Playing TETRIS for science counter-regulatory affective processing in a motivationally “hot” context

We adapted the computer game TETRIS to investigate the process of affective-motivational counter-regulation, that is, attentional biases for emotional stimuli that are in opposition to the momentary motivational focus. Counter-regulation is seen as a mechanism which should prevent escalation and impulsivity, and it should help to avoid becoming “locked up” in affective-motivational states. Accordingly, for a negative outcome focus condition (i.e., risk of losing a current high score), we hypothesized greater interference by positive distractors that were included in the game, whereas for a positive outcome focus (i.e., chance to improve one’s current high score), we hypothesized greater interference by negative distractors. Supporting our hypotheses, we found the predicted interactions between distractor valence and type of outcome focus.     

On the dynamics of institutional agreements

In this paper we investigate a logic for modelling individual and collective acceptances that is called acceptance logic. The logic has formulae of the form A_G:x j{\rm A}_{G:x} \varphi reading ‘if the agents in the set of agents G identify themselves with institution x then they together accept that j{\varphi} ’. We extend acceptance logic by two kinds of dynamic modal operators. The first kind are public announcements of the form x!y{x!\psi}, meaning that the agents learn that y{\psi} is the case in context x. Formulae of the form [x!y]j{[x!\psi]\varphi} mean that j{\varphi} is the case after every possible occurrence of the event x!ψ. Semantically, public announcements diminish the space of possible worlds accepted by agents and sets of agents. The announcement of ψ in context x makes all \lnoty{\lnot\psi} -worlds inaccessible to the agents in such context. In this logic, if the set of accessible worlds of G in context x is empty, then the agents in G are not functioning as members of x, they do not identify themselves with x. In such a situation the agents in G may have the possibility to join x. To model this we introduce here a second kind of dynamic modal operator of acceptance shifting of the form G:x-y{G:x\uparrow\psi}. The latter means that the agents in G shift (change) their acceptances in order to accept ψ in context x. Semantically, they make ψ-worlds accessible to G in the context x, which means that, after such operation, G is functioning as member of x (unless there are no ψ-worlds). We show that the resulting logic has a complete axiomatization in terms of reduction axioms for both dynamic operators. In the paper we also show how the logic of acceptance and its dynamic extension can be used to model some interesting aspects of judgement aggregation. In particular, we apply our logic of acceptance to a classical scenario in judgment aggregation, the so-called ‘doctrinal paradox’ or ‘discursive dilemma’ (Pettit, Philosophical Issues 11:268–299, 2001; Kornhauser and Sager, Yale Law Journal 96:82–117, 1986).     

A logic of intention and attempt

We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.     

Equality of Education and Citizenship: Challenges of European Integration

What kind of equality among Europeans does equal citizenship require, especially regarding education? In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans—and if so, equality of what? To what extent should the same knowledge base and citizenship norms be taught across state borders and religious and other normative divides? At least three philosophical issues merit attention: (a) The requirements of multiple democratic citizenships beyond the nation state; (b) how to respect diversity while securing such equality and inculcating commitments to justice and norms of citizenship, and (c) The multiple reasons for equality of various kinds among political equals living in a Union as compared to a unitary state. The article responds on the basis of several arguments in favour of certain kinds of equality. All Union citizens must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe. Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain ‘citizenship norms’. This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union. I also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. The paper concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship.     

Effects of race on responses and response latencies in the weapon identification task: a test of six models

The authors consider six models of underlying process in the weapon identification task: The first two are response-time extensions of signal detection models; the last four, of the process dissociation model. Predictions for accuracy data, correct response latencies, and false response latencies are used to discriminate between models. In the present study, racial bias in responses and correct response latency was replicated. New findings were that the direction of bias was reversed in error latency and that errors were faster than correct responses. These findings rule out four models, in particular, the idea that race biases early perception and interpretation of targets. Implications for reducing errors in the weapon identification task and possibilities of discriminating between the remaining two models are discussed.     

Social presence effects on the stroop task: Boundary conditions and an alternative account

Two studies investigated boundary conditions of an effect of social presence on the Stroop task and its interpretation in terms of an attentional view (P. Huguet, M. P. Galvaing, J. M. Monteil, & F. Dumas, 1999). In this view, social presence leads to attentional focusing, enhancing participants’ ability to screen out the distracting features of Stroop stimuli. As predicted, Stroop interference was found to be reduced by social presence, but an alternative account in which social presence exerts an effect on task selection received more support.     

Selective exposure and decision framing: The impact of gain and loss framing on confirmatory information search after decisions

When people make decisions, they often prefer to receive information that supports rather than conflicts with their decision. To date, this effect has mainly been investigated in the context of decisions about gains, whereas decisions about losses have received less attention. Based on Prospect Theory, we expected information search to be differently affected by whether people previously have decided about gains or losses. Three studies have revealed that selectivity of information search is stronger after gain-framed rather than after loss-framed decision problems. An investigation of the underlying psychological processes revealed that gain decisions are made with increased subjective decision certainty (i.e. they are easier and less effortful to make), which in turn systematically increases confirmatory information search.     

Testing the race inequality: A simple correction procedure for fast guesses

In speeded response tasks with redundant signals, parallel processing of the redundant signals is generally tested using the so-called race inequality. The race inequality states that the distribution of fast responses for a redundant stimulus never exceeds the summed distributions of fast responses for the single stimuli. It has been pointed out that fast guesses (e.g. anticipatory responses) interfere with this test, and a correction procedure (‘kill-the-twin’ procedure) has been suggested. In this note we formally derive this procedure and extend it to the case in which redundant stimuli are presented with onset asynchrony. We demonstrate how the kill-the-twin procedure is used in a statistical test of the race model prediction.