I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.
The personal data consumers share with companies on a daily basis often also involves other people. However, prior research has focused almost exclusively on how consumers make decisions about their own data. In this research, we explore how consumers’ social value orientation impacts their decisions regarding data about others. In contrast to the notion of proselfs as “selfish” decision-makers, across four studies we find that proselfs are less likely than prosocials to share data about others with third parties. We show that this effect arises because proselfs feel less ownership over data they hold about others than prosocials, which in turn reduces their willingness to share it. Overall, this work contributes to literature on social value orientation as well as privacy decision-making and helps marketers and policy makers in designing interdependent privacy choice contexts. 相似文献
OBJECTIVE: Evidence indicates that depression is linked to the development and worsening of diabetes, but the mechanisms underlying this link are not well understood. The authors examined the hypothesis that diabetes-related symptoms mediate the effect of both behavioral adherence and body mass index (BMI) on depression. In addition, they examined whether a prior finding that self-efficacy mediates the effect of behavioral adherence and BMI on depression would replicate with a larger sample size (W. P. Sacco, K. J. Wells, C. A. Vaughan, A. Friedman, S. Perez, & R. Morales, 2005). Also, the relative contributions of diabetes-related symptoms and self-efficacy to depression were evaluated. DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: Cross-sectional design involving adults diagnosed with Type 2 diabetes (N = 99). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The primary outcome measure was depression (Patient Health Questionnaire: Nine Symptom Depression Checklist). Predictors of depression were diet and exercise adherence (Summary of Diabetes Self-Care Activities Questionnaire), diet and exercise self-efficacy (Multidimensional Diabetes Questionnaire), diabetes symptoms (Diabetes Symptom Checklist), and BMI (based on height and weight data from medical records). RESULTS: Path and mediation analyses indicated that adherence and BMI each contributed to depression indirectly, via their effects on self-efficacy and diabetes-related medical symptoms. CONCLUSION: Results provide evidence consistent with two independent pathways by which BMI and adherence could increase depression in people with Type 2 diabetes. The first pathway indicates that the effects of higher BMI and poor adherence on depression are mediated by lower self-efficacy perceptions. The second pathway indicates that the effect of higher BMI on depression is mediated by increased diabetes symptoms. 相似文献
AbstractMy goal in this paper is to discuss the ‘Fregean’ account of inferences proposed by Recanati in his Mental Files (Oxford University Press, 2012). I raise the following dilemma for the mental files theory. (a) If the premises of certain inferences involve ‘the same file’ in a strict sense of the expression, then files cannot play the role of modes of presentation. (b) If, on the other hand, the files involved in the premises are ‘the same’ only in a loose sense, then the notion of file sameness plays no role in accounting for rational inferences, contra Recanati’s Fregean account. 相似文献
In this contribution, which takes account of important findings in neuroscientific as well as psychoanalytic research, the authors explore the meaning of the deep‐going distortions of psychic functioning occurring in hallucinatory phenomena. Neuroscientific studies have established that hallucinations distort the sense of reality owing to a complex alteration in the balance between top‐down and bottom‐up brain circuits. The present authors postulate that hallucinatory phenomena represent the outcome of a psychotic's distorted use of the mind over an extended period of time. In the hallucinatory state the psychotic part of the personality uses the mind to generate auto‐induced sensations and to achieve a particular sort of regressive pleasure. In these cases, therefore, the mind is not used as an organ of knowledge or as an instrument for fostering relationships with others. The hallucinating psychotic decathects psychic (relational) reality and withdraws into a personal, bodily, and sensory space of his own. The opposing realities are not only external and internal but also psychic and sensory. Visual hallucinations could thus be said to originate from seeing with the ‘eyes’ of the mind, and auditory hallucinations from hearing with the mind's ‘ears’. In these conditions, mental functioning is restricted, cutting out the more mature functions, which are thus no longer able to assign real meaning to the surrounding world and to the subject's psychic experience. The findings of the neurosciences facilitate understanding of how, in the psychotic hallucinatory process, the mind can modify the working of a somatic organ such as the brain. 相似文献