Analytische philosophie des geistes

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Serial murderers' spatial decisions: factors that influence crime location choice

The outcome of German serial murderer spatial decision making was measured as the straight‐line distance (km) between murderer home locations and each crime location (i.e. body recovery location). Geographic and series development data, as well as information on age, intelligence, motive, marital status, employment status, and mode of transportation of 53 German serial murderers was collected from police and prosecution service files and judicial verdict records. Potential effects of the aforementioned factors on spatial decisions were assessed. Results showed that 63% of the murderers lived within 10 km of their crime locations. Home‐to‐crime distance was negatively correlated with murderer age and positively correlated with murderer IQ score. Results also showed that the mode of transportation used by murderers had an effect on their spatial decisions. Results are discussed in terms of understanding serial murderer spatial decision‐making and implications for police investigations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Contextual Frames Normalize Submission

ABSTRACT

Two studies demonstrate how contextual frames normalize submission and hereby complement and legitimize the exercise of power. Combining Kuhn’s qualitative concept of the self with Charles Osgood’s empirical measurements of self-attitudes, the first study tests the impact of the frame of submission on self-attitudes. This assessment of the self allows to quantify the influence of a frame or context. A second study tests the hypothesis that selves, organized by the context of submission, will normalize acts of submission. Computer simulations that quantitatively operationalize the Cybernetic Symbolic Interactionist perspective, find evidence for the normalizing quality of frames.     

A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection

Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe.