A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection

Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe.     

Salivary progesterone is associated with reduced coherence of attentional, cognitive, and motivational systems

The present study tested whether the hypothesis that high levels of progesterone (P) have a decoupling effect on the function of the brain hemispheres (Hausmann & Gunturkun, 2000) also extends to attentional functions, referential connections between verbal and nonverbal representations and the degree to which implicit motivational needs match a person's explicit goal commitments. Participants (28 women on oral contraceptives, 14 naturally cycling women, 50 men) completed the Lateralized Attention Network Task (Greene et al., 2008), a measure of the alerting, orienting, and conflict-resolution functions of attention for each hemisphere; a measure of referential competence (i.e., the ability to quickly name nonverbal information); a measure of the implicit motives power, achievement, and affiliation; and a content-matched personal goal inventory. In addition, they provided a saliva sample that was assayed for P and cortisol (C). Higher levels of P were associated with lower interhemispheric correlations for alerting and orienting, but with a higher correlation of conflict-resolution performance. Higher P was also associated with longer interhemispheric transfer time, lower congruence between implicit motives and explicit goal commitments and, after controlling for C, with lower referential competence. These results suggest that (a) P is associated with the degree to which attentional functions are correlated between hemispheres, although in a different direction for more posterior (alerting and orienting: decoupling) than for more anterior functions (conflict resolution: coupling), (b) that high P is associated with other indicators of reduced functional coherence between cognitive systems (longer interhemispheric transfer time, lower referential competence), and (c) that high P is also associated with low coherence between implicit and explicit motivational systems.     

Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement

Upon discovering that certain beliefs we hold are contingent on arbitrary features of our background, we often feel uneasy. I defend the proposal that if such cases of contingency anxiety involve defeaters, this is because of the epistemic significance of disagreement. I note two hurdles to our accepting this Disagreement Hypothesis. Firstly, some cases of contingency anxiety apparently involve no disagreement. Secondly, the proposal may seem to make our awareness of the influence of arbitrary background factors irrelevant in determining whether to revise our beliefs. I show that each of these problems can be successfully accommodated by the Disagreement Hypothesis.