Neurocognitive mechanisms of individual differences in face cognition: A replication and extension

Face cognition performance is related to individual differences in cognitive subprocesses, as reflected in the amplitudes and latencies of event-related brain potentials (ERPs; Herzmann, Kunina, Sommer, & Wilhelm, 2010). In order to replicate and extend these findings, 110 participants were tested on a comprehensive task battery measuring face cognition abilities and established cognitive abilities, followed by ERP recordings in a face-learning-and-recognition task. We replicated the links of the ERP components indicating the speed of structural face encoding (N170 latency) and access to structural representations in memory (early repetition effect [ERE]/N250r) with the accuracy and speed of face cognition and with established cognitive abilities. As a novel result, we differentiated between the accuracy of face perception and face memory on the behavioral and electrophysiological levels and report a relationship between basic visual processes (P100 amplitude) and face memory. Moreover, the brain–behavior relationships for the ERE/N250r held true, even though we eliminated pictorial and perceptual structural codes from the priming effects by using backward masking of the primes with novel unfamiliar faces. On a methodological level, we demonstrated the utility of the latent difference score modeling technique to parameterize ERP difference components (e.g., ERE/N250r) on a latent level and link them to face cognition abilities.     

Transdiagnostic Implications of Parental Socialization of Child and Adolescent Emotional Development: Commentary and Future Directions

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - This special issue consists of 23 articles focusing on parent socialization of emotion in children and adolescents as a transdiagnostic factor for...     

Correction to: Secret Agent Society: a Randomized Controlled Trial of a Transdiagnostic Youth Social Skills Group Treatment

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology -     

A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory

I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.

     

Your Data are (Not) My Data: The Role of Social Value Orientation in Sharing Data About Others

The personal data consumers share with companies on a daily basis often also involves other people. However, prior research has focused almost exclusively on how consumers make decisions about their own data. In this research, we explore how consumers’ social value orientation impacts their decisions regarding data about others. In contrast to the notion of proselfs as “selfish” decision-makers, across four studies we find that proselfs are less likely than prosocials to share data about others with third parties. We show that this effect arises because proselfs feel less ownership over data they hold about others than prosocials, which in turn reduces their willingness to share it. Overall, this work contributes to literature on social value orientation as well as privacy decision-making and helps marketers and policy makers in designing interdependent privacy choice contexts.     

Adherence, body mass index, and depression in adults with type 2 diabetes: the mediational role of diabetes symptoms and self-efficacy.

OBJECTIVE: Evidence indicates that depression is linked to the development and worsening of diabetes, but the mechanisms underlying this link are not well understood. The authors examined the hypothesis that diabetes-related symptoms mediate the effect of both behavioral adherence and body mass index (BMI) on depression. In addition, they examined whether a prior finding that self-efficacy mediates the effect of behavioral adherence and BMI on depression would replicate with a larger sample size (W. P. Sacco, K. J. Wells, C. A. Vaughan, A. Friedman, S. Perez, & R. Morales, 2005). Also, the relative contributions of diabetes-related symptoms and self-efficacy to depression were evaluated. DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: Cross-sectional design involving adults diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes (N = 99). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The primary outcome measure was depression (Patient Health Questionnaire: Nine Symptom Depression Checklist). Predictors of depression were diet and exercise adherence (Summary of Diabetes Self-Care Activities Questionnaire), diet and exercise self-efficacy (Multidimensional Diabetes Questionnaire), diabetes symptoms (Diabetes Symptom Checklist), and BMI (based on height and weight data from medical records). RESULTS: Path and mediation analyses indicated that adherence and BMI each contributed to depression indirectly, via their effects on self-efficacy and diabetes-related medical symptoms. CONCLUSION: Results provide evidence consistent with two independent pathways by which BMI and adherence could increase depression in people with Type 2 diabetes. The first pathway indicates that the effects of higher BMI and poor adherence on depression are mediated by lower self-efficacy perceptions. The second pathway indicates that the effect of higher BMI on depression is mediated by increased diabetes symptoms.     

Mental Files and Rational Inferences

Abstract

My goal in this paper is to discuss the ‘Fregean’ account of inferences proposed by Recanati in his Mental Files (Oxford University Press, 2012). I raise the following dilemma for the mental files theory. (a) If the premises of certain inferences involve ‘the same file’ in a strict sense of the expression, then files cannot play the role of modes of presentation. (b) If, on the other hand, the files involved in the premises are ‘the same’ only in a loose sense, then the notion of file sameness plays no role in accounting for rational inferences, contra Recanati’s Fregean account.