction can be mediated by a host of expressive means from words in a natural language to gestures and material symbols. Given the proper contextual setting even an everyday object can gain a mediating function in a communicational situation. In this study we used event-related fMRI to study the brain activity caused by everyday material objects when they are perceived as signals. We found that comprehension of material signals activates bilaterally areas of the ventral stream and pars triangularis of the inferior frontal cortex, that is, areas traditionally associated with verbal language and semantics. In addition, we found that right-hemisphere inferior frontal cortex is recruited as a function of the increasing unconventionality of communicative objects. Together these findings support an interpretation of the traditional language areas as playing a more general role across modalities in relation to communicational mediation of social semantic meaning.     

Playing TETRIS for science counter-regulatory affective processing in a motivationally “hot” context

We adapted the computer game TETRIS to investigate the process of affective-motivational counter-regulation, that is, attentional biases for emotional stimuli that are in opposition to the momentary motivational focus. Counter-regulation is seen as a mechanism which should prevent escalation and impulsivity, and it should help to avoid becoming “locked up” in affective-motivational states. Accordingly, for a negative outcome focus condition (i.e., risk of losing a current high score), we hypothesized greater interference by positive distractors that were included in the game, whereas for a positive outcome focus (i.e., chance to improve one’s current high score), we hypothesized greater interference by negative distractors. Supporting our hypotheses, we found the predicted interactions between distractor valence and type of outcome focus.