Moral demands and the far future*

I argue that moral philosophers have either misunderstood the problem of moral demandingness or at least failed to recognize important dimensions of the problem that undermine many standard assumptions. It has been assumed that utilitarianism concretely directs us to maximize welfare within a generation by transferring resources to people currently living in extreme poverty. In fact, utilitarianism seems to imply that obligations to help people who are currently badly off are trumped by obligations to undertake actions targeted at improving the value of the long-term future. Reflecting on the demands of beneficence in respect of the value of the far future forces us to view key aspects of the problem of moral demandingness in a different light.     

Psychoeducation for Adults with Post-Traumatic Stress Symptomatology: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy - Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a condition that can develop after experiencing a traumatic event. Psychoeducation is a treatment approach often...     

Risks of Mortality of Suicide Attempters Compared with Psychiatric and General Populations

ABSTRACT: This study compares mortality risk among suicide attempters, psychiatric patients, and members of the general population using demographic data from the Monroe County (New York) Psychiatric Case Register for 1960 to 1970. During this 11-year period there were 172 deaths reported for the suicide attempt group, 6,108 for the Psychiatric Register population, and 58,542 for the general population. The relative risk of death from all causes of the suicide attempt group was nearly twice that of the general population and slightly higher than that of the psychiatric group. High risks of mortality were differentially associated with several demographic and treatment variables. Implications for predictive criteria and interventive strategies are discussed.     

Animals and Relational Egalitarianism(s)

According to relational egalitarianism, a society is just insofar as the relations in that society are equal. Exclusively, relational egalitarians have been concerned with why humans, in particular adults, must relate as equals. This is unfortunate since relational egalitarians claim to be in line with the concerns of real-life egalitarians; but real-life egalitarians, such as vegans and vegetarians, clearly care about injustices committed against non-human animals. In this article, I thus explore the role of non-human animals in relational egalitarianism. I distinguish four accounts of relational egalitarianism and argue that they differ in what they imply for relationships between humans and animals. Interestingly, it will also become clear that in relational egalitarianism, a relation may not only be unequal or equal; it may also be non-unequal.