A new method to evaluate order and accuracy of inaccurately and incompletely reproduced movement sequences

Studying imitation learning of long sequences requires the evaluation of inaccurately and incompletely reproduced movement sequences. In order to evaluate the movement reproduction, it has to be assigned to the original stimulus. We developed an assignment algorithm that considers the Spatial Neighborhood and Order of reproduction (SNOA). To evaluate the features of this analysis it was applied to human performance during learning of long pointing sequences under two conditions: stimulus-guided reproduction with high spatial accuracy and imitation learning with low spatial accuracy. The results were compared with a simple assignment considering Spatial Neighborhood only (SNA) and with a Manual Assignment (MA). In the stimulus-guided reproduction the error measures did not differ between the algorithms. In contrast, with imitation learning, SNOA and MA generated higher estimates of order and omission errors than SNA. The results show that SNOA can be used to automatically quantify the similarity of both movement structure and metric information between long target sequences and inaccurate and incomplete movement reproductions.     

Allusive thinking (cognitive looseness) and the propensity to perceive “meaningful” coincidences

This study aimed at evaluating relations between the disposition to make “meaningful” associations between random events and potentially predisposing factors related to a more “loose” cognitive control, that is, loose associative processing (allusive thinking) and poorer inhibition of irrelevant memory content. As the findings of this study suggest, individuals with a higher disposition to perceive coincidences produced a higher rate of unusual associations in the Bridge-the-Associative-Gap test than low scorers, and showed poorer inhibition of no longer relevant memory content in the Recent Probes Task. These relationships were independent from individual differences in paranormal belief. Performance in a random generation task (Mittenecker Pointing Test) yielded no support for an important role of a biased concept of randomness in the perception of coincidences. The findings suggest that common mechanisms may underlie the propensity to perceive meaningful coincidences, cognitive looseness, and positive schizotypy.     

Eye movement suppression interferes with construction of object-centered spatial reference frames in working memory

The brain’s frontal eye fields (FEF), responsible for eye movement control, are known to be involved in spatial working memory (WM).In a previous fMRI experiment (Wallentin, Roepstorff & Burgess, Neuropsychologia, 2008) it was found that FEF activation was primarily related to the formation of an object-centered, rather than egocentric, spatial reference frame. In this behavioral experiment we wanted to demonstrate a causal relationship between eye movement control and manipulation of spatial reference frames. Sixty-two participants recalled either spatial (“Was X in front of Y?”) or non-spatial (“Was X darker than Y?”) relations in a previously shown image containing two to four objects, each with an intrinsic orientation and unique luminance. During half of all recall trials a moving visual stimulus was presented, which participants had to ignore, thus suppressing eye movement. Response times were significantly slower for spatial relations with distraction while there was no effect on non-spatial relations. There was no effect on accuracy, i.e. WM maintenance. This is consistent with the hypothesis that in spatial representations the FEFs are involved in WM content manipulation, such as establishing an object-centered spatial frame of reference.     

Source reliability and the conjunction fallacy

Information generally comes from less than fully reliable sources. Rationality, it seems, requires that one take source reliability into account when reasoning on the basis of such information. Recently, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) proposed an account of the conjunction fallacy based on this idea. They show that, when statements in conjunction fallacy scenarios are perceived as coming from such sources, probability theory prescribes that the "fallacy" be committed in certain situations. Here, the empirical validity of their model was assessed. The model predicts that statements added to standard conjunction problems will change the incidence of the fallacy. It also predicts that statements from reliable sources should yield an increase in fallacy rates (relative to unreliable sources). Neither the former (Experiment 1) nor the latter prediction (Experiment 3) was confirmed, although Experiment 2 showed that people can derive source reliability estimates from the likelihood of statements in a manner consistent with the tested model. In line with the experimental results, model fits and sensitivity analyses also provided very little evidence in favor of the model. This suggests that Bovens and Hartmann's present model fails to explain fully people's judgements in standard conjunction fallacy tasks.     

Psychosoziale Versorgung von Krebspatienten

Objectives

The aim of this study was to determine rates of psychooncological care for cancer inpatients and outpatients under routine conditions in a large University hospital. The percentage of patients who received care was analyzed and compared with self-rated and expert rated supportive care needs.

Methods

The percentage of inpatients who received psychooncological care was calculated by comparing the number of cancer patients treated at the hospital as documented by the local tumor registry (n=1,979) with the number of patients treated by a psychooncologist in that hospital as documented by the hospital??s psychooncological consultation liaison service. The percentage of outpatients who received psychooncological care was calculated by comparing the number of incident cancer cases as documented by the local tumor registry (n=5,886) with the number of patients who received at least one consultation at the local tumor counseling centre. Supportive care needs were estimated by analyzing data of a prospective patient survey in the same hospital (n=1,803) using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale and single items to determine social burden and the wish for emotional support.

Results

The results showed that 11% of inpatients and outpatients (n=234 and n=638, respectively) received psychooncological care. Social care needs were prevalent in 37% and psychological care needs in 52% of the patients during the stay in hospital and in 42% (social and psychological) 6 months later. Of the patients 41% expressed the need to see a social worker and 29% to see a psychologist. Large differences were found between patients with different tumor entities.

Conclusion

Psychooncological care delivered to cancer patients under routine conditions was below the actual rate required as estimated by screening instruments and as expressed by the patients.     

Broad versus narrow traits: Conscientiousness and honesty–humility as predictors of academic criteria

Recent research has suggested that the six‐dimensional personality model, and especially the dimension Honesty–Humility/Integrity, adds incremental validity to the prediction of important criteria. We expected both this dimension and the dimension Conscientiousness to explain incremental variance in two academic criteria, namely grade point average (GPA) and counterproductive academic behaviour (CAB). In addition, we expected the more specific, so‐called narrow traits of Conscientiousness and Honesty–Humility/Integrity to be stronger predictors of academic criteria than the broad traits. To test these expectations, two studies were conducted using the HEXACO Personality Inventory Revised (HEXACO‐PI‐R) and the Multicultural Personality Test—Big Six (MPT‐BS). The results confirmed our expectations and suggest that academic criteria may be predicted with greater accuracy by focusing on the narrow traits of Conscientiousness and Honesty–Humility/Integrity. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On Devitt’s Defence of Realism

In this paper I question the view that realism must delineate the basic ontological furniture of the world rather than giving arguments in semantic or epistemic terms for the existence of a mind-independent world. I call this view of stating and defending realism the Ontological Defence of Realism (or ODR) and take Devitt’s account of realism as a paradigmatic case of ODR. I argue that ODR cannot block ‘verificationist antirealism’ because the specific (physical) nature of what exists is not enough to secure the mind-independence of what exists and, additionally, every element purported to achieve this, it compromises seriously the idea that realism is primarily an ontological issue. I also stress that ODR is in tension with a plausible realist insight namely the priority of the world over our theorizing. Because of this tension ODR weakens realism in several domains with no good reason. Specifically, I argue that in these domains ODR faces a dilemma: either to reject realism or to take realism to be dependent on a reductive account violating the realist insight. My point is that we should keep realism and ontology distinct and that compliance with the realist insight initiates a better strategy for the defence of realism. I address three possible objections thereby further clarifying my point. I conclude by presenting my view about the relation between ontology and realism.     

The effect of alterations in consciousness on quality of life (QoL) in epilepsy: searching for evidence

The impact of epilepsy on quality of life (QoL) is well-documented. The ability of epileptic seizures to alter the conscious states of patients is also well established. Although there is much research on the QoL of people with epilepsy, few researchers have looked specifically at the effect of sudden, unanticipated alterations of consciousness on QoL. This lack of systematic studies of consciousness alterations and QoL in epilepsy limits our ability to shed light on this interrelation. In this article, with these limitations in mind, we focus on studies of newer AEDs. We review the evidence as to whether a significant reduction (typically more than 50%) in seizures that induce alterations of consciousness, as a result of switching to one of the newer AEDs, leads to improvements in QoL. We draw on this literature to speculate on the relationship between ictal consciousness alterations and poor QoL in epilepsy, to identify contributory and confounding factors and to highlight implications for future research. We suggest that an understanding of how factors associated with consciousness impairment affect QoL could help the treatment and management of these patients.     

Illusory correlations revisited: the role of pseudocontingencies and working-memory capacity

Three experiments investigate illusory correlations in a feedback learning paradigm. Diverging from a standard paradigm, in which stimuli consist of joint observations of group-behaviour pairs, participants were asked to guess the group reference of positive and negative stimulus behaviours. They only knew that one group was larger than the other, and the stimulus series soon revealed that positive (negative) behaviours appeared more frequently in the stimulus series than negative (positive) behaviours. Regardless of whether feedback of the actual group reference was provided or not, the predominant valence was more strongly associated with the large than the small group. This illusory-correlation effect was evident in memory-based measures at the end of the stimulus series as well as in the online predictions during stimulus presentation. The strength of illusory correlations increased with decreasing working-memory capacity, operationalized either by an interpersonal differences measure or a cognitive-load manipulation. The occurrence of illusory correlations in the absence of joint observations about group-valence pairs (in the no-feedback condition and in the early phase of the online prediction task) can be explained as a reflection of pseudocontingency inferences.