Different Strokes in Boundary Artistry: Commentary on Cooper’s “Blurring Boundaries or Why Do We Refer to Sexual Misconduct With Patients as ‘Boundary Violation’”

In this commentary, the useful idea of psychoanalytic process as boundary art is taken up, elaborated, and further conceptualized. Two registers of psychic experience are utilized: the mutual and asymmetric modes of relating inherent in and definitional of analytic process. In line with Steven H. Cooper’s ideas, the givenness of boundaries in the mutual realm constitute the psychic matter of self-other differentiation. In contrast, the asymmetrical register marks boundaries as asserted and intended to be actualized in behavior. The usefulness of “boundary violation” as an expression of a perversion of ethical commitments is construed as a justified and necessary phrase. Boundaries in the asymmetrical register, continually asserted, make play and flex in the mutual register possible and in this way form a dialectical relation. In concert with Cooper, these assertions reflect the power of boundaries to ‘allow us to get lost.’ Fallibilities in the ways theories can be coopted to erase (and thereby truncate) aspects of the psychoanalytic process are described as a misuse (violation?) of boundary art.     

The relationship between Big-5 personality traits and cognitive ability in older adults – a review

It is well established that fundamental aspects of cognition such as memory and speed of processing tend to decline with age; however, there is substantial between-individual variability in levels of cognitive performance in older adulthood and in rates of change in cognitive abilities over time. Recent years have seen an increasing number of studies concerned with examining personality characteristics as possible predictors of some of this variability in cognitive aging. The purpose of this article is to review the literature, and identify patterns of findings regarding the relationships between personality (focusing on the Big-5) and cognitive ability across nonclinical populations of older adults. Possible mechanisms underlying associations of personality characteristics with cognition are reviewed, and assessed in the context of the current literature. Some relatively consistent relationships are identified, including positive associations between openness and cognitive ability, and associations of conscientiousness with slower rates of cognitive decline. However, the relationships between several personality traits and cognitive abilities in older adults remain unclear. We suggest some approaches to research design and analysis that may help increase our understanding of how personality differences may contribute to cognitive aging.     

Can the Innate Right to Freedom Alone Ground a System of Public and Private Rights?

The state regulates the way in which social power is exercised. It sometimes permits, enables, constrains, forbids how we may touch others, make offers, draw up contracts, use, alter, possess and destroy things that matter to people, manipulate, induce weakness of the will, coerce, engage in physical force, persuade, selectively divulge information, lie, enchant, coax, convince, … In each of these cases, we (sometimes unintentionally) get others to act in ways that serve our interests. Which such exercises of power should the state forbid? Which should it permit? An intuitively appealing way to answer this question is, with Ripstein and Kant, to point to the role of freedom: exercises of social power can be legitimately prohibited when (and only when) they restrict people's freedom. But this raises a further question: How do we identify when such exercises of power make people unfree in the relevant sense? Ripstein, in defending Kant, draws a crucial distinction between actions that subject others’ wills to our choices (and which it would therefore be presumptively legitimate for the state to forbid) and actions that merely affect the contexts in which others act (and which it would therefore be presumptively illegitimate for the state to forbid). I query that distinction, and argue that the idea of independence cannot bear, on its own, the weight it is expected to bear within the Kantian framework.