Why don't we see changes?: The role of attentional bottlenecks and limited visual memory

Seven experiments explore the role of bottlenecks in selective attention and access to visual short-term memory in the failure of observers to identify clearly visible changes in otherwise stable visual displays. Experiment One shows that observers fail to register a color change in an object even if they are cued to the location of the object by a transient at that location as the change is occurring. Experiment Two shows the same for orientation change. In Experiments Three and Four, attention is directed to specific objects prior to making changes in those objects. Observers have only a very limited memory for the status of recently attended items. Experiment Five reveals that observers have no ability to detect changes that happen after attention has been directed to an object and before attention returns to that object. In Experiment Six, attention is cued at rates that more closely resemble natural rates and Experiment Seven uses natural images. Memory capacity remains very small (<4 items).     

“I-ness” and the dissociative process. Working with defensive and creative dissociations in the analytic process

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - We suggest that the analytic dialogue develops as a continuous movement that we call “Dissociative Process”, and that this process is the...     

Searching where the treasure is: on the emergence of human companion animal partnership (HCAP)

Animal Cognition - In our view, the discipline, often referred to as human–animal interaction (HAI), lacks a well-defined conceptual framework. It is too narrow both with respect to the...     

Maximization and Search for Alternatives in Decision Situations With and Without Loss of Options

Maximizing tendency has been associated with greater accumulation of choice alternatives prior to selection of a preference. It is not known whether this search behavior extends to situations in which accumulation of new choice alternatives comes with the potential loss of existing ones. In Study 1, we replicate the original finding of greater accumulation of choice alternatives, using a computer‐based laboratory task. We then provide evidence, in Studies 2 and 3, that when potential loss of existing options is incorporated into the task, maximization is associated with less rather than more search for additional options. Maximization components of decision difficulty and alternative search, but not high standards or satisficing, explain this behavior. Other task measures are also collected, but few maximization‐related differences are observed. The findings support an interpretation of maximizers as decision makers who are as concerned with the potential loss of existing options as with the loss of undiscovered future ones. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hallucinations in the psychotic state: Psychoanalysis and the neurosciences compared

In this contribution, which takes account of important findings in neuroscientific as well as psychoanalytic research, the authors explore the meaning of the deep‐going distortions of psychic functioning occurring in hallucinatory phenomena. Neuroscientific studies have established that hallucinations distort the sense of reality owing to a complex alteration in the balance between top‐down and bottom‐up brain circuits. The present authors postulate that hallucinatory phenomena represent the outcome of a psychotic's distorted use of the mind over an extended period of time. In the hallucinatory state the psychotic part of the personality uses the mind to generate auto‐induced sensations and to achieve a particular sort of regressive pleasure. In these cases, therefore, the mind is not used as an organ of knowledge or as an instrument for fostering relationships with others. The hallucinating psychotic decathects psychic (relational) reality and withdraws into a personal, bodily, and sensory space of his own. The opposing realities are not only external and internal but also psychic and sensory. Visual hallucinations could thus be said to originate from seeing with the ‘eyes’ of the mind, and auditory hallucinations from hearing with the mind's ‘ears’. In these conditions, mental functioning is restricted, cutting out the more mature functions, which are thus no longer able to assign real meaning to the surrounding world and to the subject's psychic experience. The findings of the neurosciences facilitate understanding of how, in the psychotic hallucinatory process, the mind can modify the working of a somatic organ such as the brain.     

Mental Files and Rational Inferences

Abstract

My goal in this paper is to discuss the ‘Fregean’ account of inferences proposed by Recanati in his Mental Files (Oxford University Press, 2012). I raise the following dilemma for the mental files theory. (a) If the premises of certain inferences involve ‘the same file’ in a strict sense of the expression, then files cannot play the role of modes of presentation. (b) If, on the other hand, the files involved in the premises are ‘the same’ only in a loose sense, then the notion of file sameness plays no role in accounting for rational inferences, contra Recanati’s Fregean account.